Stahl v. Currey
| Decision Date | 12 April 1939 |
| Docket Number | 27014. |
| Citation | 135 Ohio St. 253,20 N.E.2d 529 |
| Parties | STAHL v. CURREY et al. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court.
1. The office of justice of the peace is a creature of statute.
2. A justice of the peace possesses only such powers as are conferred by statute.
3. Under the procedural provisions of Section 13433-9, General Code, and Section 13433-10, General Code, relating to persons properly charged with a misdemeanor before a justice of the peace, such magistrate is not authorized to render final judgment upon a plea of guilty unless the complaint is made by the injured party.
4. Upon such a plea of guilty when the complaint is not made by the injured party, it is the duty of the magistrate to require the accused to enter into a recognizance to appear before the proper court; and if final judgment be rendered erroneously by the magistrate, he acts in excess of his jurisdiction.
5. Such judgment is voidable but not void, and the magistrate is not civilly liable for his error.
In the Court of Common Pleas the plaintiff Stahl instituted this action for the recovery of damages for false imprisonment allegedly suffered at the hands of the defendant Currey, a justice of the peace, whose surety is also joined as a defendant.
According to the involved and confusing facts in the record, it seems that on February 16, 1934, the plaintiff Stahl was arrested and charged with the offense of operating a motor vehicle upon a public highway while in a state of intoxication, in violation of the provisions of Section 12628-1, General Code [now Section 6296-30(c), General Code]. The next day he entered a plea of guilty before the defendant Currey. Thereafter at the same session of the court he also signed a waiver of trial by jury and a consent to be tried by the court, after which the defendant Currey sentenced him as follows:
He was then released. There was no examination or trial. Subsequently, on March 22, 1934, Stahl was again arrested. This time the following three charges were lodged against him:
1. Violation of 'G. C. 12618 to wit: Displaying license plates that belong to another vehicle.'
2. Violation of
3. Violation of 'G. C. 12628-1 to wit: Driving an automobile during the time he was suspended from such operation.'
To each of these three charges Stahl entered a plea of guilty. Thereafter he also executed both a waiver of trial by jury and a consent to be tried by the court. It seems that no examination or trial was had, but the following entries were made:
Charge No. 1. 'Sentence: $50 fine, $20 costs.
'Com to jail to serve sentence March 23, 1934, to Summit county jail, Akron, Ohio.'
Charge No. 2. 'Conditional sentence: $500 find [sic] not imposed, but fine of $200 given. $100 find [sic] of sentence suspended.
'6 months in jail--second offense.
'If defendant serves entire jail sentence out, this $100 due will be suspended, otherwise in full force.
'Com to jail March 23, 1934.
'Costs suspended if the defendant serves entire sentence in jail.
'Costs $10.40.'
Charge No. 3. 'Sentence: Had been convicted of driving while intoxicated before .
'Costs suspended if defendant serves entire sentence in jail.'
Stahl was then incarcerated in the Summit county jail, where he remained for approximately eleven months until he was released by a writ of habeas corpus granted by the Court of Appeals.
In the instant action the Court of Common Pleas directed a verdict for the defendants at the conclusion of the evidence offered by the plaintiff Stahl.
Upon an appeal on questions of law the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Court of Common Pleas and remanded the case for retrial.
The matter is in this court for review by reason of the allowance of a motion to certify.
Carl M. Myers, of Akron, for appellants.
O. H. Corvington, of Akron, for appellee.
The first question to be considered relates to the requirements of the following two statutes:
Section 13433-9, General Code.
Section 13433-10, General Code.
Was the defendant Currey, as a justice of the peace, thus empowered by these statutes to render final judgment and commit Shahl to jail? Or, to restate the question was the statutory authority of the justice of the peace Currey limited under these circumstances to requiring Stahl to enter into a recognizance to appear before the proper court?
Of course the office of justice of the peace is a creature of statute, and so are the powers thereof. Counsel are therefore correct in assuming that whatever powers were possessed by Currey must be found in the statutes. The plaintiff relies upon that part of Section 13433-9, General Code, which provides that 'if the complaint is not made by the party injured and the accused pleads guilty, the magistrate shall require the accused to enter into a recognizance to appear before the proper court as provided when there is no plea of guilty.' The defendants concede the force of this language but insist that it is modified by the last sentence in Section 13433-10, General Code, to the effect that 'If the offense charged is a misdemeanor, and the accused in a writing subscribed by him and filed before or during the examination, waive a jury and submit to be tried by the magistrate, he may render final judgment.' One difficulty with this contention of the defendants is that this language itself it to the contrary. By its terms Section 13433-9 applies when the accused 'pleads guilty,' while Section 13433-10 controls when 'there is no plea of guilty.' Furthermore, this was pointed out in the opinion in the case of Hanaghan v. State, 51 Ohio St. 24, 36 N.E. 1072, cited and relied upon by both the plaintiff and the defendants. In 51 Ohio St. on page 27, 36 N.E. on page 1073, Judge Williams observes that Then too, a plea of guilty obviates both an examination and a trial in that court, thereby rendering a jury or a waiver thereof wholly useless. Section 13433-10, General Code, provides for such a waiver 'Before or during the examination.' In the instant case there was of course no examination or trial, inasmuch as Stahl had pleaded guilty. Nor is there any evidence or contention that the complaint was made by the party injured.
The three paragraphs of the syllabus in the Hanaghan case, supra, are pertinent, and read as follows:
'1. An examining magistrate is not authorized to pass sentence upon the accused on his plea of guilty of a misdemeanor, except when the complaint is made by the party injured.
'2. By 'the party injured,' as that phrase is used in section 7146, of the Revised Statutes, is meant the person who suffers some particular injury from the commission of the misdemeanor, as distinguished from that which results to the public or local community where it was committed.
The defendants contend that impliedly this court would...
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