Stahl v. Lee

Decision Date06 May 1905
Docket Number14,313
Citation71 Kan. 511,80 P. 983
PartiesFRANK M. STAHL v. E. S. LEE
CourtKansas Supreme Court

Decided January, 1905. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Error from Shawnee district court; Z. T. HAZEN, judge.

STATEMENT.

THE plaintiff brought replevin to recover certain intoxicating liquors alleged to have been wrongfully taken from his possession and detained by the defendant. There was no redelivery bond given and the property remained in the possession of the plaintiff. The defendant answered the petition as follows:

"(1) That the personal property taken on the writ of replevin herein consisted of intoxicating liquors and other property which said plaintiff was keeping and using in violation of law, and was, at the time of the issuance and service of said writ, in custodia legis, the same being in the possession of the defendant, Frank M. Stahl, who was at the time, and still is, the legally qualified and acting chief of police of the city of Topeka, pursuant to the issuance and service of a valid search-and-seizure warrant under the ordinances of the city of Topeka, in a criminal prosecution against said plaintiff for a violation of ordinance No. 2211, being an ordinance to prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors, and to prohibit and suppress the keeping of places where intoxicating liquors are sold and used, except for lawful purposes, and the said plaintiff had no legal right to take said property in said replevin suit, and was and is not entitled to the possession thereof, and has no legal right to maintain said replevin suit.

"(2) And for further answer and defense to said petition said defendant refers to his first defense herein and makes the same a part of this defense as fully as if the same were set out in detail, and, in addition thereto, says that said plaintiff had no legal right to commence and maintain said replevin suit, and now has no legal right to maintain the same, for the reason that sections 7, 8 and 9 of said ordinance No. 2211, under which the plaintiff was arrested provides fully how the right and title to the property in controversy shall be tried and determined in the police court of said city, and the said plaintiff, prior to the time that proceedings under sections 7, 8 and 9 could be instituted to determine the right and title to said property, commenced this replevin suit and thereby prevented the institution of such proceedings to determine the right and title to said property; that said sections 7, 8 and 9 of said ordinance No. 2211 are as follow:

"'SEC. 7. Upon the filing with the police judge of a complaint under oath charging that a place is kept or maintained as a common nuisance by any person or persons, and that intoxicating liquors, bottles, kegs, pumps, bars or other property are kept or used therein in keeping and maintaining such place as a common nuisance, a warrant shall be issued commanding the officer to whom it is directed to arrest the person or persons charged or described as the keeper or keepers thereof, to search the place described in such complaint, and seize and take into his custody all intoxicating liquors, bottles, pumps, glasses, kegs, bars and other property described in said complaint which he may find at such place, and safely keep the same subject to the order of the court. The complaint shall describe the place to be searched with sufficient particularity to identify the same, and shall describe the intoxicating liquors or other property alleged to be used in maintaining the same as particularly as practicable; but any description, however general, that will enable the officer executing the warrant to identify the property to be seized shall be deemed sufficient. Upon the return of the warrant the court shall proceed as in other cases against the person or persons arrested and the liquor seized.

"'SEC 8. Whenever any intoxicating liquors or other property shall be seized under such a warrant, whether an arrest has been made or not, the police judge shall issue a notice within forty-eight hours after the return of the warrant, directed to the defendant in such action, and to all persons claiming any interest in the intoxicating liquors or other property, fixing the time and place at which all persons claiming any interest therein may appear and answer the complaint made against such intoxicating liquors or other property, and show cause, if any they have, why the same should not be adjudged forfeited and ordered destroyed. The notice shall be served upon the defendant or defendants in the action in the same manner as a summons, if they be found within the jurisdiction of the police judge, and a copy thereof shall also be posted in a conspicuous position on the place where such property was seized. If at the time for filing answer said notice has not been duly served, or other sufficient cause appear, the time for answering may be by the court extended, and such other notice issued as will supply any defect in the previous notice, and give reasonable time and opportunity for all persons interested to appear and answer. At or before the time fixed by notice any person claiming an interest in the intoxicating liquors or other property seized may file his answer in writing, setting up his claim thereto, and shall thereupon be admitted as a party defendant to the proceedings against such liquor or other property. The complaint and any answer or answers that may be filed shall be the only pleadings required; and at the time fixed for answer, or at any other time then to be fixed by the court, a trial shall be had in a summary manner before the court of the allegations of the complaint against the liquors, or other property seized; and whether any answer shall be filed or not, it shall be the duty of the city attorney to appear and adduce evidence in support of such allegations.

"'SEC. 9. If the court shall find that said intoxicating liquors or other property, or any part thereof, were, at the time the complaint was filed, being used in maintaining a common nuisance, he shall adjudge forfeited so much thereof as he shall find was being so used, and shall order the officer in whose custody it is to publicly destroy the same; so much of said intoxicating liquor or other property as the court shall not find to have been used in maintaining a common nuisance he shall order returned by the officer in whose custody it is to the place, as nearly as may be, from which it was taken, or delivered to the person establishing his claim to the same. If the court shall find that any of the liquors or other property was at the time the complaint was filed being used in maintaining a common nuisance, and shall also find that it was being so used by any person served with the notice provided for in the previous section of this ordinance, or by any person filing an answer, as in said section provided, or that it was then owned by any such person, and by him knowingly allowed to be so used, the court shall render judgment against such person for the costs of the proceedings against the intoxicating liquors or other property so used or owned by him. If the court shall not find that any of said intoxicating liquors or other property seized was, at the time the complaint was filed, being used in maintaining a common nuisance, or shall not find that any of it was being so used or so owned and allowed to be used, by any person served with the notice aforesaid, or voluntarily becoming a party as aforesaid, the costs of the proceedings against such property shall be paid as in other criminal cases. Either the city or any defendant or other person claiming the property seized may appeal from the judgment of the police judge in any such special proceeding against property seized. Any claimant of such property who appeals must, within ten days, enter into an undertaking with two or more sureties to the city of Topeka, to be approved by the police judge, in a sum of not less than one hundred dollars, nor less than double the costs adjudged against him, conditioned that he will prosecute his appeal without unnecessary delay, and that, if judgment be rendered against him on appeal, he will satisfy the judgment and costs. No bond shall be required for an appeal by the city, and such appeal shall stay the execution of the judgment.'

"Wherefore, said defendant prays for a return of said property to said defendant, or judgment for the value thereof, and for costs."

To this answer a demurrer was sustained and judgment rendered for plaintiff for costs.

Sections 7, 8 and 9 of the ordinance...

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4 cases
  • Chapman v. Boynton
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — District of Kansas
    • 13 mai 1933
    ...violator, see State v. Shiffler, 93 Kan. 618, 144 P. 845; section held valid, City of Wilson v. Herink, 64 Kan. 607, 68 P. 72; Stahl v. Lee, 71 Kan. 511, 80 P. 983; penalties imposed by city must conform to state law, Assaria v. Wells, 68 Kan. 787, 75 P. 1026; city may prosecute suit to enj......
  • White Eagle Oil Co. v. Gunderson
    • United States
    • South Dakota Supreme Court
    • 28 octobre 1925
  • City of Fort Scott v. Arbuckle
    • United States
    • Kansas Supreme Court
    • 10 juillet 1948
    ... ... had a right to appeal by filing an appearance bond. We then ... distinguished some authorities relied on by petitioner and ... placed the affirmance of the lower court's judgment on ... what we held in In re Kinsel, supra, about the right to an ... unclogged appeal ... Stahl ... v. Lee, 71 Kan. 511, 80 P. 983, 987, was a replevin ... action for liquor which had been seized by the chief of ... police in a raid. The contention was made that the statute ... conferring authority on cities to provide by ordinance for ... the seizure and destruction of liquor and in ... ...
  • Enloe v. Lawson
    • United States
    • Oregon Supreme Court
    • 10 avril 1934
    ... ... as the proceeding is one in rem as to the liquors, regardless ... of whether there has been an arrest or conviction of the ... person charged with maintaining such place-citing State ... v. McManus, 65 Kan. 720, 70 P. 700; Stahl v ... Lee, 71 Kan. 511, 80 P. 983. At page 891 of 8 A. L. R., ... we find, in Landers v. Com., 126 Va. 780, 101 S.E ... 778, the court said: "It must be borne in mind that this ... is a proceeding in rem, and that personal service of notice ... is not necessary to ... ...

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