Stahmer v. State, 39305

Decision Date06 June 1974
Docket NumberNo. 39305,39305
Citation218 N.W.2d 893,192 Neb. 63
PartiesDavid STAHMER et al., Appellants, v. The STATE of Nebraska and the State Board of Equalization and Assessment of the State of Nebraska et al., Appellees.
CourtNebraska Supreme Court

Syllabus by the Court

1. Sections 77--202.25 to 77--202.33, R.R.Supp., 1972, do not constitute an appropriation of state funds and are not violative of Article II, section 1, Article III, section 22, or Article III, section 25, Constitution of the State of Nebraska.

2. It is the duty of this court to give the statute an interpretation which meets constitutional requirements if it can reasonably be done.

3. Legislative construction of a statutory or constitutional provision, although not conclusive on the courts, when deliberately made is entitled to great weight.

4. The Legislature may classify personal property in such manner as it sees fit, and may exempt any of such classes, or may exempt all personal property from taxation.

5. When general and special provisions of a state Constitution are in conflict, the special provisions should be given effect to the extent of their scope, leaving the general provisions to control when the special provisions do not apply.

6. It is competent for the Legislature to classify for purposes of legislation, if the classification rests on some reason of public policy, some substantial difference of situation or circumstance, that would naturally suggest the justice or expediency of diverse legislation with respect to the objects to be classified.

7. The partial exemption from taxation of the classes of property specified in section 77--202.25, R.R.Supp.1972, are not unreasonable, constitutionally objectionable as discriminatory, or violative of Article III, section 18, Article VIII, sections 1, 2, or 4, Constitution of the State of Nebraska.

James M. Kelley, Kelley & Thorough, Lincoln, for appellants.

Clarence A. H. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Ralph H. Gillan, Asst. Atty. Gen., Floyd A. Sterns, Lincoln, for appellees.

Heard before SPENCER, BOSLAUGH, McCOWN, NEWTON, CLINTON and BRODKEY, JJ., and VAN PELT, District Judge.

NEWTON, Justice.

Plaintiffs seek a declaratory judgment ruling sections 77--202.25 to 77--202.33, R.S.Supp., 1972, to be unconstitutional. Commencing with the 1972 tax levies, 12 1/2 percent of the actual value of agricultural income-producing machinery and equipment (except motor vehicles, property assessed by the State Board of Equalization, property of public service companies, and buildings), business inventories, livestock, feed, fertilizer, and farm inventories, grain and seed, poultry, fish, honeybees, and furbearing animals was exempted from taxation. The exemption was increased by 12 1/2 percent each year in each of the succeeding 4 years. The State Treasurer was directed to place sufficient revenue from sales and income taxes, each year, in a Personal Property Tax Relief Fund to reimburse tax agencies in all counties for tax revenue lost by reason of the exemptions. On certification by the counties of revenue lost, the State Treasurer was directed to transfer the funds in the Personal Property Tax Relief Fund to the county treasurers each year. The county treasurers are directed to retain 1 percent of the money each receives and to distribute the rest among the various taxing agencies within each county. Plaintiffs' action was dismissed in the District Court.

The Constitution, State of Nebraska, provides in Article II, section 1, for the distribution of powers among the three branches of government and prohibits the delegation of its powers by one branch to another. Article III, section 22, prior to amendment in 1972, conferred upon each Legislature the power and duty to make appropriations for governmental expenses until the expiration of the first fiscal quarter after the adjournment of the next regular session, at which time all appropriations should end. Article III, section 25, forbids the withdrawal of money from the state treasury except pursuant to a specific appropriation and on presentation of a warrant issued as the Legislature shall direct. It is contended that the act delegates the legislative power to appropriate state funds to county officers certifying lost tax revenue. It must be borne in mind that the property partially exempted from taxation is assessed in the regular time-honored manner, the same as other property subject to taxation. The ascertainment of the amount of revenue lost by taxing agencies in each county is simply a matter of mathematical computation. No discretion is vested in any county officer. The revenue thus found to be lost is certified to the State Treasurer. It is a ministerial function. It is not an appropriation of state funds but provides only a basis for the determination by the proper state authority of the appropriation to be made to reimburse the counties.

It is urged that the act provides for a continuing appropriation of state funds and is in violation of Article III, section 22, Constitution, as worded prior to its 1972 amendment, in that the appropriations extend beyond the end of the first fiscal quarter after the adjournment of the next regular legislative session. Also, that it violates Article III, section 25, in that it permits the withdrawal of state funds without a specific appropriation. The act does direct the State Treasurer to annually transfer tax funds to the Personal Property Tax Relief Fund and directs how the fund shall be expended. It is evident that the directions given are intended to remain in effect through ensuing years but the basic question is whether or not this is an appropriation bill or act. If it is, the act may well be unconstitutional. In construing the act, it is the duty of this court to give the statute an interpretation which meets constitutional requirements if it can reasonably be done. See Heywood v. Brainard, 181 Neb. 294, 147 N.W.2d 772. Another applicable rule is that: 'Legislative construction of a statutory or constitutional provision, although not conclusive on the courts, when deliberately made is entitled to great weight.' Dwyer v. Omaha-Douglas Public Building Commission, 188 Neb. 30, 195 N.W.2d 236. Laws 1973, L.B. 583, § 19, p. 1528, specifically appropriates the Personal Property Tax Relief Fund, as does Laws 1974, L.B. 997, § 66. It is evident that the Legislature did not intend or consider the statutes to be an appropriation measure. The situation is somewhat akin to that existing in Rein v. Johnson, 149 Neb. 67, 30 N.W.2d 548, involving section 68--301, R.S. 1943, which provided: 'A fund to be known as the 'State Assistance Fund' is created and established in the treasury of the State of Nebraska. There is specifically and absolutely appropriated for said fund and the purposes of sections 68--301 to 68--325, all moneys available therefor from motor fuel taxes, alcoholic liquor taxes, head taxes, and such other taxes as may be provided by law.' The court stated in the above case: 'It is equally as apparent, however, from the legislative history heretofore recited, that the Legislature never intended that it should operate as an appropriation in the constitutionally prescribed sense. Rather, the word 'appropriated' as used therein was of constitutional necessity as well as legislative intent, used only to indicate that certain public revenue derived or to be derived from certain described tax revenue sources should be paid into the state treasury, there to be administratively credited, assigned, or allocated to the State Assistance Fund for assistance purposes as distinguished from other public funds of a different nomenclature.' We conclude that the act is not in violation of any of the constitutional provisions above mentioned.

Plaintiffs also urge that the statutes are violative of Article III, section 18, and Article VIII, sections 1, 2, and 4, Constitution, in that...

To continue reading

Request your trial
11 cases
  • MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline, Inc. v. State Bd. of Equalization and Assessment
    • United States
    • Nebraska Supreme Court
    • July 10, 1991
    ...treatment under § 306(1)(d) of the Railroad Revitalization and Regulatory Reform Act of 1976. 13. Case Overruled. Stahmer v. State, 192 Neb. 63, 218 N.W.2d 893 (1974), is 14. Constitutional Law: Statutes: Appeal and Error. Although the parties ordinarily must raise constitutional issues bef......
  • Natural Gas Pipeline Co. of America v. State Bd. of Equalization and Assessment
    • United States
    • Nebraska Supreme Court
    • March 1, 1991
    ...organizations, which property is used for those purposes, must be taxed or no property may be taxed. This court in Stahmer v. State, 192 Neb. 63, 218 N.W.2d 893 (1974), wrongfully justified the partial exemption from taxation of an entire class of personal property, agricultural machinery, ......
  • Jaksha v. State
    • United States
    • Nebraska Supreme Court
    • July 24, 1992
    ...to come from funds generated by the sales This court upheld the 1972 exemptions against a constitutional challenge in Stahmer v. State, 192 Neb. 63, 218 N.W.2d 893 (1974), overruled, MAPCO Ammonia Pipeline v. State Bd. of Equal., 238 Neb. 565, 471 N.W.2d 734 (1991). In so doing, the court r......
  • State v. Harig
    • United States
    • Nebraska Supreme Court
    • June 6, 1974
  • Request a trial to view additional results
83 provisions
  • § VIII-1. Revenue; Raised By Taxation; Legislative Powers
    • United States
    • Constitution of the State of Nebraska 2007 Edition Article VIII. Revenue
    • January 1, 2007
    ...of property specified in section 77-202.25, is not unreasonable, objectionable as discriminatory, or violative hereof. Stahmer v. State, 192 Neb. 63, 218 N.W.2d 893 (1974). Revenue from sale of water and gas by metropolitan utilities district not taxes. Evans v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist.......
  • Neb. Const. art. VIII § VIII-1 Revenue; Raised By Taxation; Legislative Powers
    • United States
    • Constitution of the State of Nebraska 2022 Edition Article VIII
    • January 1, 2022
    ...of property specified in section 77-202.25, is not unreasonable, objectionable as discriminatory, or violative hereof. Stahmer v. State, 192 Neb. 63, 218 N.W.2d 893 Revenue from sale of water and gas by metropolitan utilities district not taxes. Evans v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 187 Ne......
  • Neb. Const. art. VIII § VIII-1 Revenue; Raised By Taxation; Legislative Powers
    • United States
    • Constitution of the State of Nebraska 2017 Edition Article VIII
    • January 1, 2017
    ...of property specified in section 77-202.25, is not unreasonable, objectionable as discriminatory, or violative hereof. Stahmer v. State, 192 Neb. 63, 218 N.W.2d 893 Revenue from sale of water and gas by metropolitan utilities district not taxes. Evans v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 187 Ne......
  • Neb. Const. art. VIII § VIII-1 Revenue; Raised By Taxation; Legislative Powers
    • United States
    • Constitution of the State of Nebraska 2019 Edition Article VIII
    • January 1, 2019
    ...of property specified in section 77-202.25, is not unreasonable, objectionable as discriminatory, or violative hereof. Stahmer v. State, 192 Neb. 63, 218 N.W.2d 893 Revenue from sale of water and gas by metropolitan utilities district not taxes. Evans v. Metropolitan Utilities Dist., 187 Ne......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT