Stainback v. Mabus
| Decision Date | 02 December 2009 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 06-856 (RBW). |
| Citation | 671 F.Supp.2d 126 |
| Parties | Matthew K. STAINBACK, Plaintiff, v. Ray MABUS, Secretary of the Navy,<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL> Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Columbia |
Eugene R. Fidell, Matthew Sidney Freedus, Feldesman Tucker Leifer & Fidell, LLP, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
Heather D. Graham-Oliver, U.S. Attorney's Office, Washington, DC, for Defendant.
The plaintiff, a former midshipman at the United States Naval Academy ("the Academy"), filed this action seeking judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-06 (2006) ("APA"), of a decision made on behalf of the Secretary of the Navy ("the Secretary")2 to uphold a recommendation by the Academy's Academic Board ("the Board") to terminate the plaintiff's enrollment from the Academy and discharge him from the United States Naval Service pursuant to 10 U.S.C. § 6962 (2006). Amended Complaint ("Am. Compl.") ¶ 1. The plaintiff also seeks to prevent the Academy from recouping the cost of his education at the Academy based on his disenrollment. Id. Currently before the Court are the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment.3 For the reasons set for below, the plaintiff's motion must be granted in part and denied in part, and the case remanded to the Secretary for further action consistent with this opinion.
United States Naval Academy Instruction ("the Academy Instruction" or "Acad. Instr.") 5420.24E sets forth the policies and procedures governing the Board, its constitution, and the standards and procedures it must comply with when making academic disenrollment recommendations to the Secretary. A.R. at 00469-84 (Acad. Instr. 5420.24E (1996)). Article II.A.1. of the Academy Instruction designates the Dean of Admissions as a staff member of the Board and details his or her responsibilities as follows:
The Dean of Admissions will be the Secretary of the Academic Board and will:
a. Prepare the Board agenda and make sure that supporting documents are available to the members b. Advise the members and others concerned as to the place and time of the meeting.
c. Prepare the minutes of the meeting.
d. Maintain the Academic Board files.
A.R. at 00472. Article III.J. of the Academy Instruction requires that the Board "[a]ct on all cases of academic deficiency," and further provides that "[u]nless the Academic Board recommends otherwise, midshipmen found deficient will be discharged from the Naval Academy and from the naval service." A.R. at 00474. Article IV.A.1. delineates what constitutes "[a]cademic [d]efficiency," A.R. at 00475-77, and subsection B of this Article defines what amounts to "[i]nsufficient [a]ptitude" and how this determination shall be made by the Board, A.R. at 00477-78. Specifically, Article IV.B.1. states that "[m]idshipmen are subject to discharge when the Commandant of Midshipmen recommends to the Academic Board that they be assigned an `F' in military performance and discharged for insufficient aptitude." Id. at 00477. Article IV.B.2. further provides that in making an insufficient aptitude determination, the Board "will examine the entire record forwarded by the Commandant of Midshipmen, and such other evidence as the midshipman concerned desires to present to the Board or the Board desires to hear." Id. at 00477-78. Article V.A.1.c. also obligates the Board members to "discuss the information contained in the [midshipman's] record as a part of their review." Id. at 00478. Finally, a vote to discharge a midshipman must be "unanimously approved by the Board." Id.
In April 2004, shortly before the plaintiff's anticipated graduation from the Academy, the "Board voted, over [the plaintiff's] objection, that he `possessed insufficient aptitude to become a commissioned officer in the naval service,'" citing his "aptitude remediation failure." Am. Compl. ¶¶ 8-9. The plaintiff objected to the Board's decision on the ground that the Board's conclusion was erroneous given that any alleged aptitude failure was cured in January 2004 by the plaintiff's successful completion of "an aptitude remediation program." Id. ¶¶ 6-7. Following the Board's vote and rejection of the plaintiff's position, on August 10, 2004, the Assistant Secretary affirmed the Board's recommendation on behalf of the Secretary, and ordered the Academy to recoup from the plaintiff the cost of his education. A.R. at 00427 (). After his initial affirmance of the Board's recommendation, the Assistant Secretary received from the plaintiff a memorandum contesting some of the representations made before the Board, which the Assistant Secretary reviewed before reaffirming his disenrollment and recoupment decisions on October 19, 2004. A.R. at 00445 (Oct. 19, 2004 Letter from William A. Navas, Jr., to Mr. Eugene R. Fidell).
Citing a number of ways that the Board, and then ultimately the Secretary through his delegation to the Assistant Secretary, failed to abide by the Academy's regulations and therefore violated the APA— including claims that the Board was improperly constituted, failed to afford the plaintiff notice and an opportunity to respond to all adverse information before it, and that both the Board and the Assistant Secretary considered an inaccurate or incomplete academic record—the plaintiff filed this action challenging the legitimacy of the Board's decision to disenroll him, as well as the Assistant Secretary's subsequent affirmance of that decision, and the corollary decision to require the plaintiff to reimburse the Academy for the cost of his education. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 10-25, 27. The Secretary defends the recommendation of the Board, the affirmance of the recommendation by the Assistant Secretary, and the overall soundness of the process that resulted in the plaintiff's disenrollment. Both parties have now moved for summary judgment.
To grant a motion for summary judgment under Rule 56(c), this Court must find that "the pleadings, the discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). When ruling on a motion for summary judgment, the Court must view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Bayer v. U.S. Dep't of the Treasury, 956 F.2d 330, 333 (D.C.Cir.1992). However, the non-moving party cannot rely on "mere allegations or denials ..., but ... must set forth specific facts showing that there [are] ... genuine issue[s] for trial." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). In addition, the non-moving party cannot rely upon inadmissible evidence to survive summary judgment; rather, the "non-moving party must `produce evidence ... capable of being converted into admissible evidence.'" Greer v. Paulson, 505 F.3d 1306, 1315 (D.C.Cir.2007) (alteration in original) (quoting Gleklen v. Democratic Cong. Campaign Comm., Inc., 199 F.3d 1365, 1369 (D.C.Cir.2000)). Under Rule 56(c), if a party fails to "establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial," summary judgment is warranted. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). However, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of establishing the absence of evidence that supports the non-moving party's case. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
When reviewing an administrative decision under APA, the Court must determine whether the administrative decision was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law" or "unsupported by substantial evidence." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E). "In reviewing the action of the [Secretary], the Court must be thorough and probing, but if the Court finds support for the agency action, it must step back and refrain from assessing the wisdom of the decision unless there has been `a clear error of judgment.'" Fund for Animals v. Babbitt, 903 F.Supp. 96, 105 (D.D.C. 1995) (quoting Marsh v. Ore. Natural Res. Council, 490 U.S. 360, 378, 109 S.Ct. 1851, 104 L.Ed.2d 377 (1989)). As part of its factual inquiry into the agency action, "the reviewing court `must consider whether the decision was based on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear error of judgment.'" Marsh, 490 U.S. at 378, 109 S.Ct. 1851 (quoting Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416, 91 S.Ct. 814, 28 L.Ed.2d 136 (1971)). "It is a fundamental principle of administrative law that an agency is bound to adhere to its own regulations." Fuller v. Winter, 538 F.Supp.2d 179, 186 (D.D.C.2008) (citing Frizelle v. Slater, 111 F.3d 172, 177 (D.C.Cir.1997)). The Court must also "recognize the agency's expertise and experience with respect to questions involving scientific or technical matters or policy decisions based on uncertain technical information." Fund for Animals, 903 F.Supp. at 105 (citing Marsh, 490 U.S. at 375-78, 109 S.Ct. 1851; New York v. Reilly, 969 F.2d 1147, 1150-51 (D.C.Cir.1992)). And if an agency's decision is one possible interpretation among many, regardless whether it is the best of most logical decision, the Court must defer to the agency. Nat'l Trust for Historic Pres. v. Dole, 828 F.2d 776, 782 (D.C.Cir.1987).
The plaintiff makes six arguments for why the Assistant Secretary's affirmance of the Board's decision was "arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law" or "unsupported by substantial evidence" in violation of the ADA, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (E): (1) the record before the Board was incomplete and...
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