Staley v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 14 December 1977
• Citation: 380 A.2d 515,33 Pa.Cmwlth. 22
• Parties: Joseph STALEY, Plaintiff, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Ernest Patton, Warden of the State CorrectionalInstitution, Camp Hill, Pennsylvania and William B. Robinson, Director ofCorrections, Department of Justice, Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, Defendants.
• Court: Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court

380 A.2d 515

33 Pa.Cmwlth. 22

Joseph STALEY, Plaintiff, v. COMMONWEALTH of Pennsylvania, Ernest Patton, Warden of the

State CorrectionalInstitution, Camp Hill, Pennsylvania and William B. Robinson, Director ofCorrections, Department of Justice, Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, Defendants.

Commonwealth Court of Pennsylvania.

December 14, 1977

Argued June 10, 1977.

Anne Lazarus, Bertram M. Felgoise Philadelphia, for plaintiff.

Glen F. Gilman, Lucas E. Phillips, Jr., Deputy Attys. Gen Harrisburg, for Com.

Edwin L. Scherlis, Joseph Goldberg, Frank, Margolis, Edelstein &amp Scherlis, Philadelphia, for Patton & Robinson.

Before CRUMLISH, Jr., KRAMER and BLATT, JJ.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

We have before us Defendants' preliminary objections ^[1] to an action brought by Joseph Staley against the Commonwealth, Ernest Patton, Warden of the State Correctional Institution, Camp Hill, Pennsylvania, and William B. Robinson, Director of Corrections of the Commonwealth, for personal injuries allegedly suffered by him when he fell on the premises of the State Correctional Institution in Camp Hill, Pennsylvania. The Commonwealth and individual Defendants have raised the defense of sovereign immunity.

It is settled beyond question that, under the present state of the law in Pennsylvania, the Commonwealth is immune from suit in trespass. Reinert v. Department of Transportation, 26 Pa.Cmwlth. 283, 363 A.2d 1337 (1976).

With respect to the individual Defendants, our inquiry is divided into two steps. First, we must determine whether each individual is an officer of the Commonwealth, since Section 401 of the Appellate Court Jurisdiction Act of 1970, ^[2] 17 P.S § 211.401, gives us jurisdiction over "all civil actions or proceedings against the Commonwealth or any officer thereof, acting in his official capacity . . . ." Opie v. Glascow, Inc., 30 Pa.Cmwlth. 555, 375 A.2d 396 (1977). If a defendant is an officer, we may then rule on the question of his immunity; if he is not, we lack the power to so rule, Schroeck v. Pennsylvania State Police, 26 Pa.Cmwlth. 41, 362 A.2d 486 (1976), and must transfer the question to the court of competent jurisdiction. In Opie, supra, 30 Pa.Cmwlth. at 558, 375 A.2d at 398, we defined "officer" as follows:

" '(O)fficers', for jurisdictional purposes, should encompass only those persons who perform state-wide policymaking functions and who are charged with the responsibility for independent initiation of administrative policy regarding some sovereign function of state government. We do not believe that it was the intent of the General Assembly to give this Court original jurisdiction over cases where local courts can much more conveniently and properly make the determination as to the liability of state employees who function on an essentially local or regional basis, any more than we believe that the General Assembly intended to give this Court original jurisdiction regarding employees performing subordinate ministerial functions."

In applying this standard to the subject Defendants, we conclude that the Commonwealth's Director of Corrections is an officer of the Commonwealth and hence within our jurisdiction. Since we have recently held that all officers of the Commonwealth are high public officials and, as such, are entitled to absolute immunity, Fischer v. Kassab, 32 Pa.Cmwlth. 581, 380 A.2d 926 (filed December 5, 1977), we sustain the preliminary objections of Defendant William B. Robinson and dismiss the complaint as to him.

It is equally clear to us that the Warden of a state correctional institution is not charged with statewide policy-making responsibilities, and that he therefore is not an "officer" for purposes of our jurisdiction. Since we have no subject-matter jurisdiction over this Defendant, we must transfer the action to the Court of Common Pleas of Cumberland County for that court's determination of the immunity issue. Opie v. Glascow, Inc., supra; Fischer v. Kassab, supra.

ORDER

AND...