Staley v. Illinois Cent. R. Co.

• Citation: 268 Ill. 356,109 N.E. 342
• Decision Date: 24 June 1915
• Docket Number: No. 9752.,9752.
• Parties: STALEY v. ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO.
• Court: Supreme Court of Illinois

268 Ill. 356

109 N.E. 342

STALEY

v.ILLINOIS CENT. R. CO.

No. 9752.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

June 24, 1915.

Error to Appellate Court, Fourth District, on Appeal from Circuit Court, Marion County; Thomas M. Jett, Judge.

Proceedings under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Laura Staley against the Illinois Central Railroad Company. A judgment for plaintiff was reversed by the Appellate Court (186 Ill. App. 593), and plaintiff brings certiorari. Judgments of Appellate and circuit courts reversed, and cause remanded.

Frank F. Noleman and June C. Smith, both of Centralia, for plaintiff in error.

W. W. Barr and C. E. Feirich, both of Carbondale, and Kagy & Vandervort, of Salem (Blewett Lee and W. S. Horton, both of Chicago, of counsel), for defendant in error.

CARTER, J.

This a proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Law of this state (Laws of 1911, p. 315), commenced by petition filed by plaintiff in error in the circuit court of Marion county for compensation for the death of her husband, who was run over and killed by one of defendant in error's switch engines in its yards near Centralia, Ill. The defendant in error was served with notice, and, after certain motions had been made, filed an amended answer, werein it set up that the cause stated in the petition was not comprehended within the meaning of said Workmen's Compensation Act but was within the scope and meaning of the federal Employer's Liability Act. The trial court found in favor of plaintiff in error and entered judgment in her favor for $3,500, payable in a lump sum. From this judgment defendant in error appealed to the Appellate Court. That court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, except that it was held that under the Workmen's Compensation Act it should not be for the full amount of $3,500, but should have been commuted at its present value. Plaintiff in error thereupon brought the cause to this court by petition for certiorari.

Several questions are raised and argued in the briefs. It is first necessary to consider and decide the question whether there can be a recovery in this cause under the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act, so called, or whether the cause is comprehended within the meaning and scope of the federal Employers' Liability Act and recovery can only be had under this last-named law. If the position of defendant in error on this point, raised by filing cross-errors in this court, is sustained, it will be unnecessary to consider the other questions involved.

Counsel for defendant in error insist in their amended answer that plaintiff in error's intestate was engaged, at the time of his fatal injury, in interstate commerce, and that therefore the federal Employers' Liability Act controls, superseding all state laws on the subject. The evidence showed that the deceased was working, on the day of the injury, March 28, 1913, in defendant in error's switch or terminal yards near Centralia, Ill., as a machinist; his duty being to repair the switch engines in the yards. He was sent by his superior officer to repair the whistle-rod on an engine engaged in switching and handling interstate commerce. As he went down a switch track, he saw the engine coming toward him and stepped out of its way onto another track immediately in front of another moving engine, by which he was knocked down and killed instantly. The last-named engine was also engaged in switching all classes of freight, interstate as well as intrastate. Counsel for defendant in error contend, and counsel for plaintiff in error concede, that the deceased was at the time of the accident engaged in interstate commerce. On the evidence as presented in the record before us no other conclusion can be reached under the holdings of the United States Supreme Court. Pedersen v. Delaware, Lackawanna & Western R. Co., 229 U. S. 146, 33 Sup. Ct. 648, 57 L. Ed. 1125, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 153;St. Louis, San Francisco & Texas Ry. Co. v. Seale, 229 U. S. 156, 33 Sup. Ct. 651, 57 L. Ed. 1129, Ann. Cas. 1914C, 156;Missouri, Kansas & Texas R. Co. v. United States, 231 U. S. 112, 34 Sup. Ct. 26, 58 L. Ed. 144. The federal Employers' Liability Act will therefore control if it covers the identical subject-matter or the same field as that covered by the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act.

[4] Counsel argue at length as to whether the Workmen's Compensation Act imposes a direct burden upon interstate commerce. In our judgment that is not the decisive question here. The general principles governing the exercise of federal authority, when interstate commerce is affected, have been firmly established by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court. The power of Congress to regulate commerce among the several states is supreme and plenary under the Constitution. The reservation to the states to legislate on questions affecting interstate commerce is only of that authority which is consistent with and not opposed to the grant of Congress, which extends to every instrumentality or agency by which interstate commerce may be carried on. The decisions hold that with respect to certain subjects embraced within the grant of the Constitution which are of such a nature as to demand that if regulated at all their regulation should be prescribed by a single authority the power of Congress is exclusive, while in other matters admitting of diversity of treatment, according to the special requirements of local conditions, ‘the states may act within their respective jurisdictions until Congress sees fit to act; and, when Congress does act, the exercise of its authority overrides all conflicting state legislation.’ Simpson v. Shepard, 230 U. S. 352, 33 Sup. Ct. 729, 57 L. Ed. 1511, 48 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1151. The doctrine that the states cannot, under any guise, impose direct burdens upon interstate commerce forms the basis of the foregoing classification. Within certain limitations there remains to the states, until Congress acts, a wide range for the exercise of the power appropriate to territorial jurisdiction although interstate commerce may be affected. Included within these limitations are those matters of a local nature as to which it is impossible to derive from the constitutional provisions an intention that they should go uncontrolled pending federal legislation. It is therefore ‘competent for a state to govern its internal commerce, to provide local improvements, to create and regulate local facilities, to adopt protective measures of a reasonable character in the interest of the health, safety, morals, and welfare of its people, although interstate commerce may incidentally or indirectly be involved.’ Simpson v. Shepard, supra, 230 U. S. on page 402, 33 Sup. Ct. on page 741 (57 L. Ed. 1511, 48 L. R. A. [N. S.] 1151). It is unnecessary for us to refer to or discuss the various decisionstouching this question. Many of them are referred to and considered and these general doctrines discussed at length in the case from which we have just quoted. The question in the case before us is not whether the deceased was engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the accident, for that is conceded. Neither is it necessarily the question whether the Workmen's Compensation Act affected directly and substantially an instrument of commerce. The argument of counsel for plaintiff in error that the Workmen's Compensation Act affects the employé ‘solely as a member of society and not as an instrument of society,’ and is therefore within the police power of the state, cannot be sustained if Congress has by legislation acted on the ‘subject-matter’ or the ‘particular subject’ or in the ‘same field’ (as those terms are understood in the decisions) as that covered by the Illinois Workmen's Compensation Act. Counsel in their briefs state that the particular question here presented has never been considered or decided by any court, either state or federal. We have been unable to find any decision of a court of final review where such question has been under consideration. But see as bearing on this question in nisi prius and intermediate courts of review the following: Rounsaville v. Central R. Co. of New Jersey, 37 N. J. Law J. 295; Smith v. Industrial Accident Commission of California (Cal. App.) 147 Pac. 600;Winfield v. New York Central & Hudson River R. Co., 153 N. Y. Supp. 499. We have therefore deemed it proper to discuss at some length the authorities that bear, directly or indirectly, on the point to be decided.

In considering the question whether Congress has acted upon the same matter as that covered by a state statute, the federal courts have used different terms in different decisions. In Smith v. Alabama, 124 U. S. 465, 8 Sup. Ct. 564, 31 L. Ed. 508, the words ‘subject-matter’ or ‘subject contained’ in the state statute were employed.

In Nashville, etc., Ry. Co. v. Alabama, 128 U. S. 96, 101, 9 Sup. Ct. 28, 29 (32 L. Ed. 352) the court said:

‘It is conceded that the power of Congress to regulate interstate commerce is plenary; that, as incident to it, Congress may legislate as to the qualifications, duties, and liabilities of employés and others on railway trains * * * in that commerce; and that such legislation will supersede any state action on the subject.’

In Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 10 Sup. Ct. 681, 34 L. Ed. 128, in considering this question the court used the term ‘particular subjects.’

In Gulf, Colorado & Santa Fé Ry. Co. v. Hefley, 158 U. S. 98, 102, 15 Sup. Ct. 802, 803 (39 L. Ed. 910), the opinion states:

‘Clearly the state and national acts relate to the same subject-matter and prescribe different rules. * * * In such case one must yield, and that one is the state law.’

In Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul R. R. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133, 137, 18 Sup. Ct. 289, 291 (42 L. Ed. 688), the court, in discussing the validity of state regulations as to the liabilities of state carriers of passengers, said:

‘They are not, in themselves, regulations of interstate commerce, although th...