Stallcop v. Kaiser Foundation Hospitals
| Decision Date | 23 June 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 86-2343,86-2343 |
| Citation | 820 F.2d 1044 |
| Parties | 125 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 3075, 44 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. 237, 44 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 37,426, 106 Lab.Cas. P 12,416, 2 Indiv.Empl.Rts.Cas. 1010 Stamatina STALLCOP, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. KAISER FOUNDATION HOSPITALS; the Permanente Medical Group, Inc.; Hospital & Institutional Workers Union, Local 250, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Ninth Circuit |
Segundo Unpingco, San Jose, Cal., for plaintiff-appellant.
Morton H. Orenstein, Allen M. Kato, and Stewart Weinberg, San Francisco, Cal., for defendants-appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of California.
Before HUG, NELSON and NOONAN, Circuit Judges.
Stallcop filed a complaint in state court against Kaiser Foundation Hospitals and Permanente Medical Group ("Kaiser"), her former employers, alleging wrongful discharge, fraudulent misrepresentation, intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, and violations of California equal employment laws. She also alleged a cause of action against her former union for breach of the duty of fair representation.
Following removal to federal district court, Stallcop's claim against the union was dismissed and Kaiser's motion for summary judgment on the remaining claims was granted. The district court found that all of Stallcop's claims, except that of violation of California equal employment laws, were preempted by section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act ("LMRA"), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 185(a) (1982). The district court then found that the relevant six-month statute of limitations had run on these section 301 claims, and that this time bar was not overcome by equitable considerations. Stallcop's age and sex discrimination claims under California law were dismissed for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. Summary judgment was granted to Kaiser on Stallcop's national origin claim because she failed to establish a prima facie case.
The issues we address are: (1) whether the case was properly removed to federal court; (2) whether the wrongful discharge We affirm the district court's judgment.
fraudulent misrepresentation, and emotional distress claims are preempted by section 301; (3) whether the statute of limitations should be equitably modified; and (4) whether granting summary judgment to the defendants on the California discrimination claims was proper.
Throughout her employment with Kaiser, Stallcop was a member of the Hospital & Institutional Workers Union, Local 250 ("the Union"), which had an exclusive collective bargaining agreement with Kaiser.
Stallcop was first terminated on May 7, 1984, after receiving three letters of warning from her supervisor concerning poor work performance. She was reinstated on July 11, 1984 pursuant to a reinstatement agreement negotiated between her, the Union, and Kaiser. This written agreement required Stallcop to show "substantial improvement" in her work.
After her reinstatement, Stallcop again received notices of her inadequate job performance. Stallcop alleges that she was assigned additional work responsibilities in violation of an oral agreement in connection with the written reinstatement agreement. Stallcop was then terminated a second time on November 27, 1984, for unsatisfactory work performance.
Stallcop again challenged her termination. The Union represented her through Step 3 of the grievance procedure. On March 12, 1985, the Union sent Stallcop a letter telling her it would proceed no further with her case. Stallcop alleges that DeMello, a union business representative, told her she had one year in which to sue.
On March 22, 1985, Stallcop filed a complaint against the Union and Kaiser with the NLRB. It was denied April 15, 1985. On April 8, 1985, Stallcop filed a discrimination charge against Kaiser with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH"), alleging she was terminated due to her Greek national origin. In August 1985, Stallcop received a "Notice of Closure" from the DFEH, informing her that the allegation of discrimination could not be sustained, and giving her notice of the right to sue.
In August 1985, Stallcop alleges she consulted with three different lawyers, all of whom told her the relevant statute of limitations was one year. She later consulted with other lawyers, and filed her complaint in state court on November 27, 1985. On December 20, 1985, Kaiser and the Union removed the action to federal district court.
Since Stallcop did not object to removal to the district court, the relevant question is "not whether the case was properly removed, but whether the federal district court would have had original jurisdiction of the case had it been filed in that court." Grubbs v. General Electric Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 702, 92 S.Ct. 1344, 1347, 31 L.Ed.2d 612 (1972) (quoted in Harper v. San Diego Transit Corp., 764 F.2d 663, 666 n. 1 (9th Cir.1985)). The standard of review is therefore de novo. Mobil Oil Corp. v. City of Long Beach, 772 F.2d 534, 538 (9th Cir.1985).
Federal district courts have original jurisdiction in all civil actions "arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1331 (1982). On the face of the complaint, Stallcop alleges that the Union breached its duty of fair representation by failing to represent her interests properly in the grievance procedure. This action against the Union for breach of the duty of fair representation must be based on federal labor law, section 8(b)(1)(A) of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. Sec. 158(b)(1)(A) (1982). Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171, 177-78, 87 S.Ct. 903, 909-10, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967). Since the action "arises under" a federal law, the federal court would have had original jurisdiction over Stallcop's suit.
Whether preemption was proper is a question of subject matter jurisdiction, reviewable de novo. Mobil Oil Corp., 772 F.2d at 538.
Stallcop's first four causes of action appear on their face to present only state law claims--wrongful discharge, fraudulent misrepresentation, and intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress. The district court found, however, that federal jurisdiction existed because these claims were preempted by section 301 of the LMRA. 1
The preemptive force of section 301 is so powerful as to displace entirely any state cause of action for violation of a collective bargaining agreement. 2 Franchise Tax Board v. Laborers Vacation Trust, 463 U.S. 1, 23, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 2853, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1982); Fristoe v. Reynolds Metals Co., 615 F.2d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir.1980). All that is required for a cause of action to exist under section 301 is that the suit be based on an alleged breach of contract between an employer and a labor organization and that the resolution of the lawsuit be focused upon and governed by the terms of the contract. Painting and Decorating Contractors Ass'n v. Painters and Decorators Joint Comm., 707 F.2d 1067, 1071 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 927, 104 S.Ct. 1709, 80 L.Ed.2d 182 (1984), cited in Williams v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 786 F.2d 928, 935 (9th Cir.), cert. granted, --- U.S. ----, 107 S.Ct. 455, 93 L.Ed.2d 401 (1986).
Stallcop's first cause of action is for wrongful discharge in violation of her employment agreement and of her oral agreement with Kaiser when she was reinstated after her initial discharge. Stallcop's complaint does not reveal that her employment is governed by a collective bargaining agreement, but this is not dispositive under the "artful pleading" doctrine. Under this doctrine, the court may investigate the true nature of the plaintiff's allegations; if the complaint actually raises a section 301 claim on the collective bargaining agreement, even though it is framed under state law, the claim is preempted. Olguin v. Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co., 740 F.2d 1468, 1473 (9th Cir.1984), cited in Williams, 786 F.2d at 931 n. 1. Stallcop was, in fact, subject to a collective bargaining agreement, and the claim based upon it is preempted by section 301. See Franchise Tax Board, 463 U.S. at 23, 103 S.Ct. at 2853; Fristoe, 615 F.2d at 1212.
Stallcop contends that the wrongful termination alleged does not involve the interpretation of the collective bargaining agreement. Although the argument is not clearly made, she apparently contends that she was wrongfully discharged in violation of the oral agreement in connection with her reinstatement, and that this agreement is not part of the collective bargaining agreement. However, "any independent agreement of employment could be effective only as part of the collective bargaining agreement." Olguin, 740 F.2d at 1474. Accord Bale v. General Telephone Co. of California, 795 F.2d 775, 779 (9th Cir.1986); cf. Williams, 786 F.2d at 935-36 & Stallcop also attempts to rely on the California tort of wrongful discharge. Her complaint does not plead such an action. Furthermore, even if it did, the tort is preempted as well. The collective bargaining agreement guarantees the employer will discipline employees only upon just cause. Art. XXIX Sec. 211. Thus, the agreement appears to provide "the same or greater protection of job security that state tort law seeks to provide for nonunionized employees; accordingly federal law preempts state law." Olguin, 740 F.2d at 1474. See also Harper, 764 F.2d at 668-69 ().
n. 6 (contract involved was entered into outside of the collective bargaining unit).
Stallcop's cause of action for fraud is based upon representations Kaiser made in connection with the reinstatement agreement. As such, the fraud action depends upon an interpretation of the collective...
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