Stallings v. Municipality of Anchorage, 121918 AKCA, A-12752
|Opinion Judge:||PER CURIAM.|
|Party Name:||ASHLEY DAWN STALLINGS, Appellant, v. MUNICIPALITY OF ANCHORAGE, Appellee.|
|Attorney:||Matthew A. Michalski, Attorney at Law, Anchorage, for the Appellant. Sarah E. Stanley, Assistant Municipal Prosecutor, and William D. Falsey, Municipal Attorney, Anchorage, for the Appellee.|
|Judge Panel:||Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, and Allard and Wollenberg, Judges.|
|Case Date:||December 19, 2018|
|Court:||Court of Appeals of Alaska|
UNPUBLISHED See Alaska Appellate Rule 214(d)
Appeal from the District Court, Third Judicial District, Trial Court No. 3AN-16-3897 CR Anchorage, Jo-Ann Chung, Judge.
Matthew A. Michalski, Attorney at Law, Anchorage, for the Appellant.
Sarah E. Stanley, Assistant Municipal Prosecutor, and William D. Falsey, Municipal Attorney, Anchorage, for the Appellee.
Before: Mannheimer, Chief Judge, and Allard and Wollenberg, Judges.
Following a jury trial, Ashley Dawn Stallings was convicted of misdemeanor assault under Anchorage Municipal Code (AMC) 08.10.010(B)(1) for recklessly injuring her boyfriend by throwing a small glass object at his head.
At trial, Stallings's attorney asked the court to instruct the jury on the crime of disorderly conduct as a potential lesser included offense of assault. Under AMC 08.30.120(A)(6), a person commits disorderly conduct if the person "knowingly challenge[s] another to fight, or engage[s] in fighting other than in self-defense." The defense attorney argued that the jury might reasonably conclude that S tailings's conduct fit within this provision of the disorderly conduct ordinance.
The trial judge declined to give the requested instruction. Relying on this Court's decision in Dawson v. State, where we construed an essentially identical clause of the state disorderly conduct statute, AS 11.61.110(a)(5), the judge concluded that disorderly conduct was not a lesser included offense under the facts of Stallings's case because there was no evidence that Stallings and her boyfriend shared a mutual purpose to engage in fighting.1
On appeal, Stallings argues that the evidence showed the required mutuality of purpose to engage in fighting, and thus the trial judge erred by failing to give the requested instruction on disorderly conduct. We have carefully reviewed the record, and we disagree with Stallings's assertion that the evidence reasonably supported the proposed jury instruction. Instead, we...
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