Stallings v. Sylvania Ford-Mercury, Inc., A99A2104.

• Decision Date: 13 March 2000
• Docket Number: No. A99A2104.,A99A2104.
• Citation: 242 Ga. App. 731,533 S.E.2d 731
• Parties: STALLINGS v. SYLVANIA FORD-MERCURY, INC.
• Court: Georgia Court of Appeals

533 S.E.2d 731
242 Ga. App. 731

STALLINGS
v.
SYLVANIA FORD-MERCURY, INC

No. A99A2104.

Court of Appeals of Georgia.

March 13, 2000.

533 S.E.2d 732

Edenfield & Cox, Gerald M. Edenfield, Susan W. Cox, Mary E. Adams, Statesboro, for appellant

Brennan & Wasden, Joseph P. Brennan, Savannah, for appellee.

SMITH, Judge.

Gloria Stallings brought this automobile accident collision action against numerous defendants, including not only the driver of the [242 Ga. App. 732] other vehicle, Kennedy,¹ and her father, Lowe, but also Sylvania Ford-Mercury, Inc., Effingham County, and the Georgia Department of Transportation. Her claims against Sylvania, an automobile dealership, are based on her contention that Kennedy was acting as Sylvania's agent in driving a "loaner" car that Sylvania gave to Kennedy while performing repairs on her father's truck or, alternatively, that Kennedy, her father, and Sylvania were partners in a joint venture. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Sylvania, and Stallings appeals. Because Stallings's arguments are without merit and based upon significant misunderstandings of the Georgia law of agency and joint venture, we affirm the trial court's thorough and well-crafted order.

1. No agency relationship was created here. First, Georgia law is abundantly clear that a "loaner" arrangement between car dealers and mechanics and their customers is a bailment, not an agency. Nolley v. Maryland Cas. Ins. Co., 222 Ga.App. 901, 902(1), 476 S.E.2d 622 (1996) (written agreement); Johnson v. Hardwick, 212 Ga. App. 44, 45(2), 441 S.E.2d 450 (1994) (no written agreement; still considered bailment).

533 S.E.2d 733

Second, Stallings misapprehends the nature of an agency. "The distinguishing characteristic of an agent is that he is vested with authority, real or ostensible, to create obligations on behalf of his principal, bringing third parties into contractual relations with him." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Physician Specialists &c. v. Wildmon, 238 Ga.App. 730, 732(1)(a), 521 S.E.2d 358 (1999). Nothing in the record suggests that Kennedy, as the driver of the "loaner" car, was given any authority by Sylvania to create an obligation on behalf of Sylvania or bind it to any contract or agreement. She was simply dropping off her father's car for repairs and taking the "loaner" car in exchange. Sylvania's vice president testified that this practice was merely a "courtesy" to regular customers as a matter of convenience and customer...