Stamford Hospital v. Schwartz

• Decision Date: 19 January 2017
• Docket Number: FSTCV156024492S
• Court: Connecticut Superior Court
• Parties: The Stamford Hospital v. Chaim Schwartz et al

The Stamford Hospital v. Chaim Schwartz et al

No. FSTCV156024492S

Superior Court of Connecticut, Judicial District of Stamford-Norwalk, Stamford

January 19, 2017

UNPUBLISHED OPINION

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

William A. Mottolese, Judge

In this action the court is called upon to review the findings of fact made by a fact finder pursuant to P.B. § 23-58 and G.S. § 52-549n. The fact finder has filed a written memorandum of decision in compliance with P.B. § 23-56. In accordance with P.B. § 23-57 the defendants have filed their objections to acceptance of the fact finder's report. A hearing on the objections was held on January 4 2017.

As a threshold matter preliminary to consideration of the merits the court must address the defendants' challenge to the jurisdiction of the fact finder because if the subject matter of the claim is beyond the scope of the fact finder's jurisdiction, the fact finder had no jurisdiction to entertain the claim and his report must therefore be rejected. Birch v. Williams, 82 Conn.App. 728, 733 846 A.2d 905 (2004). Although the defendants did not make this challenge before the fact finder, it is axiomatic that absence of subject matter jurisdiction cannot be waived and may be raised at any time.

" Whenever the absence of subject matter jurisdiction is brought to the notice of the court . . . cognizance of it must be taken and the matter passed upon before it can move one further step in the cause; as any movement is necessarily the exercise of jurisdiction, " and this includes a motion to amend. Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. v. Peabody, 239 Conn. 93, 99-100, 680 A.2d 1321 (1996). Correspondingly, the plaintiff has the burden of proving subject matter jurisdiction, whenever and however raised, and even though it is not raised in a timely manner. Fink v. Golenbock, 238 Conn. 183, 199, n.13, 680 A.2d 1243 (1996). On the other hand, every presumption is to be indulged in favor of jurisdiction. Demar v. Open Space and Conservation Commission, 211 Conn. 416, 425, 559 A.2d 1103 (1989).

The crux of the defendants' argument is that when the debt was incurred it was indefinite as to amount because neither party knew at the time what the final amount would be. The plaintiff argues that neither § § 52-549n nor P.B. 23-58 requires a definite amount to be included within the body of the agreement between the parties and all that is necessary is that the complaint seek a definite sum based on an agreement which allows for the ascertainment of a definite sum.

Our case law has established that fact finders have jurisdiction over claims for unpaid hospital services. Milford Hospital v. Casey, 1999 Sup. CT 6781, (1999, Flynn, J.). All that is required to satisfy the condition precedent to a fact finder referral is that the claim be based on a sum of money which is " capable of reduction to certainty" without a necessity " that the exact amount in figures be stated in the agreement." Housing Authority v. Melvin, 12 Conn.App. 711, 715, 533 A.2d 1231 (1987). It is not a fair reading of either the statute or the rule to superimpose a requirement that the agreement sued on specify a definite sum. In fact, our Supreme Court has recognized the special nature of a contract between a medical provider and the parents of a minor.

" Thus, when a medical service provider renders necessary medical care to an injured minor, two contracts arise: the primary contract between the provider and the minor's parents; and an implied in law contract, between the provider and the minor himself. The primary contract between the provider and the parents is based on the parents' duty to pay for their children's necessary expenses, under both common law and statute. Such contracts, where not express, may be implied in fact and generally arise both from the parties' conduct and their reasonable expectations." Yale Diagnostic Radiology v. Estate of Fountain, 267 Conn. 351, 359, 838 A.2d 179 (2004). Thus the court finds that the fact finder had jurisdiction to act.

The standard of review for this court is set forth in Wilcox Trucking, Inc. v. Mansour Builders, Inc., 20 Conn.App. 420, 424, 567 A.2d 1250 (1999).

A reviewing authority may not substitute its findings for those of the trier of the facts. This principle applies no matter whether the reviewing authority is the Supreme Court; Pandolphe's Auto Parts, Inc. v. Manchester, 181 Conn. 217, 220, 435 A.2d 24 (1980); the Appellate Court; Lerner v. Ceslik, 17 Conn.App. 369, 372, 553 A.2d 1142 (1989); or the Superior Court reviewing the findings of either administrative agencies; Gervasoni v. McGrath, 36 Conn.Supp. 297, 300, 418 A.2d 952 (1980), or attorney trial referees. See Practice Book § 443; Rostenberg-Doern Co. v. Weiner, 17 Conn.App. 294, 299, 552 A.2d 827 (1989). This court has articulated that attorney trial referees and factfinders " 'share the same function . . . " whose determination of the facts is reviewable in accordance with well established procedures prior to the rendition of judgment by the court." ' " Rostenberg-Doern Co. v. Weiner, supra, quoting Seal Audio, Inc. v. Bozak, Inc., 199 Conn. 496, 502, 508 A.2d 415 (1986).

" In a contract action, findings of fact should be overturned only when they are clearly erroneous. Pomarico v. Gary Construction, Inc., 5 Conn.App. 106, 112, 497 A.2d 70, cert. denied, 197 Conn. 816, 500 A.2d 1336 (1985)." (Alternate citations omitted.) Kupstis v. Michaud, 20 Conn.App. 425, 567 A.2d 1253 (1989).

With these guidelines in mind the court has reviewed the exhibits in evidence and has read the transcript of the trial and finds that the numerous findings of fact are amply supported by the evidence and are not clearly erroneous. Additionally, the court finds that the principles of law which the fact finder applied to these facts are legally and logically correct. Premier Capital, Inc. v. Grossman, 68 Conn.App. 51, 57, 789 A.2d 565 (2002).

The basic facts which form the basis of the dispute are as follows. The plaintiff, The Stamford Hospital (hereinafter " the plaintiff" or " the hospital"), commenced this action against Chaim Schwartz (hereinafter " Schwartz") and Rena Gelb (hereinafter " Gelb"), alleging in its complaint dated January 21, 2015 that at the defendants' request the plaintiff furnished medical services to the defendants' minor child from March 5, 2013 through March 6, 2013 for which the plaintiff rendered bills for its services in the amount of $14, 051.99. Of that amount there remains a balance due and payable in the amount of $8, 076.25 which is the portion of the charge that was not covered by the defendants' health insurance. Plaintiff further alleges that the defendants, who are the legal parents of the minor child, are liable for the outstanding balance pursuant to C.G.S. § 46b-37(b).

The Complaint contains two counts, each alleging the same cause of action against each defendant. The defendants' amended answers denied all relevant allegations and each included fourteen special defenses which were all denied by the plaintiff.

The court will now proceed to discuss the controlling issues gleaned from the record.

I. CREDIBILITY OF THE PARTIES

It is appropriate to discuss the credibility of the parties as an initial matter because the extent of their credibility permeates the entire proceeding. The factfinder found that the plaintiff's witnesses were " substantial and overwhelming with detail regarding the services rendered including the cost factor." He further found that the defendant Gelb, the mother of the patient, lied under oath when she denied that she was the mother of the child and that the defendant Schwartz, the father " testified that this was not the first billing dispute he has been involved in" and " that he has had other collection matters for things he didn't pay for, which would remain in collections for a period of time and then the business would simply write it off. He did not think this matter would result in litigation." Moreover, the transcript reveals that Schwartz agreed with Gelb's denial and later equivocated on the parentage of the patient. In fact, Schwartz himself took a similar position on the subject.^[1]

The fact finder declared that " This Tribunal is strained to accept any testimony provided by either Defendant as truthful. Throughout the proceedings, both Defendants admitted to lies and underhanded actions, under the guise of trial strategy or their lack of knowledge of trial procedure, despite great deference given to both Defendants as pro se litigants."

" In a case tried before a court, the trial judge is the sole arbiter of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to be given specific testimony." Cadle Co. v. D'Addario, 268 Conn. 441, 462, 844 A.2d 836 (2004). Substituting the fact finder for the jury, our Appellate Court has approved of the application by the trial court (fact finder) of the maxim " falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus." " This maxim expresses the general principle of law that it is the prerogative of the jury (fact finder) to discredit the entire testimony of a witness if it determines the witness intentionally testified falsely in some respect. State v. Stevenson, 53 Conn.App. 551, 577 n.21, 733 A.2d 253 cert. denied, 250 Conn. 917, 734 A.2d 990 (1999), citing State v. Smith, 201 Conn. 659, 666, 519 A.2d 26 (1986)." (Alternate citations omitted.) Opotzner v. Bass, 63 Conn.App. 555, 564, n.7, 777 A.2d 718.

Ironically as nonlawyers both parents who have demonstrated exceptional acumen in researching the law and fashioning their legal arguments, have overlooked the rule that in Connecticut there is a presumption of legitimacy which provides that a child born in wedlock is presumed to be the issue of the mother and her husband. Weidenbacher v. Duclos, ...