Stamile v. Cnty. of Nassau

• Decision Date: 25 March 2014
• Docket Number: CV 10-2632 (AKT)
• Parties: MELISSA STAMILE, KENDRA HINDS, SHANNON PAIZ, COURTNEY BRACCIA, and JESSICA LITTLE, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF NASSAU, MARK BARBER, individually and in his Official Capacity, C.O. "JOHN" RAVIZEE, Individually and in his Official Capacity, SHERIFF MICHAEL SPOSATO, Individually and in his Official Capacity, C.O.'s "JOHN DOE" #1-10, Individually and in their Official Capacities, (the name John Doe being fictitious, as the true names are presently unknown), Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of New York

MELISSA STAMILE, KENDRA HINDS, SHANNON PAIZ,COURTNEY BRACCIA, and JESSICA LITTLE, Plaintiffs, v. COUNTY OF NASSAU, MARK BARBER, individually and in his Official Capacity,

C.O. "JOHN" RAVIZEE, Individually and in his Official Capacity,

SHERIFF MICHAEL SPOSATO, Individually and in his Official Capacity,

C.O.'s "JOHN DOE" #1-10, Individually and in their Official Capacities,

(the name John Doe being fictitious, as the true names are presently unknown), Defendants.

CV 10-2632 (AKT)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

DATED: MARCH 25, 2014

MEMORANDUM ANDORDER

A. KATHLEEN TOMLINSON, Magistrate Judge:

I. PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

Plaintiffs Melissa Stamile, Kendra Hinds, Shannon Paiz, Courtney Braccia, and Jessica Little ("Plaintiffs") brought this action against various named and unnamed Defendants pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 as well as New York State law alleging violations of their constitutional rights. See Am Compl. [DE 36] ¶ 1. The claims arise out of Plaintiffs' allegations that former Nassau County Correctional Center Grievance Officer Mark Barber made unwanted and improper sexual comments and advances and demanded sexual favors in return for contraband and other services. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 21-22, 42-45.

At this time, Defendant Sheriff Michael Sposato ("Sposato") moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint, asserting that there are no facts proffered in the Amended Complaintwhich support any of the claims against him. See generally, Def. Sposato's Mem. of Law in Support of his Mot. to Dismiss [DE 85] ("Def.'s Mem."). Plaintiffs oppose the motion, asserting that Defendant Sposato had direct involvement in the constitutional violations and turned a blind eye to the harassment of female inmates which resulted in the constitutional violations. Pls.' Mem. of Law in Opp. to Def.'s Mot. to Dismiss [DE 83] ("Pls.' Opp.") at 1, 9. For the following reasons, Defendant's motion is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part.

II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND

Plaintiffs filed claims against Defendants County of Nassau, Mark Barber, Corrections Officer "John" Ravizee, Sheriff Michael Sposato, and "John Doe #1-10" pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1988 alleging violations of their constitutional rights. See generally Am. Compl. At the time of the acts giving rise to the allegations in the Amended Complaint, the Plaintiffs were female inmates at the Nassau County Correctional Center ("NCCC"). Am. Compl. ¶ 16. Defendant Barber served as a Grievance Officer at NCCC receiving complaints from inmates about medical care and quality-of-life issues. Id. ¶¶ 17-18. Plaintiffs allege that from August 2007 through March 2009, Defendant Barber abused his powers as Grievance Officer and engaged in inappropriate relationships with female inmates, including the Plaintiffs. Id. ¶ 20. Specifically, the Amended Complaint asserts that Barber provided contraband and services to the inmates, and, in return, demanded that the inmates perform sexual favors for him. Id. ¶¶ 21-22. Each Plaintiff asserts particular instances where Defendant Barber made unwanted and improper sexual comments and advances (id. ¶¶ 42-45, 62-63, 78-82, 124-128, 133-134, 140-142) and engaged in inappropriate touching (id. ¶¶ 87, 98-104, 129-131) as well as sexual intercourse (id. ¶ 64). Stemming from his conduct involving the Plaintiffs and several other inmates, Defendant Barber was convicted of five felonies and 56 misdemeanors in the County Court, Nassau County,and is currently serving a term of imprisonment of 5 1/3 to 8 years in New York State. See Def.'s Mem. at 2; Am. Compl. ¶¶ 166-173.¹

Plaintiffs further aver that many other staff members at NCCC knew about Defendant Barber's conduct, but simply looked the other way and did nothing. Id. ¶ 28. In that context, Plaintiffs allege that Barber's misconduct was a reflection of a larger, systemic failure of top-level prison officials to properly respect and safeguard the rights of female inmates. Id. ¶¶ 29-30.

Plaintiffs' Amended Complaint asserts causes of action under Sections 1983 and 1988 for: (i) cruel and unusual punishment in violation of the Eighth Amendment; (ii) unlawful bodily searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment; and (iii) privacy violations in contravention of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. ¶¶ 174-176, 188, 214-216. Plaintiffs also assert a claim for municipal liability against the County of Nassau, along with various New York State law claims, including assault, battery, intentional infliction of emotional distress, negligence, negligent supervision, and negligent hiring, training, and retention. Am. Compl. ¶¶ 199-212, 225-255.

As to Sheriff Sposato, Plaintiffs assert the following claims: (i) supervisory liability under Section 1983, including deliberate indifference; and (ii) negligent supervision under New York State law. Plaintiff also alleges that

32. . . . SHERIFF SPOSATO himself had engaged in misconduct which was remarkably similar to the misconduct committed by defendant Barber.

33. Specifically, SHERIFF SPOSATO had sent love notes hidden in food trays to various female inmates at NCCC. Thisgrossly improper conduct was witnessed by at least two staff members at NCCC, Corporal Daniel Donahue and Officer Sandra Rottcamp.

. . . .

180. . . . Further, several male staff members, including defendant SHERIFF SPOSATO himself, have propositioned female inmates and asked to see them outside of jail.

Id. ¶¶ 32-33, 180. Defendant Sposato moves to dismiss the Amended Complaint, arguing, inter alia, that Plaintiffs have not sufficiently alleged he was personally involved in the purported constitutional violations at issue. See generally, Def.'s Mem. Subsequent to the filing of the motion to dismiss, the parties filed a Consent to the Jurisdiction of a U.S. Magistrate Judge and the case was subsequently assigned to this Court. DE 40, 44. This matter is now under review.

III. LEGAL STANDARD

In reviewing a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), the Court must accept the factual allegations set forth in the Complaint as true and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the Plaintiff. See Walker v. Schult, 717 F.3d 119, 124 (2d Cir. 2013); Cleveland v. Caplaw Enters., 448 F.3d 518, 521 (2d Cir. 2006); Reed v. Garden City Union Free School Dist., --- F. Supp. 2d ---, 2013 WL 6645007, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Dec. 16, 2013); Camlin Ltd. v. CMB Additives LLC, No. 07-CV-4364, 2012 WL 5928443, at *1 (E.D.N.Y. Nov. 19, 2012). "[O]nce a claim has been stated adequately, it may be supported by showing any set of facts consistent with the allegations in the complaint." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 546, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1959 (2007). The Court, therefore, does not require "heightened fact pleading of specifics, but only enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Id. at 570.

The Supreme Court clarified the appropriate pleading standard in Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 129 S. Ct. 1937 (2009), in which the court set forth a two-pronged approach to be utilized in analyzing a motion to dismiss. District courts are to first "identify [ ] pleadings that,because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." 129 S. Ct. at 1950. Though "legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations." Id.; Brookfield Asset Mgmt., Inc. v. AIG Fin. Prods. Corp., No. 09-CV-8285, 2010 WL 3910590, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 29, 2010) ("A complaint is inadequately pled 'if it tenders naked assertions' devoid of 'further factual enhancement.'") (quoting Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1949). Second, if a complaint contains "well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id. "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged. The plausibility standard is not akin to a 'probability requirement,' but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a [d]efendant has acted unlawfully." Id. at 1949 (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556-57) (internal citations omitted).

IV. DISCUSSION

A. Section 1983 Supervisory Liability

Section 1983 provides that:

[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any State . . . subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. To state a claim under Section 1983, a plaintiff must allege conduct attributable to a person acting under color of state law that deprived the plaintiff of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. See Feingold v. N.Y., 366 F.3d 138, 159 (2d Cir. 2004) (quoting West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48, 108 S.Ct. 2250, 101 L.Ed.2d 40 (1988)). Therefore, a Section 1983 claim has two essential elements: (1) the defendant acted under color of state law, and(2) as a result of the defendant's actions, the plaintiff suffered a denial of her federal statutory rights, or her constitutional rights or privileges. See Palmieri v. Lynch, 392 F.3d 73, 78 (2d Cir. 2004); Annis v. Cnty. Of Westchester, 136 F.3d 239, 245 (2d Cir. 1998); Bristol v. Queens Co., No. CV 095544, 2013 WL 1121264, at *5 (E.D.N.Y. Feb. 27, 2013); Quinn v. Nassau Cnty. Police Dep't, 53 F. Supp. 2d 347, 354 (E.D.N.Y. 1999) (Section 1983 "furnishes a cause of action for the violation of federal rights created by the Constitution.") (citation omitted).

Here, Plaintiffs have alleged violations of their Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights. See generally Am. Compl. However, because respondeat superior does not apply in Section 1983 actions, "[i]t is well settled in this Circuit that 'personal involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional...