Stamp v. Union Stevedoring Corporation

• Citation: 11 F.2d 172
• Decision Date: 28 November 1925
• Docket Number: No. 11626.,11626.
• Parties: STAMP v. UNION STEVEDORING CORPORATION, with other cases.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania

11 F.2d 172 (1925)

STAMP v. UNION STEVEDORING CORPORATION, with other cases.

No. 11626.

District Court, E. D. Pennsylvania.

November 28, 1925.

Edward M. Rand, Harry H. Johns, and Rand & Johns, all of Philadelphia, Pa., for plaintiff.

C. Brewster Rhoads and Robert T. McCracken, both of Philadelphia, Pa., for defendant.

DICKINSON, District Judge.

These cases, of which there is a number, are all of kindred nature and may be determined in one opinion, although there is in some respects a differentiation to be made among them. The discussion fairly bristles with points, some of which partake of the flavor of hornbooks, and, although of more or less academic interest, are of doubtful practical value. Due deference, however, to the industry and spirit of thoroughgoing investigation, as well as ability displayed by counsel, demands a consideration of the questions which have been raised. The first is one of jurisdiction which is of paramount importance.

We may get a starting point for the discussion by an outline statement of the general fact situation and by premising a few propositions of fact and law which are not in dispute. The plaintiffs were all in the employ of the defendant, doing service in stevedoring work, which was performed, sometimes on docks, and sometimes on the decks and in the holds of vessels whose cargoes were being discharged. It is thus truly amphibious.

The claims made are for compensation for injuries received in such service. There is agreement that the contracts of employment were maritime in their nature, and that under section 2 of article 3 of the Constitution cases growing thereout are cognizable in a court of the United States sitting as a court of admiralty. There is likewise agreement that, under the provisions of the Judiciary Act, a suitor has the right (notwithstanding his case may otherwise be cognizable in admiralty as a maritime cause) to pursue at common law such remedies as the common law affords, and that the common law is "competent to give" redress for the injury of which complaint is made in these cases. Each of these plaintiffs has elected to pursue his common-law remedy and has brought his action accordingly, but has likewise brought it in a court of the United States. Out of this election the question of jurisdiction has arisen.

To recapitulate the pertinent propositions not in dispute, if the plaintiffs had appealed for redress to this court as a court of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction, the question now before us would not have been presented; if the cause had been wholly disassociated from all features of a maritime nature, then just as clearly this court would have no jurisdictional power to entertain it, unless there was the further fact of diversity of citizenship.

Waiving for the moment the distinction between contracts and torts, and ignoring for the present the effect of this distinction (which will hereafter be discussed), the question becomes whether this court, sitting for the time being as a common-law court in a common-law action, and as such having jurisdiction only because of diversity of citizenship, has none the less general jurisdiction, if the cause, although brought as one at common law, might (had the injured party so elected) been brought as a proceeding in admiralty for a cause maritime.

We do not regard the question to be an open one and content ourselves with the statement of the conclusion that, when a suitor elects to pursue his common-law remedy, he takes the cause out of the class, to which it might otherwise belong, of causes maritime, and it must be treated for jurisdictional purposes as other common-law actions are treated. This question of jurisdiction, however, does not arise in those of the cases in which there are the usual jurisdictional averments, including that of diversity of citizenship.

2. Respecting these latter cases, other questions are raised. They turn upon the general question of the propriety of the special common-law remedy which has been invoked. Common-law remedies are of great variety and diversity. Procedural law may be roughly classified into provisions for bringing a cause into court by subjecting a defendant to its jurisdiction as by writs of summons and other process; provision for bringing the subject-matter of the litigation before the court through the pleadings; provision for the entry of summary judgments by default and otherwise; provision for the trial of issues by jury process and trial regulations; provision for judgments with appellate review; and provisions for carrying the judgment into execution through execution process. In Pennsylvania, the distinction between different forms of writs soon fell into innocuous desuetude. Whether the proper form of writ to bring a defendant into court had issued could be learned only through oyer of the writ, and such oyer was early abolished in this state. A consequence was that the courts could not know whether the proper form of writ had been employed, because there was no way in which they could judicially learn what the form of the writ was. A further consequence, for the existence of which we have the high authority of Judge Sharswood, is that a plaintiff might have issued a form of writ appropriate to the assertion of one cause of action and filed a declaration setting forth a wholly different cause of action. The distinctions between forms of writs (assuming the defendant was in court so as to give the court jurisdiction of the parties and ignoring statutory enactments) became altogether unimportant. The distinction in form between declarations (for instance in causes of action arising ex contractu and ex delicto) still remained. The Legislature has, however, dealt with this subject in the Practice Act of 1915 (P. L. 483; Pa. St. 1920, §§ 17181-17204) and kindred statutes.

The Practice Act avows its purpose to be to prescribe the procedure which must be followed in asserting at law certain causes of actions which include those now before us. It clearly recognizes the distinction between, in the phraseology of the act, "actions of assumpsit" and "actions of trespass," but just as clearly abolishes all distinctions of form between the declaration or statement of these different causes of action. This must be so, because, no matter whether the case be one of contract or of tort, the statement of what it is shall be in precisely the same form. The pleadings are good if in this form, and are permitted to be in no other. The act, after dictating what shall be stated, further prescribes what shall not be stated. This means that, so far as respects form, there is no difference between a statement of claim in assumpsit and one in trespass. The distinction, however, as before stated, remains, and is recognized in the act as well as the distinction between what are commonly called evidentiary facts and ultimate facts, and that between facts and inferences or conclusions of law. These distinctions remain because they are not formal or merely conventional but are logical and not merely conducive but necessary to clear thinking. They are not only recognized to exist, but consequences of importance attach to them. The difference in the mode of treatment of causes of actions ex contractu and ex delicto is determined...