Stamp v. Vail Corp., 07SA65.

• Decision Date: 19 November 2007
• Docket Number: No. 07SA65.,07SA65.
• Citation: 172 P.3d 437
• Parties: In re Aaron STAMP and Kelly Stamp, Plaintiffs v. The VAIL CORPORATION, a Colorado corporation, d/b/a Vail Associates, Inc.; and Mark Chard, Defendants and Terry Delliquadri, Third Party Defendant.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

172 P.3d 437

In re Aaron STAMP and Kelly Stamp, Plaintiffs v. The VAIL CORPORATION, a Colorado corporation, d/b/a Vail Associates, Inc.; and Mark Chard, Defendants and Terry Delliquadri, Third Party Defendant.

No. 07SA65.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

November 19, 2007.

Rehearing Denied December 17, 2007.

Purvis, Gray & Murphy, LLP, James G. Heckbert, William R. Gray, Lettunich & Vanderbloemen, LLC, John A. Vanderbloemen, Steamboat Springs, Colorado, Attorneys for Plaintiffs.

The Rietz Law Firm, LLC, Peter W. Rietz, Kimberly A. Viergever, Dillon, Colorado, Attorneys for Defendants.

Justice BENDER delivered the Opinion of the Court.

I. Summary

In this original proceeding, we review the trial court's ruling that recovery of compensatory damages in a skiing-related wrongful death action is limited by the Ski Safety Act's damages cap provision, and not by the Wrongful Death Act's damages cap provision.¹ Under Petitioners' theory of recovery the felonious killing exception contained in the WDA's damages cap provision would entitle them to unlimited compensatory damages for the death of their daughter. In this opinion, we also review the trial court's ruling that denied Petitioners' motion to amend their complaint to add a claim for exemplary damages.

We affirm the trial court's ruling regarding the damages cap issue and hold that the SSA's damages cap provision limits recovery of compensatory damages in skiing-related wrongful death claims. However, we also hold that the trial court erred in denying Petitioners' motion to amend their complaint to add a claim for exemplary damages. Upon review of the discovery documents in this case, we conclude that Petitioners' amended complaint satisfies the burden of proof set forth in the WDA's exemplary damages provision,² and hold that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied this motion.

Hence, we discharge the rule to show cause as to the damages cap issue, but make the rule absolute as to Petitioners' claim for exemplary damages.

II. Original Jurisdiction

Exercise of our original jurisdiction is within our sole discretion. C.A.R. 21(a)(1). Relief under C.A.R. 21 is proper in cases where the trial court has abused its discretion and where an appellate remedy would be inadequate. Fognani v. Young, 115 P.3d 1268, 1271 (Colo.2005). We generally elect to hear C.A.R. 21 cases that raise issues of first impression and that are of significant public importance. Wesp v. Everson, 33 P.3d 191, 194 (Colo.2001). We have previously exercised our original jurisdiction to review questions of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., Bd. of County Comm'rs v. Colo. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 157 P.3d 1083, 1085-86 (Colo.2007). We have also previously exercised our original jurisdiction to review rulings on motions to amend. See, e.g., Polk v. Dist. Court, 849 P.2d 23, 24 (Colo.1993).

This court has never before considered how the SSA's damages cap provision intersects with the WDA's damages cap provision in a wrongful death action in which a skier died as a result of the alleged negligence of a ski area operator. This is an important issue in Colorado. The SSA is one of the most extensive and significant ski safety and liability statutory schemes in the country. See Arthur N. Frakt & Janna S. Rankin, Surveying the Slippery Slope: The Questionable Value of Legislation to Limit Ski Area Liability, 28 Idaho L.Rev. 227, 258-70 (1992). Furthermore, ski tourism is important to Colorado's economy. Schafer v. Aspen Skiing Corp., 742 F.2d 580, 584 (10th Cir.1984) ("The ski industry makes a substantial contribution, directly or indirectly, to the Colorado economy. The state has a legitimate interest in its well-being and economic viability."); see also James H. Chalat, Colorado Ski Law, 27 Colo. Law., Feb. 1998, at 5, 5. Given these concerns, we deem the exercise of our original jurisdiction appropriate in this case.

III. Facts and Procedural History

This case involves a fatal collision at a ski area between a ski racer and a snowmobile driven by an employee of the ski area operator's race crew. Petitioners Aaron and Kelly Stamp ("Stamps") brought this wrongful death action in Eagle County District Court against Respondents Vail Corporation ("Vail") and Mark Chard ("Chard")³ after the Stamps' thirteen-year-old daughter, Ashley Stamp ("Ashley"), died in a collision with a snowmobile driven by Chard, an employee of Vail's race crew.

As Ashley skied a warm-up run down the west side of Vail's Golden Peak race arena, Chard drove himself and another race crew employee up the same slope by snowmobile. Ashley and Chard approached a blind knoll at the same time and collided, causing Ashley's death. The depositions, affidavits, and police reports submitted to the trial court contain conflicting facts concerning the manner in which Chard was driving the snowmobile.

Chard states that he is an experienced snowmobile driver and that he had driven a snowmobile up the west side of the race arena between fifty and one hundred times that ski season. A police report states that Chard told an investigating law enforcement officer that he stopped and waited for four other skiers to pass him below another blind knoll. Chard states that he does not remember seeing or stopping for the four skiers.

Regarding the collision, Chard states that his speed before the collision was between ten and fifteen miles per hour and that he slowed down as he approached the blind knoll. Edward Lockwood, a ski coach who was standing below the knoll at the time of the collision, estimates that the snowmobile's speed was between twenty and twenty-five miles per hour. Likewise, Dean Havlik, the medical doctor and forensic pathologist who performed Ashley's autopsy, states that Ashley's injuries indicate that the snowmobile's speed was between twenty and twenty-five miles per hour.

Scott Shepard, a race coach who witnessed the collision, states that the front of the snowmobile lifted about one foot off of the ground as it crested the knoll. Lockwood, who also states that he saw the snowmobile lift off of the ground when it crested the knoll, estimates that the front of the snowmobile was eighteen to twenty-four inches in the air.

In addition, Chard states that the snowmobile's siren was turned on. Thom Conville, Chard's passenger and fellow race crew employee, also remembers that he heard the snowmobile's siren before the collision. However, both Shepard and Lockwood state that they never heard the snowmobile's siren.

All of these facts were presented to the trial court on Vail's motion for summary judgment. The trial court denied Vail's motion, finding that whether Chard's speed was excessive and whether the snowmobile's siren was turned on were "triable issues of fact" that relate to the Stamps' claims of "negligence, recklessness, and wanton and willful conduct."

After the trial court denied Vail's motion for summary judgment, Vail moved for a determination of law as to whether section 33-44-113 of the SSA ("SSA's damages cap provision") or section 13-21-203(1)(a) of the WDA ("WDA's damages cap provision") limits the Stamps' recovery in this case. If the SSA's damages cap provision applies to skiing-related wrongful death claims, then the Stamps' recovery of compensatory damages will be limited to $250,000. See § 33-44-113. If the WDA's damages cap provision applies to skiing-related wrongful death claims, then the Stamps' recovery of compensatory damages will also be limited to $250,000 unless the Stamps prove that Ashley's death constitutes a "felonious killing," in which case the felonious killing exception contained in the WDA's damages cap provision will permit the Stamps to recover unlimited compensatory damages. See § 13-21-203(1)(a). Among the Stamps' claims for relief is a claim alleging felonious killing.

Following Vail's motion for a determination of law, the Stamps moved to amend their complaint to add a claim for exemplary damages on the ground that Vail's conduct was "willful and wanton."

In separate orders, the trial court ruled that the SSA's damages cap provision, and not the WDA's damages cap provision, limits the Stamps' recovery of compensatory damages, and denied the Stamps' motion to amend their complaint to add a claim for exemplary damages. In its ruling on the damages cap issue, the trial court construed the term "injured" as it is used in the SSA's damages cap provision to mean "injury or death," and interpreted the phrase "any derivative claim by any claimant" contained in the SSA's damages cap provision to include wrongful death claims. For this reason, the trial court concluded that the SSA's damages cap provision limits recovery of compensatory damages in skiing-related wrongful death actions in the same way that it limits recovery of compensatory damages in skiing-related personal injury actions. The trial court also concluded that the felonious killing exception contained in the WDA's damages cap provision does not apply to skiing-related wrongful death claims. Thereafter, the trial court denied, without explanation, the Stamps' motion to amend their complaint to add a claim for exemplary damages. Thus, under the trial court's ruling, the Stamps' recovery of compensatory damages will be limited to $250,000, and their recovery of exemplary damages will be barred.

The Stamps petitioned this court for review of both rulings. We issued a rule to show cause. We now discharge the rule in part and make it absolute in part.

IV. Analysis

First, the Stamps argue that the legislature's use of the exclusive term "injured" and of the phrase "any derivative claim by any claimant" in the SSA's damages cap provision precludes application of the SSA's damages cap provision to skiing-related wrongful death actions. Second, the Stamps contend that the WDA's felonious killing exception, which provides for unlimited damages, applies to their skiing-related wrongful death claim because the...