Stamper v. Baskerville

• Decision Date: 12 February 1982
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 82-0025-R.
• Citation: 531 F. Supp. 1122
• Parties: Charles Sylvester STAMPER v. Alton BASKERVILLE.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia

531 F. Supp. 1122

Charles Sylvester STAMPER v. Alton BASKERVILLE.

Civ. A. No. 82-0025-R.

United States District Court, E. D. Virginia, Richmond Division.

February 12, 1982.

Edward D. Barnes, Denis C. Englisby, Chesterfield, Va., Gary J. Spahn, Richmond, Va., for plaintiff.

Thomas D. Bagwell, Asst. Atty. Gen., Richmond, Va., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM

WARRINER, District Judge.

Charles Sylvester Stamper, a prisoner of the Commonwealth of Virginia, brings this petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Petitioner was convicted on 9 February 1979 in the Circuit Court of Henrico County, Va., of three counts of capital murder, three counts of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, and one count of armed robbery. He was sentenced to death by electrocution for each count of capital murder, one year imprisonment for each count of use of a firearm in the commission of a felony, and life imprisonment for armed robbery. Petitioner is attacking the validity of the aforementioned convictions, and the application of the death penalty. He asserts the following allegations in support of his petition:

1) that the evidence was insufficient to justify a finding of guilt beyond a reasonable doubt;

2) that the evidence was insufficient to show that a robbery took place at the time the murders were committed;

3) that evidence was introduced at trial produced by an illegal search and seizure;

4) that the trial court erred in permitting into evidence a video tape and sound recording of a partial view of the murder scene because it had no probative value and was designed to inflame the passions and prejudices of the jury;

5) that the trial court erred in failing to ask defendant if there were anything he wanted to say prior to sentencing in accordance with Va.Code § 19.2—298 and Rule 3A:25(b);

6) that the trial court erred in not requiring a full and complete pre-sentence report;

7) that the trial court erred in permitting the introduction of the pistol and the glass particles because their probative value was outweighed by their prejudicial effect;

8) that the trial court erred in permitting the testimony in the sentencing phase of Deanie Ellsworth regarding the facts of a previous assault and in permitting Ellsworth to exhibit his injuries to the jury;

9) that the trial court erred in refusing to dismiss the indictments regarding the capital murder offenses for the reason that the indictments violate petitioner's rights under the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments of the United States Constitution;

10) that the death penalty constitutes cruel and unusual punishment;

11) that the Virginia death penalty statute, § 19.2—264.4 (1980 cum. supp.) is unconstitutional as applied to petitioner in the case at bar.

Respondent has filed his answer to the petition and oral argument has been heard.

Pertinent Facts

Recognizing that the manner of speaking, the demeanor of the witness, the pauses, the evidences of uncertainty, or certainty, the evidences of nervousness, or calm, the indications of bias, or indifference, the raised eyebrow or the trembling chin, the emphatic response, or the vocal tremor, the direct or averted gaze — all the body language and other non-verbal bases for determining the truth — are hidden from me but were open to the trial judge and jury, I have reviewed the transcript of the State court trial in its entirety and, having compared my findings with those of the Supreme Court of Virginia, I agree with and adopt its recitation of the evidence. Stamper v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 260, 264-67, 257 S.E.2d 808, 812-14 (1979) cert. denied, 445 U.S. 972, 100 S.Ct. 1666, 64 L.Ed.2d 249 (1980).

Sufficiency of the Evidence

On habeas corpus review

The relevant question is whether, after reviewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements¹ of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. (citation omitted). This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact to fairly resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.

Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319, 99 S.Ct. 2781, 2789, 61 L.Ed.2d 560 (1979) (emphasis in original). In measuring the insufficiency claim this Court must follow the Jackson rule rather than the Virginia rule.²

It is well settled that circumstantial evidence may support a verdict of guilty, even though it does not exclude every reasonable hypothesis consistent with innocence. United States v. George, 568 F.2d 1064, 1069 (4th Cir. 1978); United States v. Bobo, 477 F.2d 974, 989 (4th Cir.) cert. denied, 421 U.S. 909, 95 S.Ct. 1557, 43 L.Ed.2d 774 (1973).

In the instant action there is an abundance of circumstances from which reasonable inferences can be drawn to lead a rational trier of fact to the conclusion that Stamper was involved in these crimes. A reasonable inference from the evidence is that the crimes were committed by a Shoney's employee. The evidence proved that only employees were admitted to the restaurant prior to 7:00 a. m. It is reasonable to infer that the perpetrator forced Staples to open the safe. Staples was the only one of the victims who knew the safe's combination, a fact which would not likely be known to a non-employee. The killer had apparently made his escape by breaking out the glass in the front door rather than using the fire exit; only employees might reasonably be expected to know that the fire door was connected to an alarm which automatically triggered when the door was opened. All of the employees that were in the restaurant were murdered, even though Staples apparently cooperated by opening the safe. This fact raises an inference that the killer was known to the murdered employees and that they were killed in order to eliminate eye witnesses. The evidence showed that Stamper was employed as a weekday breakfast cook at the restaurant.

The evidence indicated that the automobile seen near Shoney's at the approximate time of the crime was an automobile similar to that owned by Stamper's wife, a yellow Ford Torino. When Stamper was stopped by the police on the evening of 25 March 1978 he stated that he had been in exclusive control of the automobile that day. Approximately twenty percent of the glass particles taken from the floorboard of the driver's side of Stamper's car had the same refractive index as glass from the Shoney's door. In the opinion of the expert witness this similarity was "significant".

Steven Staples' car keys and a .22 caliber revolver were found within a few hundred yards of Charles Stamper's parents' home. The .22 caliber revolver which was recovered near Stamper's parents' home, contained four expended cartridges and four unfired cartridges. The firearm's expert opined that three of the expended cartridges originally contained copper-coated bullets and one contained a plain lead bullet. Of the four .22 caliber bullets recovered from the bodies of the victims, three were copper-coated and one was plain lead. A test bullet fired from the revolver demonstrated the same general characteristics as the bullets recovered from the victims.³ It is, therefore, a reasonable inference that the .22 caliber revolver recovered from the woods, was in fact the murder weapon, and that it was hidden by Stamper in the woods in order to avoid detection.

The evidence proved that during March 1978, Stamper was delinquent on his rent and on his account with a credit jewelry store. He had given notice on 20 March that he was quitting his job at Shoney's because he needed to earn more money. However, within a few days after the crimes, petitioner attempted to purchase an automobile priced at $3,500.00, stating that he had $1,500.00 in his pocket to use for a downpayment. Petitioner also paid his past due rent, paid off a civil judgment in the amount of $63.55, paid $100.00 as downpayment on a $180.00 watch, and co-signed a note for a friend in the amount of $355.00.

Petitioner also claims that the evidence was insufficient to show that a robbery took place at the time the murders were committed.⁴ The testimony proved that there was substantial money in the safe on the night prior to the murders. However, after the murders, the safe was found to be open and the money was missing. There was also blood on the safe and surrounding cabinets. Steven Staples, the only one of the victims with the combination to the safe, had been beaten and cut with a sharp instrument prior to his death.

As stated earlier in the opinion, the jury is entitled to draw reasonable inferences from the facts adduced at trial. It is the opinion of the Court that the jury could have reasonably inferred from the facts that the motivation for the murders was robbery, that the robber knew who had the combination to the safe, that the robber tortured that person to make him open the safe, and that the robber killed all of the employees once the safe was open and he had access to the $4,000.00 taken from the safe.

Under Virginia law, robbery is defined as "the taking, with intent to steal, of the personal property of another, from his person or in his presence, against his will, by violence or intimidation." Jones v. Commonwealth, 218 Va. 18, 21, 235 S.E.2d 313, 315 (1977). The violence or intimidation that is an essential ingredient of robbery must proceed or be concomitant with the taking. Mason v. Commonwealth, 200 Va. 253, 255-56, 105 S.E.2d 149, 151 (1958); see also Whitley v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. ___, 286 S.E.2d 162 (1982).

Upon consideration of the evidence at trial, and viewing it in the light most favorable to the prosecution, the Court is of the opinion that a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Circumstantial evidence cannot be expected to weave an airtight case. But the...