Stamper v. Shinseki
| Decision Date | 24 October 2012 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 3:11cv546-DPJ-FKB |
| Parties | CHARLES DAVID STAMPER PLAINTIFF v. ERIC SHINSEKI, Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, et al. DEFENDANTS |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Mississippi |
This race-discrimination and retaliation case is before the Court on motions to dismiss filed by Defendants Roy Flores, National Vice President, District 10, American Federation of Government Employees, AFL-CIO ("AFGE") [78]; Eric Shinseki, Secretary for the Department of Veterans Affairs [80]; American Federation of Government Employees Local 589 ("Local 589") [92]; and Charles Jenkins, Nena Spencer, Kenny Knott, Wayne Dedmond, Luke McClinton, and Vera Norwood ("Individual Defendants") [103].
Although Stamper pursues a variety of federal and state-law claims, employment disputes of this nature usually proceed under the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The problem in this case is that Stamper either failed to file a timely complaint in federal court or appealed in the wrong venue. Moreover, Title VII may preempt essentially all of the remaining claims against all defendants leaving the Court without subject-matter jurisdiction. And even assuming jurisdiction, the claims suffer various other deficiencies, some of which could not be remedied in an amended pleading. Thus, as explained below, the Court concludes that the motions should be granted, but because the record remains incomplete and not all of these issues were addressed by the parties, the Court will provide a mechanism for Plaintiff to consider seeking leave to amend in certain respects.
Plaintiff Charles David Stamper, a white male, worked as a supervisory radiological technologist at the G.V. Sonny Montgomery Medical Center in Jackson, Mississippi, beginning in May 2009. He alleges that his immediate supervisors and union representatives were all African-American and that "he was treated differently than other individuals because of his race." Second Am. Compl. [74] at 4. He says that AFGE and Local 589, through their members, "took affirmative steps to interfere with [Stamper's] contract of employment," ultimately resulting in Stamper's termination on October 7, 2009. Id. at 4, 5.
Following the termination of his employment, Stamper filed a charge of discrimination with the Department of Veterans Affairs Office of Employment Discrimination ("the EEO department"). The EEO department issued Stamper a right-to-sue letter on September 28, 2010. Stamper then filed a pro se lawsuit in the Eastern District of Tennessee on December 30, 2010, which was transferred to this Court on August 24, 2011. Six months later, Stamper filed a Second Amended Complaint [74].
Though the Second Amended Complaint lacks clarity, it appears that Stamper alleges a Title VII claim against Shinseki in his official capacity as Secretary of the Department of Veterans Affairs and Flores in his official capacity as National Vice President of AFGE; race discrimination claims against all defendants under 42 U.S.C. § 1981; state-law claims for negligence, tortious interference with contract, and tortious interference with business relations against all defendants; state-law claims for intentional infliction of emotional distress and slander against Shinseki and Flores in their official capacities; a whistleblower retaliation claim under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) against Shinseki and Flores in their official capacities; and a claim of unfairlabor practices under 5 U.S.C. §§ 7116 and 7120. All defendants have moved for dismissal of all claims against them, raising the defenses of lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1), (6).
Defendants seek dismissal under both Rule 12(b)(1) and Rule 12(b)(6). "When a Rule 12(b)(1) motion is filed in conjunction with other Rule 12 motions, the court should consider the Rule 12(b)(1) jurisdictional attack before addressing any attack on the merits." Ramming v. United States, 281 F.3d 158, 161 (5th Cir. 2001) (citation omitted). A motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction should be granted "'when the court lacks the statutory or constitutional power to adjudicate' the claim." In re FEMA Trailer Formaldehyde Prods. Liab. Litig., 668 F.3d 281, 286 (5th Cir. 2012) (quoting Home Builders Ass'n, Inc. v. City of Madison, 143 F.3d 1006, 1010 (5th Cir. 1998)). Finally, "[j]urisdiction cannot be waived, and it is the duty of a federal court first to decide, sua sponte if necessary, whether it has jurisdiction before the merits of the case can be addressed." Filer v. Donley, 690 F.3d 643, 646 (5th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted).
In considering a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), the "court accepts 'all well-pleaded facts as true, viewing them in the light most favorable to the plaintiff.'" Martin K. Eby Constr. Co. v. Dallas Area Rapid Transit, 369 F.3d 464, 467 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting Jones v. Greninger, 188 F.3d 322, 324 (5th Cir. 1999)). However, Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555(2007)). To overcome a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a plaintiff must plead "enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face." Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. "Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level, on the assumption that all the allegations in the complaint are true (even if doubtful in fact)." Id. at 555 (citations and footnote omitted). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678.
The Supreme Court's examination of the issue in Iqbal provides a framework for examining the sufficiency of a complaint. First, the district court may "begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth." Id. at 679. Second, "[w]hen there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief." Id.
Ordinarily, a court decides a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim looking only at the face of the complaint; if "matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d); see In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 205 (5th Cir. 2011). Documents attached to a motion to dismiss that are "referred to in the plaintiff's complaint and . . . central to [his] claim," however, are considered part of the pleadings for purposes of a motion under Rule 12(b)(6). Causey v. Sewell Cadillac-Chevrolet, Inc., 394 F.3d 285, 288 (5th Cir. 2004). Additionally, the Court may consider matters outside the pleadings in deciding a motion under Rule 12(b)(1). Ramming, 281 F.3d at 161.
In this case, the parties have submitted several documents in support of and in opposition to the pending motions. Some documents are properly before the Court as they are either referred to in the Complaint and central to Stamper's claims or are probative as to subject-matter jurisdiction. See Notice of Right to Sue Letter and Signed Return Receipt [50-1, 50-2]; Walker Decl. [16-1]; Second Walker Decl. [27]. Others go outside the complaint and address the substantive merits of Stamper's claims. See June 11, 2009 Meeting Notes [100-1, 100-2, 106-1, 106-2]; Flores Decl. [101-1]; Jenkins Decl. [107-1]. The Court has considered only the documents properly before it in ruling on Defendants' motions and declines to convert the Rule 12(b)(6) motions under Rule 12(d).1
Finally, Stamper's various responses include requests for a stay. Those requests failed to comply with Local Rule 7(b)(3)(C), which states that "[a] response to a motion may not include a counter-motion in the same document." Regardless, the requested stay would address only one of the numerous claims and is not otherwise supported. This Order does, however, provide an opportunity for Stamper to seek leave to amend a few of his claims. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 687 (); Hart v. Bayer Corp., 199 F.3d 239, 248 n.6 (5th Cir. 2000) ().
Though the Court recognizes that Stamper has failed in several opportunities to develop a sufficient complaint, dismissal is without prejudice. First, not all of the issues raised in Defendants' motions were urged with respect to prior iterations of the complaint. Second, this Order is based in part on legal authority the parties have not adequately addressed. And finally, some of the issues turn on documents that are not in the record.
Stamper has conceded the following claims against the following defendants: (1) all "stand alone" claims under the Civil Rights Act of 1991; (2) claims for libel and defamation as to all defendants; (3) intentional infliction of emotional distress ("IIED") claims against all defendants; (4) the whistleblower claims under 5 U.S.C. § 2302(b)(8) against Defendants Flores, Local 589, and the Individual Defendants; and (5) the Title VII claims against the Individual Defendants. These claims are dismissed with prejudice.2
Stamper persists in his ...
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