Stamper v. State

Decision Date11 April 1973
Docket NumberNo. 971S254,971S254
Citation260 Ind. 211,294 N.E.2d 609
PartiesRichard Dirk STAMPER, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee.
CourtIndiana Supreme Court

William C. Erbecker, Indianapolis, for appellant.

Theodore L. Sendak, Atty. Gen., A. Frank Gleaves, III, Deputy Atty. Gen., for appellee.

GIVEN, Justice.

The appellant was charged with murder in the second degree. Trial by jury resulted in a verdict of guilty. Upon such verdict the trial judge sentenced the defendant to the Indiana State Prison for life imprisonment.

The record reveals the following facts:

On December 3, 1970, the appellant returned home from work to find his wife had died from an apparent overdose of sleeping tablets. There was evidence that upon discovering the death of his wife the appellant became very distraught to the point of becoming somewhat irrational in his conduct. However, by the time police officers arrived the appellant was able to discuss the matter with them in a rational manner.

Sometime later that same evening the appellant was seated on the front porch of his home drinking a cup of coffee when Pat Kerins, the person whose death appellant was tried for in the instant case, appeared at appellant's home. Kerins was a former husband of appellant's deceased wife, and just prior to her death they had been engaged in a legal controversy concerning the custody of a daughter. When Kerins arrived at the Stamper home on the evening in question, he apparently was unaware of Mrs. Stamper's death and immediately entered into a conversation with Stamper in which he referred to Mrs. Stamper in derogatory terms and asked appellant to tell Mrs. Stamper that she would never gain custody of their child. When appellant informed Kerins that Mrs. Stamper was dead, Kerins registered disbelief in a manner which apparently further distressed the appellant, whereupon the two men began to fight. During this fight the appellant stabbed Kerins fourteen times, from which injuries Kerins immediately died.

The appellant entered a plea of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. In addition to the evidence of the commission of the instant crime, the State produced evidence that the appellant had previously beaten his wife, had attacked and beaten a fellow worker, had engaged in a shoot out with police officers resulting in wounding of the officers, and had previously stated that he would one day kill the decedent, Pat Kerins.

Appellant's first assignment of error is that the verdict of the jury is not sustained by sufficient evidence and is, therefore, contrary to law in that there was uncontroverted evidence conclusively showing that the appellant was of unsound mind at the time of the commission of the alleged crime.

Appellant correctly takes the position that once he had interposed the defense of insanity that the presumption of sanity no longer prevailed, and that the State thereupon bore the burden of proving that appellant was sane beyond a reasonable doubt in order to sustain the conviction. Young v. State (1972), Ind., 280 N.E.2d 595, 30 Ind.Dec. 91; Brattain v. State (1945), 223 Ind. 489, 61 N.E.2d 462.

Appellant takes the position that the State failed in this burden because the two psychiatrists appointed by the court to examine the appellant filed separate reports, each stating that they were of the opinion that the appellant was under such stress at the time of the killing that he was unable to control his emotions and actions and at that time was of unsound mind. However, the reports of these doctors did not constitute the sole evidence submitted to the jury for their determination as to the appellant's sanity at the time of the killing. Police officers testified that when they talked to the appellant after he had discovered his wife's death and before the death of Kerins, he had calmed down and was showing no indication of hysteria. There is also evidence from which the jury could conclude that appellant's past behavior had indicated that he was a man with a violent temper, and he had previously attacked persons including his wife and had previously threatened to kill Kerins. There was evidence from which the jury could determine that the appellant was merely giving vent to his violent temper when he attacked and killed Kerins, rather than being the victim of temporary insanity. We have repeatedly held that it is within the province of the jury to determine the fact of the sanity of the appellant at the time in question, and that they may accept or reject the statements of any of the witnesses in that regard including psychiatrists. So long as there is evidence to support the issue of sanity for which the State bears the burden of proof, this Court will not disturb their verdict. Twomey v. State (1971), Ind., 267 N.E.2d 176, 24 Ind.Dec. 713.

We hold in the case at bar the jury was justified from the evidence in finding that the appellant was in fact sane at the time of the attack on Kerins.

Appellant next claims the court erred in giving an instruction to the jury that the defendant must present credible evidence in meeting his burden of producing evidence on the issue of insanity and instructing the jury that there was a presumption that the defendant was sane. The only instruction which appellant cites to support such a contention reads as follows:

'You are the judges of the credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to their testimony. You should reconcile the evidence in this case upon the theory that each and every witness has spoken the truth, if...

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29 cases
  • Com. v. Kostka
    • United States
    • United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court
    • June 23, 1976
    ...v. Myers, 94 Idaho 570, 573, 494 P.2d 574 (1972). People v. Bassett, 56 Ill.2d 285, 296, 307 N.E.2d 359 (1974). Stamper v. State, 260 Ind. 211, 213, 294 N.E.2d 609 (1973). State v. Thomas, 219 N.W.2d 3, 5 (Iowa, 1974). State v. Lamb, 209 Kan. 453, 473, 497 P.2d 275 (1972). Robinson v. State......
  • Stacks v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Appellate Court
    • February 22, 1978
    ...behavior, is admissible for the purpose of determining his sanity. Whitten v. State (1975), Ind., 333 N.E.2d 86; Stamper v. State (1973), 260 Ind. 211, 294 N.E.2d 609; Fulmer v. State (1967), 249 Ind. 261, 230 N.E.2d 307. Since Stacks entered a plea of not guilty by reason of insanity, Stra......
  • Myers v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • April 8, 2015
    ...relevance to the issue of his sanity.” Howard v. State, 265 Ind. 503, 507, 355 N.E.2d 833, 835 (1976) (citing Stamper v. State, 260 Ind. 211, 216, 294 N.E.2d 609, 612 (1973) ). This is not to suggest that relevance of the defendant's behavior would trump a constitutional violation. However,......
  • Stevens v. State
    • United States
    • Indiana Supreme Court
    • September 24, 1976
    ...and his environment including prior commission of crimes.' Wilson v. State, (1975) Ind., 333 N.E.2d 755, 764; Stamper v. State, (1973) 260 Ind. 211, 216, 294 N.E.2d 609, 612. In Twomey v. State, (1971) 256 Ind. 128, 132, 267 N.E.2d 176, 179, we said, 'Once a plea of insanity is offered by a......
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