Stample v. Idaho Power Co.

• Decision Date: 10 February 1969
• Docket Number: No. 10026,10026
• Citation: 92 Idaho 763,450 P.2d 610
• Parties: Charles J. STAMPLE and Ethel J. Stample, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. IDAHO POWER COMPANY, Defendant-Respondent.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 610

450 P.2d 610

92 Idaho 763

Charles J. STAMPLE and Ethel J. Stample, Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. IDAHO POWER COMPANY, Defendant-Respondent.

No. 10026.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

Feb. 10, 1969.

John Hjellum, II, Boise, for plaintiffs-appellants.

James E. Bruce, Boise, for defendant-respondent.

SCOGGIN, District Judge.

Appellants brought this action for recovery of damages on account of the alleged wrongful death of their son, the late Eddy D. Stample, on May 21, 1965.

On May 21, 1965, Eddy Stample, an employee of respondent Idaho Power Company, was working with a mobile line crew engaged in work connected with energizing a new substation of respondent. The accident occurred when the lower portion of the upper segment of the boom of a 'High Ranger' bucket truck accidentally contacted a 25 KW Circuit, causing a current of electricity to proceed down the boom into the truck body, and thence to ground. At the time of contact Eddy Stample was leaning against the side of the truck; the current passed from the conductor through the truck body through the body of Eddy Stample to the earth, causing his immediate death.

Whether there was any negligence involved is irrelevant for purposes of this appeal.

Following the accident, respondent Idaho Power Company filed with the Industrial Accident Board, according to the procedures of the Workmen's Compensation Law, an 'Employer's Notice of Death of Employee.' Appellants subsequently filed with the Industrial Accident Board their claim as dependents seeking an award under the law for death benefits arising from the accident in the course of their son's employment with respondent. The Industrial Accident Board ruled that since no claim was filed by any 'dependent,' as that term is understood in the Workmen's Compensation Law, then $1,000.00 should be paid to the State of Idaho, in accordance with I.C. § 72-301. This was done.

Finding themselves unable to recover under the Workmen's Compensation Law, appellants then brought an action for wrongful death, per I.C. § 5-311. ¹ Respondent made a motion for summary judgment under I.R.C.P. 56(c), ² on the ground that the district court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter; it contended that the rights of persons injured within the scope of employment are governed solely by the Workmen's Compensation Law. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment. Citing the case of Gifford v. Nottingham, 68 Idaho 330, 193 P.2d 831 (1948), the court held that 'all rights and remedies for personal injuries or death as between the employee and employer growing out of the employment relationship are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Industrial Accident Board under the Workmen's Compensation laws.' Gifford v. Nottingham, supra, and the statutes amply demonstrate that the above holding is a correct statement of the law of Idaho.

The Idaho Workmen's Compensation Laws, however, are quite explicit as to who is to recover under them and the effect that their existence is to have on the normal civil remedies. Parents may receive compensation only if dependent on the child injured or killed, as is explicitly provided by I.C. § 72-302. ³

Concerning the effect of Workmen's Compensation Laws on other civil actions, I.C. § 72-102 notes that one of the main purposes of the statutory scheme was to remove these cases from the courts:

'72-102. Declaration of police power.-The common law system governing the remedy of workmen against employers for injuries received in industrial and public work is inconsistent with modern industrial conditions. The administration of the common law system in such cases has produced the result that little of the cost to the employer has reached the injured workman, and that little at large expense to the public. The remedy of the workman has been uncertain, slow and inadequate. Injuries in such employments formerly occasional have become frequent and inevitable. The welfare of the state depends upon its industries, and even more upon the welfare of its wageworkers. The state of Idaho, therefore, exercising herein its police and sovereign power, declares that all phases of the premises are withdrawn from private controversy, and sure and certain relief for injured workmen and their families and dependents is hereby provided regardless of questions of fault and to the exclusion of every other remedy, proceeding or compensation, except as is otherwise provided in this act, and to that end all civil actions and civil causes of action for such personal injuries, and all jurisdiction of the courts of the state over such causes are hereby abolished, except as is in this act provided.'

If that formal policy statement were not sufficient, I.C. § 72-203 removes all remedies other than Workmen's Compensation, in cases where workmen's compensation is applicable, from 'such employee, his personal representatives, dependents, or next of kin.' ⁴

In Gifford v. Nottingham, supra, this Court had previously ruled on the effect of the passage of the Workmen's Compensation Laws on the older civil actions.

'(I)n the enactment of (these statutes), the legislature removed from the sphere of civil actions, all suits against an employer for damages on account of personal injury or death of an employee, where such injury or death arises out of and in the course of the employment, and this restriction applies to the employee, his personal representatives, dependents and...