Stamps v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ.
| Decision Date | 20 May 1994 |
| Citation | 642 So.2d 941 |
| Parties | 94 Ed. Law Rep. 1077 Lisa STAMPS, et al. v. JEFFERSON COUNTY BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al. 1920607. |
| Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Carol Ann Rasmussen, Birmingham, for appellants.
Carl E. Johnson, Jr. of Bishop, Colvin, Johnson & Kent, Birmingham, for appellees.
Lisa Stamps, David Elliott, Paul Allen, Kay Mickel, and Marilyn Benson, "special education" teachers assigned to the W.E. Burkett Center for the Multi-Handicapped, appeal from a judgment declaring that they, the Jefferson County Board of Education, and several of its officials are not violating the Nursing Practices Act, Ala.Code 1975, §§ 34-21-1 to -63 ("the NPA"), in performing certain procedures connected with the instruction of "exceptional children" at the Center. Because we conclude that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction to enter the judgment and that that judgment is therefore void, we dismiss this appeal.
Stamps, Elliott, Allen, Mickel, and Benson, none of whom is a licensed nurse, are employed by the Jefferson County Board of Education to provide instruction for "exceptional children" 1 enrolled at the Center many of whom are severely disabled. On September 14, 1992, Stamps and Elliott sued (1) the Jefferson County Board of Education, (2) Bruce Wright, superintendent of the Jefferson County Board of Education, (3) Raphael McDaniel, the director of personnel for Jefferson County schools, (4) Nell Salamone, director of special education for Jefferson County schools, and (5) Cathy Stagg, the principal at the Center, in a declaratory judgment action. (These five defendants will be collectively designated as "the Board.") The plaintiffs alleged that, as a condition of their employment, they are regularly required to perform procedures the NPA restricts to licensed nurses. More specifically, they alleged that they "and other teachers at the Burkett Center have [performed] and are compelled to perform medical procedures such as direct line feedings, gastronomy with button, insertion of tubes, suctioning of tracheotomy tubes, administration of prescribed medication, and the changing of colostomy bags." The performance of such procedures, they alleged, "constitute[s] the unauthorized practice of nursing." They also sought to enjoin the Board from requiring them to perform such duties.
Ten days later, they amended their complaint to add as plaintiffs their co-employees Allen, Benson, and Mickel. Following a bench trial on October 26-27, 1992, the court denied the requested injunctive relief and held that the challenged procedures did not violate the NPA. On appeal, the teachers reassert their contentions that they are required, as a part of their employment, to practice nursing without a license as that concept is defined in § 34-21-1.
Section 34-21-1(3)a. defines "practice of professional nursing":
"The performance, for compensation, of any act in the care and counselling of persons or in the promotion and maintenance of health and prevention of illness and injury based upon the nursing process which includes systematic data gathering, assessment, appropriate nursing judgment and evaluation of human responses to actual or potential health problems through such services as case finding, health teaching, health counselling; and provision of care supportive to or restorative of life and well-being, and executing medical regimens including administering medications and treatments prescribed by a licensed or otherwise legally authorized physician or dentist...."
(Emphasis added.) Section 34-21-1(3)b. defines "practice of practical nursing":
"The performance, for compensation, of acts designed to promote and maintain health, prevent illness and injury and provide care utilizing standardized procedures and the nursing process, including administering medications and treatments, under the direction of a licensed professional nurse or a licensed or otherwise legally authorized physician or dentist...."
(Emphasis added.) The teachers insist that their employment subjects them to the possibility of "criminal prosecution if the State Board of Nursing [chooses] to file a complaint." Reply Brief of Appellants, at 3; see also Brief of Appellants, at 18. For this proposition, the teachers cite § 34-21-7, which provides in part:
"Any person ... who ... practices professional nursing as defined in this chapter or ... practices practical nursing as defined in this chapter, unless duly licensed to do so under the provisions hereof; or uses in connection with his or her name any designation implying or tending to imply that he or she is a licensed professional nurse and licensed to practice as a registered nurse, or a practical nurse licensed to practice practical nursing as a licensed practical nurse, unless duly licensed to practice under the provisions of this chapter ... shall be guilty of a Class A misdemeanor and upon conviction, shall be punished in accordance with the laws of the state of Alabama."
(Emphasis added.) The teachers assert that through this action they are "attempting to enjoin the Board from forcing them to commit a misdemeanor." Reply Brief of Appellants, at 1.
The Board characterizes this action as a "purported effort" by the teachers "to enjoin the commission of a 'crime' and ... protect the public from themselves [and that the effort] is nothing more than a disingenuous attempt to use the licensing statute as a means to litigate their way out of what have apparently become disagreeable portions of their work." Brief of Appellees, at 22. The Board does not dispute the teachers' contentions that many of their duties constitute "care supportive to or restorative of life and well-being," as that phrase is used in § 34-21-1(3)a., and that those duties are "designed to promote and maintain health, prevent illness and injury and provide care utilizing standardized procedures and the nursing process," as that phrase is used in § 34-21-1(3)b. However, it insists that these definitions of "nursing" are so "vague," Brief of Appellees, at 12, and "so all-encompassing ... as to be all but meaningless." Id. at 15.
The Board further contends that, regardless of the meanings of the terms expressed in § 34-21-1, the teachers do not have standing to enforce the provisions of the NPA in a civil action. It insists that the only entity so authorized is the board of nursing, which, indisputably, is not represented in this action. In support of this proposition, the Board cites §§ 34-21-2, -25, and -26.
Section 34-21-2 provides in part:
Section 34-21-25 (Supp.1993) provides in part:
Section 34-21-26 provides in part:
(Emphasis added.)
The Board places particular emphasis on the section referenced in the emphasized portion of § 34-21-26, that is, Ala.Code 1975, § 6-6-503(a), which provides: "The unauthorized or unlawful practice of any profession ... by any person ... may be enjoined by any court of competent jurisdiction on complaint brought in the name of any public body or officer having authority conferred by statute to regulate or to license the activity engaged in by such person...."
These and other points are thoroughly argued by both sides in this dispute. In our view, however, neither side has articulated precisely the issue that we perceive to be dispositive. That issue is whether an action brought by special education teachers against their employers seeking a judgment construing the NPA and declaring that their duties subject them to prosecution by the board of nursing for the unlicensed practice of nursing presents a controversy that is justiciable under the Declaratory Judgment Act, Ala.Code 1975, §§ 6-6-220 to -232, where the action does not include the board of nursing. We hold that it does not.
Section 6-6-222 authorizes the courts of this state to "declare rights, status, and other legal relations whether or not further relief is or could be claimed."...
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