Stamps v. State, 82S00-8601-CR-18
| Decision Date | 24 November 1987 |
| Docket Number | No. 82S00-8601-CR-18,82S00-8601-CR-18 |
| Citation | 515 N.E.2d 507 |
| Parties | Richard C. STAMPS, Appellant (Defendant Below), v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee (Plaintiff Below). |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
John F. Davis, Mary Jane Humphrey, Evansville, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Louis E. Ransdell, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
Defendant Richard Stamps was convicted of murder. In this direct appeal he presents the following issues:
1. denial of fair trial because of prosecutor's peremptory challenges;
2. application of Patterson exception to hearsay rule;
3. admissibility of cropped photograph of victim;
4. opinion testimony.
We affirm.
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred in subjecting him, a black man, to a jury trial in which the State had improperly used its peremptory challenges to exclude two black persons from the jury.
The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment forbids the prosecutor from challenging potential jurors solely on account of their race. Batson v. Kentucky (1986), 476 U.S. 79, 106 S.Ct. 1712, 90 L.Ed.2d 69; Weekly v. State (1986), Ind., 496 N.E.2d 29. In order to demonstrate purposeful discrimination in the selection of the petit jury, a defendant must show that he is a member of a cognizable racial group, that the prosecutor has peremptorily challenged members of the defendant's race, and that these facts and other relevant circumstances raise an inference that the prosecutor excluded prospective jurors because of their race. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 87-88; Weekly, 496 N.E.2d at 31. Once these factors are shown, purposeful discrimination will be presumed unless the prosecutor presents a neutral explanation for his exercise of peremptory challenges. The explanation must relate to the particular case to be tried, but need not rise to the level justifying exercise of a challenge for cause. Id.
Following the completion of voir dire questioning by both parties, including each party's use of the full amount of allotted peremptory challenges, but before the jury was sworn, defense counsel requested an opportunity to make a motion outside the jurors' presence. Before allowing the motion, the trial court swore in the jury. Defendant then orally objected, asserting that the State had systematically excluded the only two black members of the jury by use of his peremptory challenges, and claimed as a result that the defendant was denied equal protection of the law, due process of law, and the right to a fair and impartial trial. Defense counsel also requested the cause to be withdrawn from the jury, and moved for mistrial.
In response, the prosecutor explained that his actions had nothing to do with race, but were based upon the jurors' responses to voir dire questions. The prosecutor did not particularize his reasoning beyond stating that he "did not believe it would be appropriate to have these individuals on the jury," and that "[i]t had nothing to do with their race." (R. 83)
In deciding whether defendant has made the requisite showing, the trial court should consider all relevant circumstances. Batson, 476 U.S. at 96-98, 106 S.Ct. at 1723, 90 L.Ed.2d at 88. We share the confidence expressed by the United States Supreme Court that:
[T]rial judges, experienced in supervising voir dire, will be able to decide if the circumstances concerning the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges creates a prima facie case of discrimination against black jurors.
Id. Batson also observes that a prosecutor may not rebut a defendant's prima facie case of discrimination merely by denying that he had a discriminatory motive. Id.
We find that neither party provided sufficient explanations to satisfy the requirements of Batson and Weekly. The defendant failed to show the trial court that the prosecutor's peremptory challenges and other relevant circumstances raised an inference of purposeful exclusion of jurors because of race. The prosecutor's explanation wholly failed to provide sufficient particulars explaining any neutral basis for his peremptory challenges. If defendant had been able to demonstrate an inference that potential jurors were excluded because of race, the prosecutor's explanation would have been insufficient to overcome the inference.
Faced with the issue presented, and having personally observed voir dire, the trial judge denied the motions to withdraw submission and for mistrial. The trial court is vested with broad discretion and responsibility to regulate voir dire, and its decision will generally be reversed only on a showing of manifest abuse of discretion and denial of fair trial. Hall v. State (1986), Ind., 497 N.E.2d 916; Linder v. State (1985), Ind., 485 N.E.2d 73. The record supports the ruling of the trial court. The voir dire responses of the excused black persons provide a basis for the legitimate exercise of peremptory challenges. One potential juror disclosed strong religious convictions which could impair her ability to serve as a juror. The other's responses indicate that she was having substantial difficulty in understanding and following the proceedings.
We decline to find error in the trial court's denial of defendant's motion to withdraw submission and for mistrial.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erred in its rulings regarding admission of evidence under Patterson v. State (1975), 263 Ind. 55, 324 N.E.2d 482. Defendant first claims error in the admission of evidence under the Patterson exception to the hearsay rule before the declarant testified. This Court has previously found no violation of Patterson where the declarant later testifies regarding the same matter after his out-of-court statement has been proved. See, e.g., Taylor v. State (1986), Ind., 496 N.E.2d 561; Short v. State (1982), Ind., 443 N.E.2d 298; Remsen v. State (1981), Ind., 428 N.E.2d 241, later proceeding, (1986), Ind., 495 N.E.2d 184; Bundy v. State (1981), Ind., 427 N.E.2d 1077; Brown v. State (1979), 271 Ind. 129, 390 N.E.2d 1000. In the instant case, the declarant did testify after his out-of-court statement was proved and was subjected to cross-examination concerning the statement. Thus, the trial court did not err in admitting the evidence.
Defendant next contends that the trial court erroneously refused to permit other testimony which should have qualified for admission under the Patterson rule. We disagree. It is within the trial court's discretion to decide whether a particular statement should be admitted when the out-of-court declarant is available. Doerner v. State (1986), Ind., 500 N.E.2d 1178; Gaunt v. State (1983), Ind., 457 N.E.2d 211. Exclusion of evidence which is arguably relevant will not...
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