Stamps v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 27 February 2006
• Docket Number: No. B183741.,B183741.
• Citation: 136 Cal.App.4th 1441,39 Cal.Rptr.3d 706
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: Robert STAMPS, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent; Kenny-Shea-Traylor-Frontier-Kemper, JV et al., Real Parties in Interest.

39 Cal.Rptr.3d 706

136 Cal.App.4th 1441

Robert STAMPS, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Los Angeles County, Respondent Kenny-Shea-Traylor-Frontier-Kemper, JV et al., Real Parties in Interest.

No. B183741.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 8.

February 27, 2006.

McNicholas & McNicholas, Patrick McNicholas, Tae Kim and Holly N. Boyer, Los Angeles, for Petitioner.

No appearance for Respondent.

McKenna Long & Aldridge, Stephanie B. McNutt, Los Angeles, Margaret I. Johnson, San Jose, and Joseph L. Greenslade, Los Angeles, for Real Parties in Interest.

RUBIN, J.

INTRODUCTION

The issue presented in this petition for writ of mandate is whether a violation of statutory protections against discriminatory violence and intimidation and against denial of civil rights by means of threats and intimidation (Civ.Code, §§ 51.7, 52.1) may be asserted as a separate cause of action in an action alleging wrongful termination and employment discrimination.¹ The trial court ruled these sections were part of the Unruh Civil Rights Act (the Unruh Act) and, thus, were inapplicable in the employment context. We conclude there is no bar to asserting violations of sections 51.7 and 52.1 in employment cases. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court's order sustaining real parties in interest's demurrer and granting their motion to strike.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND²

Kenny-Shea-Traylor-Frontier-Kemper, JV and Traylor Bros., Inc. (collectively Traylor) is a mining company that employed petitioner Robert Stamps as a tunnel miner. Stamps sued Traylor and his supervisor, Travis Thompson, alleging he was subjected to retaliation, violence, and intimidation by threat of violence. Stamps, an African-American, further alleged Thompson verbally harassed him with racist remarks, yelled at him in an intimidating manner, threatened him with physical violence for not completing work assignments, and generally placed him in unsafe work situations without proper equipment and training, all on account of his race. Thompson's alleged lack of concern for Stamps's safety resulted in an injury that caused several of Stamps's toes to be amputated. Stamps was terminated as a result of his injury.

The operative pleading was the first amended complaint, which alleged three causes of action: (1) wrongful termination in violation of public policy, (2) retaliation in violation of public policy, and (3) violation of sections 51.7 and 52.1. Traylor and Thompson (collectively "real parties") demurred and filed a motion to strike. Among their contentions, real parties argued the third cause of action failed because sections 51.7 and 52.1 are part of the Unruh Act and the Supreme Court held in Rojo v. Kliger (1990) 52 Cal.3d 65, 276 Cal.Rptr. 130, 801 P.2d 373 (Rojo), that the Unruh Act does not apply to employment cases.

The trial court agreed with real parties and sustained the demurrer to the third cause of action without leave to amend. The court also struck Stamps's request for attorneys' fees and penalties under sections 51.7 and 52.1. On Stamps's petition, we issued an alternative writ of mandate and heard oral argument. As we will discuss, we hold Stamps properly stated a cause of action; the trial court, therefore, erred in its rulings.³

We organize our opinion by first providing an overview of the applicable legislation and its history. We then conclude that sections 51.7 and 52.1 are not part of the Unruh Act, the Supreme Court in Rojo did not adopt a rule barring employment cases from being founded on the two statutes, and there is no other reason to preclude such statutory claims in employment cases.

DISCUSSION

1. Standard of Review

"As the issues presented are all entirely legal in nature, we employ our independent judgment. [Citations.]" (Gatto v. County of Sonoma (2002) 98 Cal. App.4th 744, 753, 120 Cal.Rptr.2d 550 (Gatto).)

2. The Legislative Framework of Relevant Civil Code Sections

A. Sections 51.7 and 52.1: Overview. Section 51.7 broadly provides that all persons have the right to be free from violence and intimidation by threat of violence based on, among other things, race, religion, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation, sex, or position in a labor dispute.⁴ The rights protected by section 51.7 may be enforced by a private action for damages. (See § 52, subd. (b).)⁵ Section 52.1 allows a civil action for damages and equitable relief for interference, by threats, intimidation or coercion, with the exercise of constitutional or other rights provided by law. The section also provides criminal sanctions for violations.⁶ Attorneys' fees may be awarded under both statutes. (§§ 52, subd. (b)(3), 52.1, subd. (h).)

B. Sections 51.7 and 52.1: Legislative History. The history of section 51.7 indicates the legislation was referred to as the Ralph Civil Rights Act and enacted in 1976 as part of Assembly Bill No. 2986. An Assembly Committee report stated that while there were "numerous state and federal laws providing for full and equal civil rights protections in employment, housing, and access to public accommodations and facilities," there was no specific prohibition protecting individuals from "violence because of their race, religion, color, ancestry, or national origin." (Assem. Com. on Labor Relations, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2986 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) April 20, 1976, p. 1.) The report continues, "Although it is impossible to estimate the instances of violence against persons in California because of race, color, religion or other factors, there have been enough occurrences such as the one in Taft, California last year where Black college students were threatened with violence and chased out of town to signify a possible need for greater protection of this fundamental right.... This measure declares that all persons have a right to be free from violence or threat of violence committed against their persons or property because of race, color, religion, ancestry, national origin, political affiliation, or position in a labor dispute." (Ibid.; see also Venegas v. County of Los Angeles (2004) 32 Cal.4th 820, 845-848, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 692, 87 P.3d 1 (Venegas), conc. opn., Baxter, J. [describing the historical background of the "Ralph Civil Rights Act"]; In re Joshua H. (1993) 13 Cal.App.4th 1734, 1748, fn. 9, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 291 [referring to section 51.7 as the "Ralph Civil Rights Act"].)

As noted by an Assembly Committee Report, a central feature of section 51.7 was to afford an individual the opportunity to file immediately a private civil action at the same time he or she pursued a complaint with the Fair Employment Practices Commission (FEPC). (Assem. Com. on Labor Relations, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2986 (1975-1976 Reg. Sess.) April 6, 1976, p. 1.) Previously, a person filing a complaint with the FEPC would have been precluded from concurrently initiating a private civil action on the same matter. Assembly Bill 2986 allowed for both a private civil remedy and the enforcement mechanisms of the FEPC. (Ibid.; Assem. Office of Research, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2986 (1975-76) as amended Aug. 16, 1976, "Unfinished Business"; Legis. Analyst, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 2986 (1975-1976) as amended April 30, 1976, p. 2; Sen. Com. on Judiciary, Analysis of Assem. Bill 2986 (1975-1976) as amended May 25, 1976, p. 2.)

The second statute on which Stamps's third cause of action was based, section 52.1, was enacted a decade later as part of Assembly Bill 63 and is known as the Tom Bane Civil Rights Act. It was intended to supplement the Ralph Civil Rights Act as an additional legislative effort to deter violence. (See Assem. Comm. On Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 63 (1987-1988) as amended Mar. 2, 1987, p. 1.) The stated purpose of the bill was "to fill in the gaps left by the Ralph Act" by allowing an individual to seek relief to prevent the violence from occurring before it was committed and providing for the filing of criminal charges. (Assem. Comm. on Ways and Means, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 63 (1987-1988) as amended Apr. 6, 1987, p. 2.)

The Assembly Committee on Public Safety reported, "The Attorney General's office states that the number of crimes which are committed because of the victim's racial, ethnic, religious, or other minority status are increasing, that members of minority groups increasingly believe they are threatened by attack or harassment, and that existing law is inadequate to protect them. They also stated that existing civil rights statutes do little to deter hate violence because there are no criminal penalties. Existing criminal statutes (trespass, vandalism, etc.) do not reflect the seriousness of the problem of racially motivated violence. The purpose of this bill is to give law enforcement officials clear effective authority to prevent acts of hate violence, and to deter such conduct by establishing serious criminal penalties" and by "[a]llow[ing] an individual, or the Attorney General, district attorney, or city attorney, to bring an action to enjoin crimes of hate violence where they are threatened." (Assem. Comm. on Public Safety, Analysis of Assem. Bill No. 63 (1987-1988) as amended Mar. 2, 1987, pp. 1-2; see also Venegas, supra, 32 Cal.4th at pp. 845-848, 11 Cal.Rptr.3d 692, 87 P.3d 1, conc. opn., Baxter, J. [describing the historical background of the "Tom Bane Civil Rights Act"]; In re Joshua H., supra, 13 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1739, 1748, fn. 9, 17 Cal.Rptr.2d 291 [referring to section 52.1 and Penal Code section 422.7 as the "Tom Bane Civil Rights Act," and stating that, along with the Ralph Civil Rights Act and related statutes, it is California's response to the increase in hate crimes]; Cabesuela v. Browning-Ferris Industries of California, Inc. (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 101, 110, 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 60 [§ 52.1 part of Bane Act].)

The legislative history reveals that the broad and plain language of sections 51.7 and 52.1 was chosen to provide protection from...