Stan v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.

Decision Date23 August 2000
Docket NumberNo. 99-CV-0653.,99-CV-0653.
Citation111 F.Supp.2d 119
PartiesDesiree STAN, Plaintiff, v. WAL-MART STORES, INC., Wal-Mart Stores East, Inc., d/b/a Wal-Marts, Sam's East, Inc., d/b/a Sam's Club and John Does, Defendants.
CourtU.S. District Court — Northern District of New York

Zappone, Fiori Law Firm, Latham, NY (Joseph W. Zappone, of counsel), for plaintiff.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., Bentonville AK (Susan Klooz, of counsel), O'Connor, O'Connor Law Firm, Albany, NY (Michele M. Monserrate, of counsel), for defendants.

MEMORANDUM — DECISION & ORDER

McAVOY, District Judge.

Plaintiff commenced the instant action pursuant to Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. § 12181, et. seq., and NEW YORK CIVIL RIGHTS LAW § 47, claiming that she was discriminated against in the use of a public accommodation on account of her disability. Presently before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 56 seeking dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint in its entirety.

I. BACKGROUND

Because the instant matter is before the Court on Defendants' motion for summary judgment, the following facts are presented in the light most favorable to Plaintiff. See Ertman v. United States, 165 F.3d 204, 206 (2d Cir.1999).

Plaintiff Desiree Stan suffers from an eye disease that has rendered her legally blind. Defendants concede for purposes of this motion that she is disabled within the meaning of the ADA. To assist her in getting around, Plaintiff uses a service dog.

Plaintiff shopped at Wal-Mart Stores ("Wal-Mart") approximately four times per year and at Sam's Club, approximately ten times per year. See July 17, 2000 Stan Dep. at ¶ 3. She alleges that on three occasions (two at Wal-Mart and one at Sam's) she experienced discrimination on account of her disability.

In one instance, in approximately November 1997, Plaintiff entered the East Greenbush, New York Wal-Mart store with her guide dog by her side. A Wal-Mart greeter1 told her she could not bring her pet into the store. Plaintiff informed the greeter that it was a service dog, to which the greeter iterated that dogs were not allowed into the store. Plaintiff pushed past the greeter and entered the store. The greeter did not attempt to follow Plaintiff or further obstruct her from entering the store. Plaintiff approached the service desk and asked to speak with the general manager. Because the general manager was unavailable at the time, a Wal-Mart employee asked if Plaintiff would like to speak with the assistant manager. Plaintiff declined and agreed to wait for the general manager. Plaintiff proceeded to shop until she was paged by the general manager. After Plaintiff explained to the general manager that the greeter "tried to eject me from the store because she wouldn't recognize that my dog was a service animal ... after I told her it was a service animal," the general manager apologized and indicated that she would properly train her employees about such matters. Plaintiff thanked the general manager, made her purchases, and left the store. See Pl. Dep. at 18-20.

Thereafter, Plaintiff shopped at the East Greenbush store one or two times without incident, although she is uncertain whether she had her service dog with her at those times. See id. at 20-21.

In another similar instance, on May 12, 1998, Plaintiff entered a Sam's Club store in Latham, New York. A greeter advised Plaintiff that pets were not allowed in the store. Plaintiff stepped past the greeter and her ex-husband informed the greeter that Plaintiff is blind and the dog was a service animal, not a pet. Plaintiff then proceeded to what she believed to be the service counter and asked for the address and telephone number of Wal-Mart's corporate headquarters. The employee at the counter responded that she did not have that information. Plaintiff then requested to speak with the store's general manager. The employee proceeded to page the manager. At that point, the greeter approached Plaintiff. Plaintiff asked him if he was the general manager, to which he responded that he was not. Believing that Defendants tried to deceive her into believing that the greeter was the general manager, Plaintiff walked away and proceeded to do her shopping. As she was paying for her purchases, Plaintiff remarked to the cashier that she could not believe that the address and telephone number for corporate headquarters were not available. The cashier then informed Plaintiff that she had previously gone to the membership desk rather than the service desk and directed Plaintiff to the service desk. See id. at 22-24.

Plaintiff proceeded to the service desk and asked for the address and telephone number for corporate headquarters. The store's general manager then approached Plaintiff and inquired if there was a problem. Plaintiff explained what had happened. The manager apologized, informed Plaintiff that he would give the matter immediate attention, and stated that he would train all of the associates regarding allowing service dogs into the store and that Plaintiff and her dog would not be excluded again. The manager also gave Plaintiff the address and telephone number for corporate headquarters. See id. at 24-25.

That same day, Plaintiff wrote a letter to corporate headquarters complaining of the treatment she experienced at Wal-Mart and Sam's Club. Plaintiff sought to train Defendants' employees properly and to obtain a promise that she would never again be harassed on account of her entering one of Defendants' stores with a service dog. See id. at 25.

When Plaintiff did not receive a response to her letter, she telephoned corporate headquarters to inquire whether they received the letter. Defendants stated that they could not find a copy of the letter on file. Plaintiff then requested the name and fax number for Wal-Mart's president. On May 24, 1998, Plaintiff again wrote a letter complaining of the treatment she received at the East Greenbush Wal-Mart and the Latham Sam's Club. See id. at 25-26.

In late May 1998, a representative of either Wal-Mart or Sam's Club responded by telephone to Plaintiff's letter. Because Plaintiff was not home at the time of the this telephone call, the representative left a message stating that she had taken care of the problem, that they had trained their associates, and that if Plaintiff had any questions she could feel free to call. Plaintiff returned the telephone call and offered to assist in training employees. The representative declined Plaintiff's offer and stated that she would not again be subjected to such treatment. See id.

Approximately one month later, Plaintiff entered a Sam's Club store. The greeter asked Plaintiff if her dog was a service dog, to which she responded that it was. The greeter then asked Plaintiff whether she could explain to him what a service dog is. Plaintiff proceeded to educate the greeter about what her dog did, the dog's value, and her rights under the ADA. The greeter thanked Plaintiff and returned to his post. See id. at 26-27.

Finally, a third instance occurred in July 1998 in the East Greenbush Wal-Mart. Plaintiff entered and shopped at the store without incident. However, when she was waiting on line to pay for her items, a store employee approached her and inquired whether her dog was a service dog. Plaintiff responded that it was. The employee then asked if Plaintiff was blind. Plaintiff responded that it was none of his business and it should be sufficient for him to know that the dog was a service dog. The employee allegedly responded that he needed to know if she was blind enough to have a service dog and if she did not tell him if she was blind he would eject her from the store. A supervisor then appeared, stated that the matter was improperly handled, and apologized for the employee's behavior. The assistant manager then approached Plaintiff to resolve the matter. Plaintiff told the manager what happened, stated that she would never come back to the store, made her purchases, and left. See id. at 33-34.

Plaintiff continued to shop at Sam's Club until approximately February 1999 without incident. See id. at 41. In fact, the records submitted by Defendants reveal that Plaintiff purchased items at Sam's Club on at least six occasions after the May 12 incident. See Def. Ex. I (Plaintiff's Sam's Club Purchase History).

Plaintiff has since discontinued shopping at Wal-Mart and has allowed her Sam's membership to expire. Instead, Plaintiff drives longer distances to shop at other stores.

Scott Lewis, who was the manager of Sam's Club at the time of the instances alleged in the Complaint, testified at deposition that Sam's Club trains its employees to assist disabled members and allow service animals into the facility. See Lewis Dep. at 13. He further testified that there are signs at the entrance welcoming service animals. Moreover, in response to the incident with Plaintiff, Lewis discussed the matter at morning meetings for several days "to make sure our partners and associates understand service animals." Id. at 15-16. Lewis explained that "the service animal would have a harness on them identifying them as a service animal. If there wasn't a harness, we had every right to ask if it was a service animal." Id. at 20-21.

Shawn Ramsdell, who was the co-manager at the East Greenbush Wal-Mart at all times relevant hereto, testified at deposition that sales associates and greeters are trained on matters related to disabled individuals. See Ramsdell Dep. at 18-23. He also testified that store policy is to permit all service animals in the store, although he was unsure how an employee could recognize a service animal without having to ask the individual. See id.

Plaintiff commenced the instant action claiming violations of Title III of the ADA and the New York Civil Rights Law on account of her disability. Plaintiff seeks compensatory and punitive damages and an order requiring Defendants to adopt and/or modify...

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