Stanaland v. Jamison, 21221

• Decision Date: 07 May 1980
• Docket Number: No. 21221,21221
• Citation: 275 S.C. 50,268 S.E.2d 578
• Court: South Carolina Supreme Court
• Parties: Patsy C. STANALAND, Appellant, v. Robert G. JAMISON, Respondent.

Page 578

268 S.E.2d 578

275 S.C. 50

Patsy C. STANALAND, Appellant, v. Robert G. JAMISON, Respondent.

No. 21221.

Supreme Court of South Carolina.

May 7, 1980.

Jan L. Warner, Sumter, for appellant.

David W. Keller, Jr., of McGowan, Nettles, Keller & Eaton, Florence, for respondent.

LITTLEJOHN, Justice:

The appellant, Patsy C. Stanaland (wife), and the respondent, Robert G. Jamison (husband), were formerly married. Incident to their separation they entered into a property settlement agreement dated September 1, 1976. That settlement agreement has been incorporated into an order of the Family Court of Florence County and has become, in addition to a contract, the court's directive. The contract was entered into after much negotiation, with each of the parties being represented by counsel.

Included in the contract are two provisions, which were construed by the trial court and are now before us by reason of exceptions taken by the wife. They are as follows:

"(b) The husband shall pay the sum of $500.00 per month beginning September 1, 1976 for the support and education of each child until such child shall die, marry, or become emancipated, whichever event first occurs, provided, that in addition to this sum, the husband agrees to pay the annual tuition for each child as he or she becomes of school age at a private primary or secondary educational institution equivalent to James F. Byrnes Academy, Florence, South Carolina, provided further, that the husband shall pay all reasonable medical expenses incurred by each child ;

(c) The husband shall provide college tuition and ordinary expenses for each child at a college or university selected by such child with the advice and consent of the husband and wife which obligation on the part of the husband shall be limited to the amount then paid at a state-supported college or university, provided, that should either child not desire to attend such institution or should become married or otherwise emancipated prior to or during such post-secondary education tenure, then and in that event, the husband's obligation for college expenses would cease and desist, provided further, that the husband's obligation to provide the college expenses set forth herein shall remain in effect only so long as each child is enrolled as a full-time student and is making average or better progress in the areas of his studies and passing from one year to the next." (Emphasis added.)

It is the contention of the husband that paragraph (b) of the contract requires him to pay a total of only $500.00 per month support for the two children and that such support is adequate. It is the contention of the wife that according to this contract the husband should pay $1,000.00 per month for the support of the two children.

Without holding that the terms of the contract were ambiguous, the trial judge found that the contract required the husband to pay to the wife for the support and education of the two children the sum of Five Hundred Dollars per month and not One Thousand Dollars per month. It was the opinion of the trial judge that such amount ". . . is fair, equitable and just."

The order continued by ruling:

"Even if the Agreement could be construed as requiring a total payment of One Thousand ($1,000.00) Dollars for the two (2) children (with which interpretation I disagree), in the opinion of the Court the Petitioner by and through her actions has acquiesced in a modification of this Agreement for a period in excess of two years and such acquiescence has not in any way been detrimental to the minor children. There is no evidence that they have not been adequately provided for, financially or otherwise."

The wife has appealed, taking the position in essence that the contract is not ambiguous and that the husband is bound by its terms. We agree.

We think the trial judge erred in undertaking to interpret the provisions of a contract which were not ambiguous. Its terms are clear, and if the parties did not intend to be bound by that which they included in the contract, they should have said so. Oftentimes it becomes the duty of the court to construe a contract which is subject to more than one interpretation, but when the terms of a contract are clear, there is no room for...