Stanberry v. State

• Decision Date: 01 September 1994
• Docket Number: No. 1394,1394
• Citation: 105 Md.App. 200,659 A.2d 333
• Parties: Labaron STANBERRY v. STATE of Maryland. ,
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 200

105 Md.App. 200

659 A.2d 333

Labaron STANBERRY v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 1394, Sept. Term, 1994.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

June 5, 1995.

Melissa M. Moore, Asst. Public Defender (Stephen E. Harris, Public Defender, on the brief), Baltimore, for appellant.

Mary Ellen Barbera, Asst. Atty. Gen., and Michelle N. Levister, Staff Atty. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., on the brief), Baltimore, for appellee.

Submitted before WILNER, C.J., and CATHELL and SALMON, JJ.

CATHELL, Judge.

Appellant, Labaron Stanberry, appeals an order of the Circuit Court for Harford County (Carr, J., presiding), which denied his motion to suppress evidence of controlled dangerous substances found in a bag located in the overhead compartment of a commercial bus on which he was a passenger. Appellant was later found guilty by the court, on an agreed Statement of Facts, of bringing heroin in an amount exceeding four grams into Maryland and was sentenced to fifteen years incarceration. All but three years were suspended in favor of two years probation with credit for time served. The State urges affirmance of the trial court based on general principles of reasonableness. Appellant relies on the Fourth Amendment for his challenge, alleging on appeal that the trial court erred in denying his motion to suppress the evidence.

THE FACTS

On August 16, 1993, at approximately 9:00 p.m., several Maryland State Police officers were stationed at Maryland House on the I-95 corridor. These officers, a part of the State Police's Support Enforcement Division of the Drug Interdiction Unit, are "responsible for interdicting drugs on commercial carriers such as airplanes, buses and AMTRAC [sic] trains." ¹ The officers' purpose that night was "to interdict the illegal contraband, guns and drugs coming into the State of Maryland via Greyhound and other buses that stop" at Maryland House. The officers were dressed in plain clothes and were awaiting the arrival of buses at the rest stop. Around 9:00 p.m., a Greyhound bus from New York City arrived at the rest area. The passengers, including appellant, alighted for the twenty minute stop. ² After approximately twenty minutes had passed, the officers asked the bus driver, who was familiar with the Interdiction Unit's activities, if all the passengers had resumed their seats. The driver performed a head count and indicated to the officers that all were present. At that time, Trooper Edward Burnette made an announcement over the driver's microphone identifying himself and TFC Michael Milburn as police officers and explaining the purpose for their presence on the bus. He also told them that he sought their cooperation in identifying their respective baggage in the overhead compartments. Trooper Milburn began this process at the far end of the bus, while Trooper Burnette began questioning passengers at the front.

Roughly six seats in, the troopers observed what has been described as a black suit bag in the overhead area. When no one claimed ownership of the bag, Trooper Burnette continued down the aisle and, upon completing the identification of all the other baggage, again asked to whom the previously unclaimed bag belonged. Again, he received no response. He repeated his inquiry over the driver's microphone, holding the bag up for all the passengers to see. No one responded. At that point, Trooper Burnette considered the bag to have been abandoned, testifying at the suppression hearing that it had been his experience that "when a bag is not claimed ... [there] is possibly illegal substances in the bag." All told, this procedure took approximately two minutes to complete and, during this time, the driver was not present on the bus.

The bag was then taken off the bus and opened, revealing approximately three hundred packets of heroin and a quantity of cocaine inside. The bag was then closed and Trooper Burnette reboarded the bus to "find a suspect, someone that looked nervous or just ... suspicious ... that would indicate that [the bag] might be his...." While Trooper Burnette was on the bus, appellant approached the vehicle in an attempt to reboard but was detained by the driver, who believed him not to be a passenger. The driver, however, soon acknowledged that appellant was in fact a passenger. Before appellant boarded the bus, Corporal Kevin Welkner asked if the still unclaimed bag, which then hung on the door handle of the bus, belonged to him. Appellant indicated that it did and then, immediately, that it did not. Upon further questioning, appellant is said to have informed Corporal Welkner and Trooper Burnette, who had disembarked by this time, that the controlled dangerous substances that were found were his and that he had been paid three hundred dollars to make the trip to New York City from Richmond, Virginia. Appellant was then placed under arrest and taken to police headquarters.

Prior to trial, appellant moved to suppress the evidence of the controlled dangerous substances, alleging that the search of the bus and seizure of the bag had been unlawfully carried out and that his subsequent statements should be suppressed as "fruit of the poisonous tree," i.e., emanating from the illegal search. The trial court denied the motion and appellant was found guilty of the underlying charges. He filed this timely appeal therefrom.

LEGAL ANALYSIS

In reviewing the denial of a motion to suppress, we look only to the record of the suppression hearing and do not consider the record of the trial. Trusty v. State, 308 Md. 658, 670-71, 521 A.2d 749 (1987) (quoting Jackson v. State, 52 Md.App. 327, 332 n. 5, 449 A.2d 438, cert. denied, 294 Md. 652 (1982)); Watkins v. State, 90 Md.App. 437, 439, 601 A.2d 1115, cert. denied, 327 Md. 80, 607 A.2d 921 (1992); Pharr v. State, 36 Md.App. 615, 618, 375 A.2d 1129, cert. denied, 281 Md. 742 (1977). We are further limited to considering only those facts that are most favorable to the State as the prevailing party on the motion. Riddick v. State, 319 Md. 180, 183, 571 A.2d 1239 (1990). See also Simpler v. State, 318 Md. 311, 312, 568 A.2d 22 (1990). In considering the evidence presented at the suppression hearing, we extend great deference to the fact finding of the suppression judge with respect to determining the credibility of the witnesses and to weighing and determining first-level facts. Perkins v. State, 83 Md.App. 341, 346, 574 A.2d 356 (1990). When conflicting evidence is presented, we must accept the facts as found by the hearing judge unless it is shown that his findings are clearly erroneous. Riddick, 319 Md. at 183, 571 A.2d 1239. Even so, as to the ultimate, conclusionary fact of whether a search was valid, we must make our own independent constitutional appraisal by reviewing the law and applying it to the facts of the case. Id.; Perkins, 83 Md.App. at 346, 574 A.2d 356. With this in mind, we turn to the case sub judice.

The trial court, in ruling on appellant's motion to suppress, made the following findings of fact:

That the Defendant in this case left the bus, as did everyone else that was an occupant, who went into the Maryland House for refreshments or whatever. And that this included the Defendant.

And that at the time he left the bus to go to the restaurant or the rest room that he had no intention of abandoning the property which was his, namely the black bag or luggage.

And that ... he willfully intended to return to the bus and secure possession of his property and be on his way.

Having found that, I also find that since it was luggage and was his and it had contents, that he had a legitimate expectation of privacy in the luggage.

....

And I find as a fact that it was a logical inference, and a reasonable inference for the Troopers to then regard the property as abandoned since no one on the bus had owned up to it as being theirs.

And I also find that it is reasonable under those circumstances to examine the contents of the bag, having inferred from the facts that the property had been abandoned.

The trial court then proceeded to discuss the Fourth Amendment implications of the interdiction at issue:

So the first question we have to answer is whether or not under the Fourth Amendment this is an unreasonable search and unreasonable seizure.

There is an abandoned property doctrine which basically provides it is not unreasonable to make an exploratory examination of property that has been abandoned. And the rationale behind that is because there is no expectation of privacy in ... property that has been abandoned.

....

In this case, the facts on the surface to the police officers appeared or showed that the property was abandoned, when in fact this was not correct, since the rather unusual facts in this case were that the Defendant wasn't on the bus, he didn't have an opportunity to speak up whether it was his or not and ... no one else owned up to it, which makes sense, because it wasn't anyone else's bag.

I would find from this that the Troopers had no reason to believe that the property was not abandoned. There was no factor there that would point to anything other than nobody owning up to the property, therefore it looks like it's abandoned.

I am going to find ... that where the facts reasonably show abandonment, even though that's not the case, then it is reasonable to examine the contents of property that appears to be abandoned.

Getting ... back to the issue of expectation of privacy, that's not the whole answer. The fact that somebody has the expectation of privacy in property is only a part of it. A person that has such an expectation cannot complain where the search is otherwise said to be reasonable.

... In fact as far as I can see, this search and seizure is no more unreasonable than searching a bag that the Defendant does not claim as his own--tracking the facts of the [Florida v. ] Bostick decision.

Upon our independent constitutional appraisal, we conclude that the trial court was...