Stancavage v. Saul

Decision Date29 June 2020
Docket NumberCivil No. 1:19-CV-1296
CourtU.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania
Parties Kathleen A. STANCAVAGE, Plaintiff v. Andrew M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant

Thomas D. Sutton, LeVanthal, Sutton & Gornstein, Trevose, PA, for Plaintiff.

George Michael Thiel, U.S. Attorney's Office, Scranton, PA, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

Martin C. Carlson, United States Magistrate Judge

I. Introduction

The Supreme Court has recently underscored for us the limited scope of our review when considering Social Security appeals, noting that:

The phrase "substantial evidence" is a "term of art" used throughout administrative law to describe how courts are to review agency factfinding. T-Mobile South, LLC v. Roswell, 574 U.S. [293, 301], 135 S. Ct. 808, 815, 190 L.Ed.2d 679 (2015). Under the substantial-evidence standard, a court looks to an existing administrative record and asks whether it contains "sufficien[t] evidence" to support the agency's factual determinations. Consolidated Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 L.Ed. 126 (1938) (emphasis deleted). And whatever the meaning of "substantial" in other contexts, the threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial evidence, this Court has said, is "more than a mere scintilla." Ibid. ; see, e.g., Perales, 402 U.S. at 401, 91 S. Ct. 1420 (internal quotation marks omitted). It means—and means only—"such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Consolidated Edison, 305 U.S. at 229, 59 S. Ct. 206. See Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 153, 119 S. Ct. 1816, 144 L.Ed.2d 143 (1999) (comparing the substantial-evidence standard to the deferential clearly-erroneous standard).

Biestek v. Berryhill, ––– U.S. ––––, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154, 203 L.Ed.2d 504 (2019).

In the instant case, the plaintiff, Kathleen Stancavage applied for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act on October 20, 2016, alleging disability due to severe degenerative arthritis

in both knees, plantar fasciitis in both feet, post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, acid reflux, pain in the legs and feet, and cornea abrasion. (Tr. 151). However, after consideration of the medical records and opinion evidence, including the objective diagnostic tests and clinical findings on Stancavage's physical and mental examinations, Stancavage's longitudinal treatment history, and her documented activities of daily living, the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") who reviewed this case concluded that Stancavage could perform a limited range of sedentary work and denied her disability application.

Mindful of the fact that substantial evidence "means only—‘such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,’ " Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154, we find that substantial evidence supported the ALJ's findings in this case. Therefore, for the reasons set forth below, we will affirm the decision of the Commissioner denying this claim.

II. Statement of Facts and of the Case

Stancavage is a 41-year-old female who is a veteran of the U.S. Army. (Tr. 72). Stancavage has a high school education and a bachelor's degree and master's degree in social work. (Tr. 73-74). On October 20, 2016, Stancavage applied for disability benefits pursuant to Title II of the Social Security Act. (Tr. 25). In this application, Stancavage alleged that she became disabled beginning July 8, 2009, as a result of severe degenerative arthritis

in both knees, plantar fasciitis in both feet, PTSD, degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, acid reflux, pain in the legs and feet, and cornea abrasion. (Tr. 238). Stancavage was 30 years old on her alleged onset date of disability. (Tr. 150). Prior to the alleged onset of her disability Stancavage served as a cashier at a convenience store and a petroleum supply specialist in the U.S. Army (combat infantry). (Tr. 85, 229).

The medical record in this case is mixed and equivocal but contains substantial evidence which indicates that Stancavage retained the capacity to perform some work. Stancavage's medical history indicates that her principal concern was her inability to work due to her PTSD. (Tr. 64-92; Doc. 10 p. 1-20). Specifically, Stancavage alleges that she suffers from severe PTSD stemming from her experiences as part of the combat infantry in Iraq and Afghanistan. (Doc. 10 p. 2). To date, the Department of Veterans Affairs has granted 100 percent service connected disability rating to Stancavage based on her PTSD. (Tr. 500, 942). The ALJ concluded, however, that there is no equivalency between the VA rating system and the Social Security Administration's Rules and Regulations governing the determination of disability. (Tr. 33). Further, a VA rating of total and permanent disability is not legally binding on the Commissioner, because the criteria applied by the two agencies are different. (Id.)

On this score, Stancavage's treatment history discloses that in July 8, 2009, claimant's alleged onset date, Stancavage had an outpatient psychotherapy session for PTSD with Dr. Thomas Roedema. (Tr. 32). Stancavage was on her summer break from school, but planned to start her social work internship in the fall and to graduate in December. (Tr. 788). Stancavage planned to continue until she attained her master's degree in social work. (Id.). During her psychotherapy session, Stancavage stated that most of her social contact was with her sister's children. (Id.). Stancavage indicated that she had an increase in PTSD symptoms from fireworks and old military friends contacting her. (Id.). Dr. Roedema reported, however, that Stancavage demonstrated no disturbances of thought processes or thought content; that her expressive and receptive communication was intact; that she was interpersonally appropriate; and that she did not show any signs of impulsivity. (Id.).

In January 2010, Stancavage saw Dr. Roedema for another outpatient psychotherapy session. (Tr. 32). During the examination, Stancavage admitted to an increase in free time following her graduation from college. (Id.). Stancavage planned to enter a graduate social work program that spring. (Id.). On examination, Stancavage showed no disturbances of thought process or thought content; she had no signs of perceptual disturbances and did not describe any history of the same; her expressive and receptive communication were intact; her mental status findings were the same as her previous psychotherapy appointment; she reported her mood was more anxious and stressed due to back pain, but her affect did not reflect her reported mood. (Id.).

In December 2010, Stancavage met with Dr. Roedema and it was reported that she "seems to be handling things well." (Id.). Stancavage reported that she was completing her schooling, including an internship in social work; she did not feel depressed; and she did not complain of re-experiencing avoidance, or arousal symptoms. (Tr. 797, 889). Stancavage's mood was stable and her affect was within normal limits. (Tr. 797, 889). In March 2011, Stancavage met with Dr. Roedema, however, the conversation primarily concerned Stancavage's relationship issues, and was not related to her PTSD. (Id.). Additionally, on examination, Stancavage revealed normal mental status findings. (Id.).

In May 2012, subsequent to her date last insured, Stancavage had an individual psychotherapy session with Dr. Peter Lielbriedis for treatment for her PTSD. (Id.). The treatment notes revealed that Stancavage was taking amitriptyline

, a psychotropic medication used to treat mental and mood problems, such as depression. (Tr. 421). Additionally, the treatment notes indicated that Stancavage was experiencing trust issues, depression, trouble sleeping, tension, pain, difficulty focusing and concentrating, and problems setting boundaries. (Tr. 421). It was also noted that Stancavage was experiencing difficulty dealing with symptoms consistent with PTSD and that she was managing her PTSD mostly by avoidance. (Id.). In terms of her mental status examination, Dr. Lielbriedis noted that Stancavage presented on time and casually, but appropriately dressed; she was alert and verbal; she had good eye contact; her speech was clear with normal volume, pace, and tone; she was oriented to self, others, and surroundings; and her judgement and insight were within normal limits. (Id.). Dr. Lielbriedis also noted a Global Assessment of Functioning (GAF) score of 65.2

In July 2017, Dr. Frank Mrykalo completed a Psychiatric Review Technique Form, indicating that Stancavage had medically determinable impairments of anxiety and obsessive-compulsive disorders

, during the relevant period. (Tr. 34). Dr. Mrykalo determined that Stancavage had mild restrictions in understanding, remembering or applying information; mild difficulties interacting with others; moderate difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace; and mild difficulties adapting or managing oneself. (Id.).

In July 2017, Dr. Mrykalo also completed a Mental Residual Functional Capacity Assessment. (Tr. 155-56). In the assessment, Dr. Mrykalo concluded that Stancavage was moderately limited in her ability to carry out detailed instructions, maintain attention and concentration for extended periods, complete a normal workday and workweek without interruption from psychologically based symptoms and to perform at a consistent pace without an unreasonable number and length of rest periods. (Id.) Dr. Mrykalo further opined that Stancavage was moderately limited in her ability to interact appropriately with the general public and get along with co-workers or peers without distracting them of exhibiting behavior extremes. (Id.).

In contrast, in November of 2018, Dr. Holly Kricher, who had counseled Stancavage about tobacco use cessation on several occasions in 2011 and 2012, completed a medical source...

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