Stanciel v. Donahoe
| Decision Date | 01 July 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 13-1921,13-1921 |
| Parties | MILTON STANCIEL, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. PATRICK R. DONAHOE, Postmaster General, United States, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit |
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 14a0474n.06
Plaintiff Milton Stanciel sued his former employer, the United States Postal Service, alleging that it did not accommodate his mental disability and terminated him solely because of that disability, all in violation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-797. The district court granted summary judgment to defendant on both claims. We affirm.
Plaintiff suffers from a mental disability. He was first diagnosed with a learning disability when he was 12 years old, as a 6th grade student in the Detroit Public School system. Plaintiff's disability makes it difficult for him to understand directions he is given, and he finds that it greatly aides his ability to learn or understand when people repeat instructions to him orspeak to him slowly. Notwithstanding this disability, plaintiff graduated from high school with the assistance of special education classes. He then attended Wayne Community College for some time, and later the Detroit Business Institute. Plaintiff has an IQ of 69.
Plaintiff began working for defendant as a bulk mail handler in January 1991 and was a member of the National Postal Mail Handlers Union, Local 307. Because of his mental impairment, defendant hired plaintiff through a special, non-competitive hiring process. This process excused plaintiff from taking the standard service entrance exams to determine literacy or ability to serve as an employee. Included among the paperwork completed during the hiring process is a certification of disability form which lists plaintiff as having disability code 90, defined as "mental retardation." All agree that plaintiff excelled at his job as a "sack sorter," keying in zip codes of mail as it passed him on a conveyor belt.
However, plaintiff had serious attendance problems. Plaintiff received thirteen multi-day suspensions for attendance infractions between July 1994 and June 2009. He also received five notices of removal during his tenure that ultimately were modified to provide him with another chance to retain his employment. Admittedly conscious of his attendance issues, plaintiff utilized various strategies to avoid infractions. For example, when he knew he would be late, he would call and ask his supervisor, Donna Bright, to punch him in before he arrived. Bright complied initially but later refused after plaintiff made the request "too many times." Plaintiff also took his timecard home with him overnight so he could clock in at the first time clock he encountered when entering the facility, rather than at the clock closest to his work station, where his timecard normally would be kept. Further, plaintiff obtained Bright's permission to use his annual leave to cover the time he missed when tardy. And, despite the fact that defendantdisciplined plaintiff for being absent without leave on many occasions, plaintiff was aware of the form he needed to complete to comply with the general procedure for requesting time off.
In 2008, plaintiff developed an alcohol abuse problem. He admitted that he had been drinking daily, even before work and on his lunch breaks, and that he had also been using marijuana and cocaine. He also admitted that his drinking problem caused him to be late.
In September 2009, plaintiff participated in another pre-disciplinary interview for attendance problems. Under the attendance policy in effect at plaintiff's location, if an employee has more than three attendance infractions over a ninety-day period, the computer notifies the supervisor to conduct an attendance review. Plaintiff does not dispute that he incurred four violations during the relevant time period: two tardies and two absences. During the meeting, plaintiff cited "car problems" and "transportation" as the reason for his absences. Bright did not offer plaintiff an accommodation for his disability at this time because she did not know one was needed, nor was she ever told that defendant had previously certified that plaintiff was mentally disabled. She was also unaware that plaintiff had a drinking problem, and plaintiff did not inform her of his problem during the interview.
After the investigation was complete, on September 22, 2009, Betty Mitchell, acting Supervisor Distribution Operations, issued a letter of removal notifying plaintiff of his termination effective October 30, 2009. Plaintiff subsequently checked himself into rehabilitation for alcoholism and drug abuse, and on October 8, 2009, he returned to work and worked until his removal date.
In May 2010, as a result of a successful union grievance process related to his termination, plaintiff signed a "redress mediation settlement agreement" with defendant. Under that agreement, plaintiff could have returned to work if he, among other things, passed a drugtest. However, plaintiff later decided that the drug test requirement was unfair, and he rejected the settlement. Plaintiff's grievance was ultimately denied on December 15, 2010, when an arbitrator found that defendant had "just cause" to terminate plaintiff's employment.
In April 2011, plaintiff filed the instant suit against defendant, raising a variety of claims under state and federal law. By 2013, as a result of plaintiff's subsequent abandonment of certain claims and the district court's ruling on defendant's motion to dismiss,1 only two claims remained: (1) disability discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act—based on the above-described mental disability and alcoholism; and (2) gender discrimination under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on both claims, which the district court granted. Plaintiff timely appealed, challenging only the ruling related to his disability discrimination claim based on his mental disability.
We review de novo the district court's grant of summary judgment. Geiger v. Tower Auto., 579 F.3d 614, 620 (6th Cir. 2009). Summary judgment is proper when, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Burley v. Gagacki, 729 F.3d 610, 618 (6th Cir. 2013).
Plaintiff first argues that he has created a genuine issue of material fact on whether defendant terminated his employment "solely because of" his disability in violation of the Rehabilitation Act. We disagree.
The Rehabilitation Act provides that "[n]o otherwise qualified individual with a disability . . . shall, solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity . . . conducted by any Executive Agency or by the United States Postal Service." 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). To prevail on a claim of discriminatory discharge under the Act, a plaintiff must "prove that he was fired solely by reason of his disability." Jones v. Potter, 488 F.3d 397, 409 (6th Cir. 2007) (); see also Lewis v. Humboldt Acquisition Corp., Inc., 681 F.3d 312, 317 (6th Cir. 2012) (en banc) (). An employer makes a termination decision "solely" because of its employee's disability when "the employer has no reason left to rely on to justify its decision other than the employee's disability[.]" Monette v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 90 F.3d 1173, 1183 n.9 (6th Cir. 1996), abrogated on other grounds by Lewis, 681 F.3d at 313-14.
In assessing Rehabilitation Act discrimination claims based on circumstantial evidence— as is the case here—we apply the three-step McDonnell Douglas framework. Gribcheck v. Runyon, 245 F.3d 547, 550 (6th Cir. 2001). First, a plaintiff must set forth evidence from which a jury could conclude a prima facie case of discrimination has been established. Macy v. Hopkins Cnty. School Bd. of Educ., 484 F.3d 357, 364 (6th Cir. 2007). Then, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some "legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason" for its actions. Id.Finally, if the defendant meets that burden, "the plaintiff must identify evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that the proffered reason is actually a pretext for unlawful discrimination." Id.
To establish a prima facie case of discrimination under the Rehabilitation Act, a plaintiff must show that (1) he is disabled; (2) he is otherwise qualified for the position, with or without reasonable accommodation; (3) he suffered an adverse employment decision; (4) the employer knew or had reason to know of his disability; and (5) either the position remained open; he was replaced by a non-disabled person; or similarly-situated non-disabled employees were treated more favorably. DiCarlo v. Potter, 358 F.3d 408, 418 (6th Cir. 2004).
In this case, the district court assumed that plaintiff has established a prima facie case. Defendant does not challenge this determination on appeal. Accordingly, we turn to pretext.
Defendant has articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating plaintiff's employment—his numerous attendance violations. Plaintiff may demonstrate that defendant's rationale is a pretext designed to mask intentional disability discrimination with proof that the attendance rationale had either (1) no basis in fact; (2) did not actually motivate defendant's termination decision; or (3) was insufficient to motivate termination. Jones, 488 F.3d at 406. On this record, plaintiff cannot make that showing.
Plaintiff does not dispute...
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