Stancill v. Ford Motor Co.

Decision Date01 September 1992
Docket NumberNo. 1941-91-1,1941-91-1
CourtVirginia Court of Appeals
PartiesGuilford STANCILL, Sr. v. FORD MOTOR COMPANY. Record

John H. Klein, Norfolk (Rutter & Montagna, on brief), for appellant.

Barry Dorans, Virginia Beach (Samuel W. Meekins, Jr., Wolcott, Rivers, Wheary, Basnight & Kelly, on brief), for appellee.

Present: KOONTZ, C.J., and BAKER and COLEMAN, JJ.

COLEMAN, Judge.

Guilford Stancill, Sr. appeals the Workers' Compensation Commission decision denying his application for compensation benefits based on his claim that he had developed an "occupational disease." Stancill contends that the commission erred in finding the evidence insufficient to prove that he had sustained an occupational disease and, in doing so, the commission either disregarded or failed to consider uncontradicted credible evidence. As cross-error, Ford Motor Company (Ford) contends that the commission erred by using an incorrect legal standard in deciding that a rotator cuff tear can be an occupational disease, rather than an ordinary disease of life, and in failing to find that Stancill had a preexisting, noncompensable condition that had been aggravated by, but not caused by, his employment. We hold that the uncontradicted credible evidence is contrary to the commission's factual findings, which were the basis for its determination that Stancill failed to bear his burden of proving a causal connection between workplace activity and the rotator cuff tear. Thus, the commission's findings are not supported by credible evidence. Consequently, we reverse and remand the claim with directions. Our opinion necessarily addresses the employer's questions raised by cross-appeal.

Guilford Stancill, Sr. was employed by Ford as a welder on its truck assembly line. Stancill's job required him to spot-weld three places on the left side of truck beds using equipment suspended from overhead tracks. From time to time, he was required to spot-weld other designated places on the truck that robots missed. Stancill was also required to affix six steel spring clips onto a steel plate, which was a component part of each truck. He placed the six clips on between forty and forty-seven plates per hour. Beginning in March 1990, Stancill began experiencing pain in his left shoulder and side which grew worse in May or June. When he returned from a vacation in early July 1990, he consulted Dr. Edward Habeeb, who opined that Stancill might be suffering from some shoulder pathology. Dr. Habeeb restricted Stancill's work as of July 10, 1990, pending the determination and treatment of his medical problem. Dr. Habeeb referred Stancill to Dr. Pat L. Aulicino. Dr. Aulicino first examined Stancill on August 6, 1990, in regard to his left shoulder. Aulicino diagnosed Stancill as suffering from subacromial bursitis of the left shoulder, with a possible left rotator cuff tear and radial tunnel syndrome. On August 27, 1990, Dr. Aulicino performed an arthroscopic examination upon Stancill, which confirmed that he had a rotator cuff tear. Dr. Aulicino surgically repaired the shoulder on October 2, 1990. When Dr. Aulicino repaired the rotator cuff, he believed that Stancill's condition was caused by the work that Stancill did on his job with Ford.

On October 19, 1990, Stancill filed a claim with the Workers' Compensation Commission for temporary total benefits, alleging that he had developed a rotator cuff tear that constituted an occupational disease as defined by Code § 65.2-400 1 (formerly Code § 65.1-46). Deputy Commissioner Dely heard the claim and found that Stancill, who had "presented himself as a very credible witness," had sustained a left rotator cuff tear that was directly caused by the cumulative trauma associated with performing his work. Dely found no evidence of any contributing cause outside work. The deputy commissioner held that Stancill had proven that the rotator cuff tear was a compensable occupational disease. The commission reversed. In doing so, the commission did not disagree that a rotator cuff tear may be an occupational disease, but it found the evidence insufficient to establish a causal relationship between Stancill's work activity and the rotator cuff tear. The commission ruled that the medical evidence did not establish that Stancill's rotator cuff tear had its origin in a risk connected with the employment.

Stancill contends that the commission erred as a matter of law in finding the evidence insufficient to prove that his rotator cuff tear arose out of his employment within the meaning of Code § 65.2-400. He asserts that the commission's ruling that no credible evidence exists to prove that the rotator cuff tear was caused by the employment is based upon a misperception of the evidence. We agree. Generally, a ruling by the commission that the claimant's evidence is insufficient to prove that an injury was causally related to the employment must be upheld on appeal because the question is one of causation, which is a factual determination frequently turning upon the weight and credibility accorded to the evidence. Code § 65.2-706(A); Island Creek Coal Co. v. Breeding, 6 Va.App. 1, 12, 365 S.E.2d 782, 788 (1988). Here, however, the commission misperceived the basis for the medical evidence and based its holding on an erroneous factual finding that the doctor's opinion was not based upon his having knowledge of the physical activity and requirements for Stancill to perform his work. The misperception of the evidence was critical to the commission's holding that the claimant had failed to establish that his condition was caused by his employment. Thus, we reverse the commission. The uncontradicted medical evidence proved that the nature of the work that Stancill performed--the repetitive trauma to the shoulder associated with welding and affixing the clips--was the direct proximate cause of Stancill's rotator cuff tear. Therefore, because there was no evidence that Stancill was substantially exposed to any condition outside his work which caused or contributed to cause the condition, the evidence established as a matter of law that the occupational disease arose out of Stancill's employment.

"Factual findings of the Industrial Commission will be upheld on appeal if supported by credible evidence." James v. Capitol Steel Constr. Co., 8 Va.App. 512, 515, 382 S.E.2d 487, 488 (1989); Code § 65.2-706. The causal relationship, or lack thereof, between a disease and employment is a question of fact. Island Creek Coal Co., 6 Va.App. at 12, 365 S.E.2d at 788. Similarly, the "question [of causation] raised by 'conflicting expert medical opinions' is one of fact." Eccon Constr. Company v. Lucas, 221 Va. 786, 790, 273 S.E.2d 797, 799 (1981). The deference that we give to the commission's fact-finding on medical questions is based upon the "unwisdom of an attempt by ... [courts] uninitiated into the mysteries to choose between conflicting expert medical opinions." Johnson v. Capitol Hotel, 189 Va. 585, 590, 54 S.E.2d 106, 109 (1949). Consequently, where the commission resolves the conflict in medical testimony, on appeal the medical issue will not be "settled by judicial fiat," and the commission's decision is binding so long as it is supported by credible evidence. Id. When, however, there is no conflict in the evidence or where there is no credible evidence to support the commission's factual findings, the question is the sufficiency of the evidence, which is a question of law. VEPCO v. Kremposky, 227 Va. 265, 269, 315 S.E.2d 231, 233 (1984); City of Newport News v. Blankenship, 10 Va.App. 704, 708, 396 S.E.2d 145, 147 (1990). 2

Code § 65.2-101 of the Virginia Workers' Compensation Act defines "injury" as either "injury by accident" or "occupational disease." In 1986, the General Assembly revised the occupational disease statute to include certain repetitive and cumulative injuries other than conditions of the neck, back or spinal column. 3 Under Code § 65.2-400, a condition other than an ordinary disease of life, as defined in Code § 65.2-401, is an occupational disease if it arises out of and in the course of employment. The disease shall be deemed to arise out of the employment if it is apparent to the rational mind that a direct causal connection exists between the work conditions and the disease, that it followed as a natural incident from the nature of the work, that it can be fairly traced to the work as the proximate cause, and that it is incidental to the character of the business and had its origin in a risk connected with the employment. Code § 65.2-400. A claimant has the burden of proving that the condition flowed from the employment as a natural consequence. Id.

Despite Dr. Aulicino's uncontradicted medical opinion that Stancill's work activity, which entailed repetitive microtrauma to the left forearm and shoulder, caused the rotator cuff tear in his left shoulder, 4 the commission found that "the evidence is not sufficient to establish [a] causal relationship between work activity and the condition described" and "that the medical evidence does not persuasively show that the employee's rotator cuff tear had its origin in a risk connected with employment." 5 The commission based its findings that Stancill failed to establish causation upon secondary factual findings that Stancill did not identify any specific physical movements that he performed as a part of his employment, "which are, in turn, described by Dr. Aulicino as being the origin and the cause of the rotator cuff tear or the radial tunnel syndrome," and that Stancill's testimony was inconsistent "with the history upon which Dr. Aulicino bases his conclusion as to causation." These subsidiary findings led the commission to discount and to disregard the uncontradicted medical testimony of Dr. Aulicino. We find, however, that these subsidiary findings of fact are either not supported by credible evidence or are based upon the...

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