Stancill v. Stancill

• Decision Date: 13 December 1979
• Docket Number: No. 22,22
• Citation: 286 Md. 530,408 A.2d 1030
• Parties: Larry G. STANCILL v. Bette H. STANCILL.
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 530

286 Md. 530

408 A.2d 1030

Larry G. STANCILL v.Bette H. STANCILL.

No. 22.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

Dec. 13, 1979.

Charles G. Page and Peter Parker, Baltimore (White, Page & Lentz, Baltimore, on brief), for appellant.

Ronald J. Miller, Towson (Bregel & Bregel, Chartered, on brief), for appellee.

Argued before MURPHY, C. J., and SMITH, DIGGES, ELDRIDGE, ORTH and COLE, JJ.

DIGGES, Judge.

This dispute lies at the interface of both the interests of children and the duties and rights of their parents, pursuant to agreement, decree and statute.Specifically, the issue presented is, when both alimony and visitation are provided for in the divorce decree, may an ex-husband interpose his former wife's interference with his right to visit his child as a defense to a contempt citation for nonpayment of alimony?

The parties to this appeal were divorced A vinculo matrimonii by the Circuit Court for Harford County on December 23, 1976, twenty years after their marriage.The decree, which incorporated a written agreement between the parties entered into on November 5, 1976, established that custody of their two children be divided between them the appellantLarry G. Stancill retaining custody of David, and appelleeBette H. Stancill of their daughter, Stacey each subject to specified rights of visitation of the other parent.¹The decree further provided that $150 per week be paid by the appellant to the appellee as "permanent non-modifiable alimony," and that he also pay $40 weekly to his ex-wife for the support and maintenance of Stacey.

On November 10, 1977, the appellee filed a petition in the divorce action seeking to have the appellant adjudged in contempt for failure to make the alimony payments provided for in the decree.At the hearing, the appellant attempted to defend by eliciting testimony concerning the appellee's alleged interference with his visitation privileges as well as the alienation of his daughter's affections for him, both as provided for in the agreement and divorce decree.Mr. Stancill supported this proffer by maintaining that impeding his right to companionship with his daughter constituted bad faith on the part of his former wife so that the equitable doctrine of "clean hands" applied to bar her from enlisting the aid of the equity court to enforce the monetary portion of the decree.The chancellor excluded this proffered testimony on the ground that it was irrelevant to the issue whether the appellant's support payments were in arrears.After determining that Mr. Stancill was in default in the amount of $2,600, the court entered a judgment in that amount in favor of the ex-wife, but dismissed her contempt petition.Mr. Stancill appealed that ruling to the Court of Special Appeals, which affirmed the order of the circuit court.Stancill v. Stancill, 41 Md.App. 335, 397 A.2d 218(1979).It concluded that upon the incorporation of a separation agreement into a divorce decree, the covenants, as a matter of public policy, cease to be, if they formerly were, mutually dependent, and therefore, noncompliance with the decree by one party does not constitute a defense to an action to enforce the decree by the other.Id. at 338, 397 A.2d at 221.We granted certiorari.

Initially, the appellant argues in this Court that the covenants contained in the separation agreement, guaranteeing him reasonable visitation with his daughter, on the one hand, and providing for permanent nonmodifiable alimony to his former wife, on the other, are mutually dependent when viewed in light of ordinary contract principles.He then asserts that the incorporation of the agreement into the divorce decree did not change the dependent nature of the two covenants; thus, in the appellant's view, Mrs. Stancill's material breach of the one provision of the decree constitutes a defense to any legal action by her to enforce the other.We find it unnecessary to address these contentions since we determine that regardless of what may normally result from the incorporation of a separation contract into a decree of divorce, where a provision relating to the custody, maintenance, visitation, care or support of a child is involved, the public policy of this State requires that, in the absence of ambiguity, such items be treated as independent provisions of the contract or decree.

We begin our analysis by noting our decision in Seltzer v. Seltzer, 251 Md. 44, 246 A.2d 264(1968)(per curiam), referred to neither by the intermediate appellate court, nor cited by either party, which we believe is dispositive of the case now before us.There, this Court, when faced with the same claim that the appellant asserts here, denied the father's request to be relieved of his decretal child support and alimony obligations because of his ex-wife's nonconsensual removal of their children from the State, thus effectively denying him his visitation privileges established by the divorce decree.Id. at 45, 246 A.2d at 265.The premise of that result was that the father's obligation for support was not conditioned on whether he could visit his children, but only on what was in the children's best interests.In light of the fact that this Court's opinion in Seltzer does not state in any detail a rationale for the conclusion, we now further explain the law and considerations that factor into the denial of the availability of such a defense.

Under section 3-602(a) of the CourtsArticle of the Maryland Code(1974, 1979 Cum.Supp.), which we have held to be declaratory of the common law, E. g., Price v. Price, 232 Md. 379, 384, 194 A.2d 99, 102(1963);Barnard v. Godfrey, 157 Md. 264, 267, 145 A. 614, 615(1929), courts of equity are granted jurisdiction over minors in these words:

§ 3-602.Custody, guardianship, maintenance and support of child.

(a) Jurisdiction of courts of equity.A court of equity has jurisdiction over the custody, guardianship, legitimation, maintenance, visitation and support of a child.In exercising its jurisdiction, the court may:

(1) Direct who shall have the custody or guardianship of a child;

(2) Determine the legitimacy of a child, pursuant to § 1-208 of the Estates and Trusts Article of this Code;

(3) Decide who shall be charged with the support and maintenance of a child, pendente lite or permanently;

(4) Determine who shall have visitation rights to a child; or

(5) From time to time set aside or modify its decree or order concerning the child.(Md.Code(1974, 1979 Cum.Supp.), CourtsArt., § 3-602(a).)

As is evident from this section, the equity courts of this State have plenary authority to determine questions concerning the welfare of children within their jurisdiction, and such power does not terminate once custody, support and visitation rights have been established by the decree.Id.§ 3-602(a)(5);See, e. g., Ross v. Hoffman, 280 Md. 172, 174, 372 A.2d 582, 585(1977);Monticello v. Monticello, 271 Md. 168, 175-76, 315 A.2d 520, 524(1974), Cert. denied, 419 U.S. 880, 95 S.Ct. 145, 42 L.Ed.2d 145(1975);Price v. Price, supra, 232 Md. at 383, 194 A.2d at 101;Accord, Kicherer v. Kicherer, 285 Md. 114, 118-19, 400 A.2d 1097, 1100-01(1979)(court which establishes guardianship has continuing duty to monitor);Glading v. Furman, 282 Md. 200, 208, 383 A.2d 398, 403(1978)(continuing personal jurisdiction over parent absent from State).For time beyond memory, the public policy of this State has required that, when exercising this authority, the court's paramount concern be to secure the welfare and promote the child's best interest.E. g., Glading v. Furman, supra;Burns v. Bines, 189 Md. 157, 162-163, 55 A.2d 487, 489(1947);Barnard v. Godfrey, supra, 157 Md. at 267, 145 A. at 615;Hill v. Hill, 49 Md. 450, 457, 33 Am.Rep. 271, 276(1878).

The primacy of the interests of the child was explicitly advanced by the General Assembly's enactment of section 28 of Article 16 of the Maryland Code(1957, 1973 Repl. Vol., 1979 Cum.Supp.), which states in part:

§ 28.Effect of agreement and settlements between parties.

Any deed or agreement made between husband and wife respecting alimony, support, maintenance, property rights, or personal rights, or any settlement made in lieu of alimony, support, maintenance, property rights or personal rights shall be valid, binding and enforceable to every intent and purpose, and the deed or agreement may not be a bar to an action for divorce, either a vinculo matrimonii or a mensa et thoro, as the case may be, whether the cause for divorce existed at the time or arose prior or subsequent to the time of the execution of the deed or agreement, or whether at the time of making the deed or agreement the parties were living together or apart.However, Whenever any deed or agreement shall make provision for or in any manner affect the care, custody, education or maintenance of any infant child or children of the parties, the court has the right to modify the deed or agreement in respect to the infants as to the court may seem proper, looking always to the best interests of the infants.(Md.Code(1957, 1973 Repl.Vol., 1979 Cum.Supp.), Art. 16, § 28(emphasis added).)

Section 28, and the decisions of this Court, make it quite clear that the chancellor cannot be handcuffed in the exercise of his duty to act in the best interests of a child by any understanding between parents.E. g., Glading v. Furman, supra;Tvardek v. Tvardek, 257 Md. 88, 97, 261 A.2d 762, 767(1970).Implicit in the principle that a court, looking to the best interests of an infant, may modify the terms of an agreement that "in any manner affect the care, custody, education or maintenance of any infant child or children of the parties" is that any such provisions are to be accorded separate and distinct treatment from other items contained in the compact.We conclude, therefore, that section 28 of Article 16andsection 3-602 of the CourtsArticle, evince a public policy that provisions relating to...