Standard Acc. Ins. Co. v. Doiron
Decision Date | 29 October 1948 |
Docket Number | No. 4356.,4356. |
Citation | 170 F.2d 206 |
Parties | STANDARD ACC. INS. CO. v. DOIRON. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — First Circuit |
Berge C. Tashjian, of Worcester, Mass., (Frank P. Ryan, of Worcester, Mass., on the brief), for appellant.
Philip J. Murphy, of Worcester, Mass., (John M. Hart, of Worcester, Mass., on the brief), for appellee.
Before MAGRUDER, Chief Judge, and GOODRICH (by special assignment), and WOODBURY, Circuit Judges.
The only point on this appeal deserving of any comment is a question of collateral estoppel by judgment, which must be determined by the Massachusetts law, since this cause was removed from the Superior Court for Worcester County, Massachusetts, on grounds of diversity of citizenship.
On July 8, 1939, appellee Ralph H. Doiron, while driving his car in the town of Shrewsbury, Worcester County, Massachusetts, accompanied by his wife, suffered a collision with a car driven by one Miriam P. Coulson. As a result Mr. and Mrs. Doiron each received personal injuries, and their car was damaged. Mrs. Coulson at the time of the accident was a household employee of Claire A. Hosmer. The car which Mrs. Coulson was driving was owned by Mrs. Hosmer and registered in her name. Mrs. Hosmer held a liability insurance policy on this car, issued by appellant Standard Accident Insurance Company, pursuant to the provisions of § 34A of C. 90, Mass. Gen.L.(Ter.Ed.). Under the policy, the insurance company contracted to indemnify against liability not only the insured but also any person responsible for the operation of the insured's motor vehicle with her express or implied consent.
Mr. Doiron brought tort actions in the Superior Court for Worcester County against both Mrs. Coulson and her employer, Mrs. Hosmer, to recover damages for his own personal injuries, for loss of his wife's services, and for damage to his car. He recovered a judgment in the sum of $4,234.23 against Mrs. Coulson; but his action against Mrs. Hosmer failed, the auditor having found that Mrs. Coulson was not at the time of the accident acting as the servant of Mrs. Hosmer within the scope of her employment. Similarly, Mrs. Doiron sued for the personal injuries suffered by her. She recovered judgment against Mrs. Coulson in the sum of $362.36, but judgment went against her in her action against Mrs. Hosmer.
On February 14, 1946, the judgment in her favor against Mrs. Coulson not having been satisfied, Mrs. Doiron filed in the Superior Court for Worcester County a bill in equity against Standard Accident Insurance Company, to reach and apply the proceeds of the aforesaid insurance policy to the satisfaction of the judgment, as provided in C. 214, §3(10), Mass. Gen.L. (Ter. Ed.). The bill was predicated upon the allegation of fact that Mrs. Coulson was driving the car at the time of the accident with the express or implied consent of the insured, and that therefore the contract of indemnity extended to Mrs. Coulson. This issue of fact was resolved against Mrs. Doiron, and her bill was dismissed by final decree of the Superior Court on July 8, 1947.
When Mrs. Doiron filed her bill in equity, Mr. Doiron at the same time filed in the Superior Court for Worcester County a similar bill against the insurance company to reach and apply the proceeds of the same policy to the satisfaction of his judgment against Mrs. Coulson. Upon petition of the insurance company, this suit was removed to the District Court of the United States for the District of Massachusetts. The insurance company filed its answer and amended answer, denying that Mrs. Coulson was operating the car with the consent of the insured, and further pleading res judicata on the strength of the aforesaid decree of the Superior Court for Worcester County dismissing Mrs. Doiron's bill to reach and apply. The case came on for trial in the court below on March 5, 1948. The district court, upon sufficient evidence, found as a fact that Mrs. Coulson was driving the car at the time of the accident with the permission of the insured. The court ruled against the insurance company on its special defense, and entered its decree ordering that appellee's judgment against Mrs. Coulson in the sum of $4,234.23 be satisfied out of the proceeds of the insurance policy. From that decree the present appeal has been taken.
We are of opinion that the decree must be affirmed. In Massachusetts, the general rule is recognized "that a judgment, except in proceedings in rem, is without force save as between the parties to it and their privies, even though such judgments involved precisely the same issues." Jones v. Cella, 1933, 284 Mass. 154, 159, 187 N.E. 294, 295. That was a suit against an insurance company by one who had been injured in an automobile accident, to reach and apply the proceeds of an insurance policy to the satisfaction of a judgment which the plaintiff had recovered against the operator of a motor vehicle; and the court held that a judgment in favor of another person injured in the same accident was not res judicata against the insurance company. See also McCarthy v. William H. Wood Lumber Co., 1914, 219 Mass. 566, 107 N.E. 439; McGreevey v. Boston Elevated Ry Co., 1919, 232 Mass. 347, 122 N.E. 278.
The principle applied in Jones v. Cella, supra, is applicable to the case at bar. The respective causes of action of appellee and his wife were entirely distinct and independent, though they arose out of the same accident. Mr. Doiron was not, and did not have to be, joined as a party-plaintiff in the proceeding brought by his wife. Under C. 209, § 6, Mass. Gen.L.(Ter.Ed.), "A married woman may sue and be sued in the same manner as if she were sole". Any sum recovered by her becomes her exclusive property. Nolin v. Pearson, 1906, 191 Mass. 283, 288, 77 N.E. 890, 4 L.R.A., N.S., 643, 114 Am.St.Rep. 605, 6 Ann.Cas. 658. That there is no privity between husband and wife by virtue of their respective distinct rights of action arising out of a single tortious act is made clear in Erickson v. Buckley, 1918, 230 Mass. 467, 470, 471, 120 N.E. 126, 127, where the court said: ...
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