Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez

• Court: Texas Court of Appeals
• Writing for the Court: CADENA; CANTU
• Citation: Standard Fire Ins. Co. v. Rodriguez, 645 S.W.2d 534 (Tex. App. 1982)
• Decision Date: 24 November 1982
• Docket Number: No. 16788,16788
• Petition History: writ ref'd n.r.e.
• Parties: The STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Lucy G. RODRIGUEZ, Appellee.

Page 534

645 S.W.2d 534

The STANDARD FIRE INSURANCE COMPANY, Appellant, v. Lucy G. RODRIGUEZ, Appellee.

No. 16788.

Court of Appeals of Texas San Antonio.

Nov. 24, 1982.

Rehearing Denied Jan. 13, 1983.

Joe Meador, Thomas Stevens, San Antonio, for appellant.

Richard Knutson, San Antonio, for appellee.

CADENA, C.J., and CANTU and BASKIN, JJ.

OPINION

CANTU, Justice.

This is a worker's compensation case. Standard Fire Insurance Company, hereinafter referred to as Standard, appeals an unfavorable jury finding declaring appellee, Lucy G. Rodriguez, totally and permanently incapacitated. ¹

Standard has raised fifteen points of error which can readily be reduced to two basic contentions. The first ten points of error challenge the sufficiency and presence of the evidence to establish that appellee was within the course and scope of her employment at the time of her injuries. The remaining five points of error challenge the sufficiency and presence of the evidence to support the jury's finding that appellee sustained total and permanent incapacity.

Initially we address Standard's challenge to the jury's finding that the injuries sustained were within the course and scope of appellee's employment. Since the jury heard the testimony of the witnesses in conjunction with the exhibits now before us, and since Standard asserts there was no evidence to support the verdict, we shall consider only that evidence, and reasonable inferences therefrom, which viewed in its most favorable light support the jury findings, and reject all evidence or inferences to the contrary. Garza v. Alviar, 395 S.W.2d 821 (Tex.1965). In re: Kings Estate, 150 Tex. 662, 244 S.W.2d 660 (1951).

Appellee Rodriguez, on June 23, 1976, was employed as a seamstress by the Foree Manufacturing Company, Inc., a business engaged in the manufacture of uniforms. Foree's business is located on the third floor of a building known as the Firestone Building in San Antonio. The entire third floor of the building is leased by Foree from the owners of the building. The remainder is occupied by a concern doing business as Southwest Lighting Company. The Firestone Building is bound on the east side by S. Flores Street, a major thoroughfare, on the south by Graham Alley, on the west by an abandoned railroad easement and on the north by a private parking lot. The building includes loading docks on the north and south sides. It also has entrances on the north, west and south sides.

Access to Foree's work area on the third floor of the building is had by entering a door located within the south loading dock area. Appellee and other employees customarily used this entrance to reach the third floor working area. Also, a freight elevator located within the first floor loading dock area reaches Foree's work area on the third floor and is routinely used by Foree employees for shipping and receiving along with the loading dock. ² There is no evidence that the elevator was ever used by employees of Foree for ingress or egress other than in the course of shipping and receiving. Accordingly, all employees in order to reach the third floor level necessarily entered through the entrance located within the loading dock area adjacent to Graham Alley.

Since Foree did not provide employee parking, employees could gain access to the only entrance by approaching on Flores Street from the north or the south or by being dropped off on Graham Alley. If approaching from the parking lot on the north, access to the building can be gained by using a concrete ramp or walkway forming an extension of the north loading dock and continuing along the west side of the building as a walkway leading to the south loading dock area and thus to the entrance containing the stairways leading to the third floor.

The only entrance to Foree's work area required employees to first enter the loading dock area regardless of the approach the employee took.

The record reflects that some of Foree's employees customarily parked in the private parking lot north of the Firestone building and either walked south on Flores Street or used the loading dock extension towards the entryway.

Foree management had neither prohibited nor designated any particular route of ingress or egress for its employees, but took the simple position that it was responsible for only the area constituting the third floor and ending as of the doorway on the third floor leading to the stairway.

Foree customarily maintained the stairways for the safety of its employees and admitted cleaning them, although it disclaimed any duty or responsibility for their upkeep.

On June 23, 1976, appellee, Lucy G. Rodriguez, during the noon lunch hour, purchased a caladium plant being sold by Foree. Originally, appellee planned to ride a city bus home, but the purchase of the plant required a change of plans. A co-worker offered to give her a ride home and at the end of the work day appellee and her friend punched out, descended the flights of stairs to the loading dock area, walked across the loading dock area towards the parking lot on the north side of the building. While descending the metal stairs attached to the loading dock extension, she lost her balance and fell to the ground, sustaining injuries.

It is undisputed that the loading dock is not a public sidewalk nor a public thoroughfare. It is also undisputed that at the time appellee sustained her injuries she had punched out from work and was not on any special mission or errand for her employer.

Standard asserts that the premises at which appellee fell were neither owned, used, maintained nor controlled by the employer. While there is no issue of ownership, the use, maintenance and control are in dispute.

As admitted by its vice president, Foree habitually used either the north loading dock area, the south loading dock area, or both on a daily basis, thus it was not unusual for Foree employees to be in the areas now disclaimed as Foree's premises. Additionally, there is evidence that Foree employees were parking on the adjacent private parking lot with the full knowledge of Foree management, if not with their consent. Appellee and another witness both testified that employees parking on the private lot routinely used two approaches to the Foree entrance door. Foree denied having knowledge of the employee practice, but admitted that the practice was never prohibited. This position is totally in keeping with Foree's testimony that it did not concern itself with routes taken by their employees before or after entering or leaving the doorway leading to the plant on the third floor. Foree Vice President Ken Sugarman admitted that appellee had to have been in the building in order for her to reach the place of injury.

Although it is undisputed that there was but a single staircase leading to the third floor, the crucial issue is the location of this staircase in relation to the entire building. If the evidence disclosed that the entryway leading to the staircase originated upon a public sidewalk on Graham Alley, our task would be considerably simpler. But the evidence in this regard, although uncontested in some respects, remains susceptible of various interpretations. Under appellee's version she never left the confines of the building when she undertook to use the loading dock area as a means of reaching the parking lot. Under Standard's version, appellee came out upon the loading dock area but Standard considers this area as a portion of the public sidewalk on Graham Alley. The exhibits before us support the conclusion that appellee exited into the loading dock area. We must, therefore, decide whether such constituted a departure from the premises or whether appellee remained upon the premises until the injury occurred.

It is safe to assume that the loading dock area extending from immediately adjacent to the staircase entrance to the point of injury is not, in the strictest sense, on Foree's premises. Yet we may hold the injury compensable if we are prepared to further hold that such place was in such proximity and relation to employee's premises as to be in practical effect a part of her employer's premises.

Standard places principal reliance upon Texas Compensation Insurance Co. v. Matthews, 519 S.W.2d 630 (Tex.1974), as does appellee.

We are directed to the following language found in Matthews:

... Cases in which the employer has evidenced an intention that the particular access route or area be used by the employee in going to and from work, and where such access route or area is so closely related to the employer's premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the premises.

The jury was charged by the court at the request of Standard in the following manner:

If an employee is injured at a place where the employer has evidenced an intention that the particular access route or area be used by the employee in going to and from work, and where such access route or area is owned by employer or is so closely related to the employer's premises as to be fairly treated as a part of the premises, the injury is one in the course of her employment.

Special issue 2 inquired, "Was she injured in the course of her employment?" The jury answered, "Yes."

Standard urges the application of a two-part test in order to properly invoke the "access doctrine" and adds the additional requirement that the evidenced intention be an "obvious manner". Standard further would have us limit the rule's application to a particular route with no consideration given to the possible application of "area." The instruction was given as requested by Standard and did not include the qualifications it seeks to place upon the test now. We decline to add or detract from the announced rule.

We must begin our examination of the applicable law with the general and well-established rule that the benefits of the workers compensation statute do not apply to injuries received going to and from work. Dishman v. Texas...