Standard Generator S. Co. v. National Labor Rel. Bd.

• Decision Date: 23 January 1951
• Docket Number: No. 14188.,14188.
• Parties: STANDARD GENERATOR SERVICE CO. OF MO. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

186 F.2d 606 (1951)

STANDARD GENERATOR SERVICE CO. OF MO. v. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD.

No. 14188.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

January 23, 1951.

C. Willard Max, Clayton, Mo., for petitioner.

Marcel Mallet-Prevost, Attorney, National Labor Relations Board, Washington, D. C. (George J. Bott, General Counsel; David P. Findling, Associate General Counsel and A. Norman Somers, Assistant General Counsel; all of Washington, D. C. and Leonard S. Kimmell, Cincinnati, Ohio, on the brief), for respondent.

Before SANBORN, JOHNSEN, and RIDDICK, Circuit Judges.

RIDDICK, Circuit Judge.

This case is here upon the petition of the Standard Generator Service Company of Missouri, hereinafter called the Company, to review and set aside an order of the National Labor Relations Board (90 N.L. R.B., No. 131), and upon the petition of the Board for a decree of this court enforcing its order. The Board found that the Company, after knowledge that the United Automobile, Aircraft and Agricultural Implement Workers of America, UAW-CIO, in a representation proceeding before the Board had established its right as exclusive bargaining agent for the Company's production and maintenance employees, by ordering a decrease in the wages of its employees without consultation with the Union had violated section 8 (a) (3) of the Labor Management Relations Act, and that it had refused to bargain in good faith with the Union in violation of section 8(a) (5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C.A., § 158(a) (3) and (a) (5).

The Board's order under review requires the Company to cease and desist from (1) discouraging membership in the Union, (2) refusing to bargain collectively with the Union as exclusive representative of its production and maintenance employees, and (3) interfering in any manner with the rights of the employees to self organization and collective bargaining. The order also requires the Company to take the following affirmative action: (1) make whole its employees for any loss of pay suffered by reason of a wage reduction ordered by the Company without consultation with the Union; (2) bargain collectively with the Union as exclusive representative of its employees; and (3) post appropriate notices. The Board expressly found that compliance with the affirmative provisions of the order was necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act.

The Company, in exceptions filed to the intermediate report of the trial examiner and in its petition to review the decision of the Board after the rejection of its exceptions, makes numerous assignments of error in the findings and conclusions of the trial examiner and of the Board in its decision. All these assignments, however, upon analysis, come down to the contention that the findings of the Board were not supported by any evidence. In the brief on behalf of the Company the challenges to the validity of the Board's order are reduced to three in number which, if they mean anything, mean only that the Board's order is without evidence to support it.

With one possible exception to be noted later, there is no dispute in the evidence. The Company offered none in the proceedings before the Board. In this state of the record it is wholly unnecessary to enter upon a detailed discussion of...