Standard Life & Acc. Ins. Co. of Detroit, Mich. v. McNulty
| Decision Date | 16 November 1907 |
| Docket Number | 2,597. |
| Citation | 157 F. 224 |
| Parties | STANDARD LIFE & ACCIDENT INS. CO. OF DETROIT, MICH., v. McNULTY. [1] |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit |
Syllabus by the Court
An agreement to insure one against bodily injuries, except injuries sustained while entering or leaving, or trying to enter or leave, any moving conveyance, and except injuries fatal or otherwise caused by intoxicants, anaesthetics, etc excepts from the promised indemnity fatal injuries sustained while trying to enter a moving passenger car.
(Risks and causes of loss under accident insurance policies, see note to National Acc. Soc. v. Dolph, 38 C.C.A. 3.)
Agreements of insurance are to be construed like other contracts according to the sense and meaning of the terms which the parties use, taken in their plain and popular sense.
The natural and obvious meaning of the terms of a contract must be preferred to any curious hidden sense evolved by the ingenuity of a trained and acute intellect and the exigencies of a hard case.
Henry J. Hersey (Arthur Ponsford, on the brief), for plaintiff in error.
R. S Morrison (Emilio D. DeSoto, on the brief), for defendant in error.
Before SANBORN and VAN DEVANTER, Circuit Judges, and PHILIPS, District judge.
This writ of error was sued out to reverse a judgment against the insurance company and in favor of the beneficiary named in one of its tickets or policies, upon the pleadings which disclosed these facts:
McNulty, the insured, died from injuries which he sustained while he was trying to enter a moving car in which he was a passenger on his way from Los Angeles to Denver. The second sentence of paragraph D of the policy provides that this insurance shall not cover 'injuries sustained * * * while entering or leaving, or trying to enter or leave, any moving conveyance,' and in many other situations. The next sentence reads 'this insurance does not cover any injury fatal or otherwise received while, or in consequence of, being or having been, under the influence of or affected by, or resulting directly or indirectly, wholly or partly, from intoxicants,' and various other causes. Counsel for the plaintiff below contended, and so the court adjudged, that fatal injuries were excluded from the meaning of the word 'injuries' in the former sentence, because the latter sentence expressly included injuries fatal or otherwise. The contention was, and is, that all the terms of a contract should be given effect, and that the words 'fatal or otherwise' in the second sentence have no effect if the word 'injuries' in the preceding sentence includes injuries that are fatal as well as those that are not. The argument seems to be fallacious. The words 'fatal or otherwise' were not used to qualify or affect the injuries described in the former, but those specified in the latter sentence, in the sentence in which they were written only. They were inserted in this sentence to make it clear beyond question that all injuries, whether fatal or otherwise, resulting from intoxicants, and the other causes there specified were not covered by the insurance. They accomplish this purpose, and have their intended effect just as completely whether the word 'injuries' in the preceding sentence is interpreted to include all injuries, or only those that are fatal, or those that are not fatal, only.
It is obvious that there are two classes of injuries. Those that are fatal, and those that are not fatal. The word 'injuries' is a generic term, and it naturally includes injuries of both classes, because no one of either class is not an injury. Again the word is known by its associates and by the sense in which it is used in other parts of the same contract or in similar agreements. The first sentence of the policy reads that the company 'hereby insures the person whose name is entered upon the stub of this ticket * * * against loss of time resulting from bodily injuries * * * '; (A) to the amount of $2,500 if death results from such injuries within 90 days; (B) to the amount of $12.50 per week for 26 weeks, if such injuries should wholly disable the insured during that time, and if such injuries shall not so disable...
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