Standard Oil Co Indiana v. United States

• Decision Date: 20 March 1931
• Docket Number: No. 384,384
• Parties: STANDARD OIL CO. (INDIANA) v. UNITED STATES et al. Argumed
• Court: U.S. Supreme Court

283 U.S. 235

51 S.Ct. 429

75 L.Ed. 999

STANDARD OIL CO. (INDIANA)

v UNITED STATES et al.

No. 384.

Argumed March 20, 1931.

Decided April 13, 1931.

Messrs. John R. Cochran and L. L. Stephens, both of Chicago, Ill., for appellant.

Mr. John Lord O'Brian, Asst. to Atty. Gen., for the United States and the Interstate Commerce Commission.

Mr. Louis H. Strasser, of St. Louis, Mo., for appellee carriers.

Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a suit in equity brought in the court below against the United States, the Interstate Commerce Commission, and some fifty interstate railway carriers, under the provisions of the Urgent Deficiencies Act of October 22, 1913, c. 32, 38 Stat. 208, 219, abolishing the Commerce Court and transferring its jurisdiction to the several district courts of the United States. The provisions conferring jurisidction are found in chapter 309, 36 Stat. 539 (- U. S. C., title 28, § 41 (27,28), 28 USCA § 41 (27, 28) and include the following cases:

'First. All cases for the enforcement, otherwise than by adjudication and collection of a forefeiture or penalty or by infliction of criminal punishment, of any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission other than for the payment of moeny.

'Second. Cases brought to enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend in whole or in part any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission.'

Appellant sought to enjoin and annul an order of the Commission dismissing two complaints filed with that body to recover damages for numerous alleged overcharges exacted by the carriers. The petition also prayed that the Commission be directed by the court to enter an order 'granting the prayer of said complaints, and finding that petitioner has been overcharged by an amount which is equal to the difference between the rates assessed by said defendant carriers and the rates lawfully applicable to said petitioner's shipments, and ordering a further hearing, if necessary, for the purpose of determining the amount of money to be paid by the defendant carriers to petitioner by way of reparation. * * *' The complaints alleged overcharges on about 2,500 shipments of pertroleum products originating at Wood River, Ill., or at points west of the Mississippi River, and carried to various eastern destinations. It is unncessary, in view of our conclusions, to state the case at length. It is fully set out in the reports of the Commission (113 I. C. C. 597; 139 I. C. C. 297), and in the opinion of the court below.

The rates assailed before the Commission were those charged according to what is called the 'Kelley tariff.' Appellant contended that there were in effect specific rates taking precedence which were lower and should have been applied. The order of the court below, constituted of three judges as required by the Urgent Deficiencies Act was, in effect, a dismissal of the petition for the want of jurisdiction, 41 F.(2d) 836; and with that action we agree.

First. The Commission made two reports, one following the original hearing, and the other after reargument. The order based upon these reports simply dismissed the complaints; that is to say, the Commission refused to grant any affirmative relief to the appellant. It is plain that the order is negative both in form and effect. The jurisdiction of the district courts (transferred from their predecessor, the Commerce Court), in this class of cases, embraces (1) those brought for the 'enforcement' of orders of the Commission, and (2) those brought to 'enjoin, set aside, annul, or suspend in whole or in part' such orders. It is obvious that this language was not intended to apply to puely negative orders. A negative order which denies relief without more compels nothing requiring enforcement, and contemplates no action susceptible of being stayed by an injunction or affected by a decree setting aside, annulling, or suspending the order.

The question in the present case depends upon the correct interpretation and application of the second subdivision of the act conferring jurisdiction, referred to and quoted supra; and necessarily the district court was without jurisdiction under the settled construction of that provision by which the authority of the court is limited to the review of affirmative orders, with 'power to relieve parties in whole or in part from the duty of obedience to orders which are found to be illegal.' Procter & Gamble v. United States, 225 U. S. 282, 292-293, 32 S. Ct. 761, 765, 56 L. Ed. 1091; Manufacturers Ry. Co. v. United States, 246 U. S. 457, 483, 38 S. Ct. 383, 62 L. Ed. 831; Piedmont & Nor. Ry. v. United States, 280 U. S. 469, 477, 50 S. Ct. 192, 74 L. Ed. 551.

Second. The case before the Commission did not, as contended, involve merely the construction of the written words employed in a rate tariff-a simple question of law; but required consideration of matters of fact and the application of expert knowledge for the ascertainment of the technical meaning of the words and a correct appreciation of a variety of incidents affecting their use. It is evident from an inspection of the record, as the Commission in its first report said, that 'both cases concern unusually complicated and technical tariff situations,' the proper determination of which called for the exercise of the trained judgment of that body of experts, 'appointed by law and informed by experience.' Illinois Cent. etc., R. R. v. Inter. Com. Comm., 206 U. S. 441, 454...