Standard Oil Co. of Indiana v. United States
Decision Date | 22 July 1908 |
Docket Number | 1,409. |
Parties | STANDARD OIL CO. OF INDIANA v. UNITED STATES. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit |
On Rehearing, November 10, 1908.
John S Miller and Moritz Rosenthal, and Alfred D. Eddy, for plaintiff in error.
Edwin W. Sims, U.S. Dist. Atty., and James H. Wilkerson, Sp. Asst U.S. Atty.
Before GROSSCUP, BAKER, and SEAMAN, Circuit Judges.
The writ of error is to the judgment and sentence of the District Court, fining plaintiff in error in the sum of twenty-nine million, two hundred and forty thousand dollars, upon a verdict of guilty upon 1,462 counts of an indictment, each charging plaintiff in error with having, on a date mentioned within the period from September 1, 1903, to March 1, 1905 unlawfully and knowingly accepted and received from the Chicago & Alton Railway Company a concession in respect of the transportation of certain property of plaintiff in error therein mentioned, in interstate commerce, whereby such property was transported, in such interstate commerce, at a rate less than that named in the tariffs published and filed by said Railway Company, as required by the act to regulate commerce and the acts amendatory thereof.
The indictment is based upon section 1 of the Act approved February 19, 1903 (32 Stat. 847, c. 708 (U.S. Comp. St. Supp. 1907, p. 880)), formerly known as the 'Elkins Act,' wherein it was provided:
The fine actually imposed, was the maximum penalty provided.
The provision of the interstate commerce act relating to the publishing and filing of rates is as follows: * * *
'And when any such common carrier shall have established and published its rates, fares and charges, in compliance with the provisions of this section, it shall be unlawful for such common carrier to charge, demand, collect or receive from any person or persons, a greater or less compensation for the transportation of passengers or property, or for any services in connection therewith, than is specified in such published schedules of rates, fares and charges as may at the time be in force.
Act March 2, 1889, c. 382, Sec. 1, 25 Stat. 855 (3 U.S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3156; 3 Fed.St.Ann. 827-829).
Each count of the indictment is based upon a car load of petroleum and products of petroleum, irrespective of the number of pounds, carried by such car (in some cases thirty thousand pounds, in other cases eighty thousand pounds) and irrespective, also, of whether the car constituted the whole or a part only of an actual shipment-- the plaintiff in error being convicted of as many offenses as there were car loads, although each car load was in some instances but one only, in a number of car loads that made up the shipment.
From 1 to 885 inclusive, the counts charge, that during the period covered by the shipment, the said Chicago & Alton Railway Company, as required by law, kept open for public inspection at Whiting and Chappell, its printed tariffs and schedules then in force upon its route; and, as required by law, filed copies of such tariffs and schedules with the Interstate Commerce Commission; which tariffs and schedules, so published and filed, showed the rate for the transportation of petroleum and products of petroleum, in car load lots, from Whiting, Indiana, to East St. Louis, Illinois, to be eighteen cents per one hundred pounds, all of which was well known to the plaintiff in error; but that said Railroad Company, at the request, and on account of said plaintiff in error, did unlawfully engage in the transportation in interstate commerce from Whiting to St. Louis, of the property named, at a total rate and charge to said plaintiff in error, for such transportation, of six cents for each one hundred pounds, under a common arrangement between the said Railway Company and the Chicago Terminal Transfer Railroad Company, for continuous carriage and shipment of such property from Whiting to East St. Louis; wherefore the plaintiff in error unlawfully did knowingly accept and receive from said Railway Company, the concession named.
The remaining counts of the indictment from 886 to 1903 inclusive, are in the same form as the previous counts (except as to the dates, weight, description of property, number of car and the like) with this exception, that the transportation was charged to be from Chappell, in Illinois, to St. Louis in the State of Missouri-- the published tariff being charged to be nineteen and one-half cents per one hundred pounds, and the total rate and charge to plaintiff in error being seven and one-half cents for each one hundred pounds.
There are one hundred and sixty-nine assignments of error, taking up seventy-six pages of the printed record. In view of the conclusion, however, to which we have come, it is unnecessary to review many of these assignments-- the ones reviewed covering all the propositions of law that we deem essential to the guidance of the District Court in the event of a second trial. Comprehensively stated, the assignments of error that we shall review, relate:
First: To the view adopted by the trial court, carried out in its rulings on the admission and exclusion of evidence, and embodied in its charge to the jury, that a shipper can be convicted of accepting a concession from the lawfully published rate, even though it is shown, as bearing on the matter of intent, that the shipper, at the time of accepting such concession, did not know what the lawfully published rate actually was;
Secondly: To the view adopted by the trial court that the number of offenses is the number of car loads of property transported, irrespective of whether each car load constituted the whole or a part only, of a single transaction resulting in a shipment; and
Thirdly: Whether, in the imposition of the fine named, the trial court abused the discretion vested in the court.
We shall take up these subjects in the order stated, the first being whether a shipper can, without error, be convicted of accepting a concession from the lawful published rate, even though it is shown, as bearing on the matter of intent, that the shipper, at the time of accepting such concession, did not know what the lawful published rate actually was-- a view of the law that is embodied in the charge, and carried out in the ruling excluding certain proffered testimony including as a result...
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