Standard Oil Co. of New Jersey v. Midgett

• Decision Date: 06 January 1941
• Docket Number: No. 4702.,4702.
• Citation: 116 F.2d 562
• Parties: STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW JERSEY v. MIDGETT et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fourth Circuit

116 F.2d 562 (1941)

STANDARD OIL CO. OF NEW JERSEY v. MIDGETT et al.

No. 4702.

Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit.

January 6, 1941.

J. L. Emanuel, of Raleigh, N. C. (Pou & Emanuel, of Raleigh, N. C., on the brief), for appellant.

M. B. Simpson and John H. Hall, both of Elizabeth City, N. C., for appellees.

Before PARKER, SOPER, and DOBIE, Circuit Judges.

DOBIE, Circuit Judge.

This appeal involves an action for damages brought by the plaintiff for the destruction by fire of his premises, which, it is alleged, was due to an explosion and fire on the premises of defendant, which spread to the buildings of the plaintiff. The jury brought in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff against the defendant, and judgment was duly entered thereon. There is no complaint on the part of defendant as to the rulings of the trial judge on the evidence. Defendant did, however, ask for an instruction by the trial judge directing a verdict for the defendant, and this was denied. The only question before us on this appeal is the correctness of the trial judge in refusing to give this instruction. Defendant does not complain of the trial judge's other instructions which appear to have been quite favorable to the defendant.

There were a number of other actions in addition to that of Midgett. In all these actions, the complaints contained identical allegations of negligence and the defendant's answers denying liability were all identical. These actions were all consolidated and tried as one, with separate issues as to the amount of damages for each plaintiff. To simplify the appeal, only the record in the Midgett case has been certified to this Court, and by stipulation, the remaining cases will abide the result of this appeal.

We therefore, must consider whether there was evidence substantial and sufficient enough to go to the jury on the question of the negligence of the defendant. In such consideration, the evidence must be viewed from the standpoint most favorable to plaintiff and the plaintiff is further entitled to every reasonable intendment and every proper inference which may legitimately be drawn from the evidence. McAtee v. Branning Manufacturing Co., 166 N.C. 448, 82 S.E. 857; Sampson v. Jackson Brothers Company, 203 N. C. 413, 166 S.E. 181; Dozier v. Wood, 208 N.C. 414, 181 S.E. 336. See also Garrison v. United States, 4 Cir., 62 F.2d 41; Moore's Federal Practice 3106; 64 C.J. 407.

We think the trial judge was altogether correct in refusing to direct a verdict for the defendant. Such a ruling, we believe, can be justified in this case on either the theory of res ipsa loquitur or upon the doctrine of general negligence.

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has thus been set out: "Res ipsa loquitur. The thing itself speaks, the occurrence tells its own tale, — an expression which applies to a certain class of phenomena so probative on the issue of negligence that their occurrence is held to present a prima facie case of negligence, which, unless counter evidence is produced by the defendant tending to show his absence of negligence, justifies the jury in finding him guilty of negligence. Where that which causes an injury is under the management and control of the defendant, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management and control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation, that the accident is the result of the want of care." Ballentine's Law Dictionary, p. 1129. See also 9 R.C.L. 1259; 20 R.C.L. 185; 45 C.J. 1193, 1200. This statement of the doctrine seems to be directly in line with the applicable North Carolina decisions. Fitzgerald v. Southern Ry. Co., 141 N.C. 530, 54 S.E. 391, 6 L.R. A.,N.S., 337; Stone v. Texas Co., 180 N. C. 546, 105 S.E. 425, 12 A.L.R. 1297; Newton v. Texas Co., 180 N.C. 561, 105 S.E. 433; Fox v. Texas Co., 180 N.C. 543, 105 S.E. 437; Springs v. Doll, 197 N.C. 240, 148 S.E. 251.

Judge Meekins charged the jury that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could be applied if, but only if, the jury found that the explosion in the warehouse of the defendant was prior in time to the fire. Inasmuch as the jury did so find, all that we need decide is whether there was substantial evidence in the record to support its finding. We believe that there was such evidence and we accordingly affirm the judgment in the court below.

It is significant that the witnesses who were closest to the warehouse at the time of the explosion and the fire, and whose opportunities for observation were the best, testified in no uncertain terms that the explosion came first and the fire later. Thus, Floyd Berry testified that he was one hundred and fifty feet from the warehouse at about five-thirty on the morning of September 11, 1939, the date of the explosion and the fire. He was asked: "Did the fire follow that explosion?" and answered: "Yes, sir". He further testified that prior to the time of the explosion, he observed nothing out of the way around the warehouse and no signs of any fire until after the explosion. Again, when asked: "What, if anything, did you see at the Standard Oil Company's warehouse?", he replied: "Explosion". Then, when immediately he was asked: "An explosion of what?", his answer was "Some sort of oil and afterwards was the fire". He further testified that at the time of the explosion, he saw a barrel, drum or some similar metal object blown through the roof of the warehouse. He gave evidence further to the effect that he had been at the spot from which he observed the explosion for about half an hour before the explosion, with a clear view of the warehouse, and that, during this period, he saw no sign of fire or smoke before the explosion.

Similar testimony was given by Orlando Burrus, who stated that he was about two hundred feet from the warehouse at the time of the explosion and fire. When asked "If there was any fire in that warehouse before you saw the explosion", he replied: "None that I could see". To the question: "Where did the fire first appear?" his answer was: "Right at the roof, where the barrel went through". He reiterated his previous testimony later, for on being again asked: "Did you see any sign of any fire in that building before the explosion?", his answer was: "No, sir".

These two witnesses were further corroborated by the testimony of Claude Wise, who was about two hundred and fifty feet from the warehouse at the time of the explosion and fire, and who also stated that his view of the warehouse was unobstructed. He was asked: "What, if anything, did you see at that time when you looked over there in the way of fire and smoke?" and he answered: "I didn't see anything at all". He was further asked: "You could not see inside the building, could you?", and his answer was: "Oh, if there had been fire inside the building, I could have seen the smoke". And when asked: "when you first knew of anything, you say you heard and felt an explosion?", he replied: "Yes, sir".

Defendant's witness, L. B. Midgett, testified that shortly before the explosion and fire, he had passed in a boat within a few feet...