Standard Oil Co. v. Allen, 3339.

• Decision Date: 02 June 1920
• Docket Number: 3339.
• Citation: 267 F. 645
• Parties: STANDARD OIL CO. v. ALLEN.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — District of Columbia Circuit

267 F. 645

STANDARD OIL CO. v. ALLEN.

No. 3339.

United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia.

June 2, 1920

Submitted May 5, 1920.

Appeal from the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia.

W. M Lewin and A. L. Sinclair, both of Washington, D.C., for appellant.

W. J Lambert, of Washington, D.C. (R. H. Yeatman, of Washington D.C., on the brief), for appellee.

SMYTH Chief Justice.

Mary E Allen, alleging that she sustained personal injuries through the negligence of one of the drivers of the Standard Oil Company, instituted an action against that company in the Supreme Court of the District. From a judgment in her favor, the company brings the case here for review.

There was testimony tending to show that in June, 1915, the plaintiff, with others, was riding in an automobile going in a northeasterly direction along New York avenue, Washington. As the automobile approached Sixth street, where it intersects the avenue, a heavy steel wagon with a capacity of 800 gallons, drawn by three large horses, belonging to the defendant company, was rapidly advancing from the north on the east or left-hand side of Sixth street toward the avenue.

When the automobile was about to enter Sixth street, the driver of the wagon reduced the speed of the horses and signaled to the driver of the automobile to proceed. He did so, increasing the speed of the automobile somewhat as he advanced. Just as he got in front of the horses, they suddenly rushed forward, and the tongue of the wagon struck the automobile, inflicting upon plaintiff the injuries for which she sued.

Without objection plaintiff introduced in evidence a police regulation, which reads:

'A vehicle shall keep over, as near as practicable, to the right-hand curb, so as to leave the center of the street free and open for overtaking traffic-- the slower the speed the nearer the curb.'

With respect to this regulation the court, at the request of the plaintiff, charged the jury as follows:

'The jury are instructed as a matter of law that if they find from a preponderance of the evidence that the driver of the defendant company violated the municipal regulation offered in evidence requiring vehicles to keep to the right of the street, and that such violation of the regulation was the proximate cause of the collision resulting in the injuries complained of by the plaintiff, then the defendant was guilty of negligence.'

To the giving of this instruction the defendant company objected, 'because,' it said:

'There is no evidence in the case tending to show that violation of said regulation, if the regulation was in fact violated by the defendant, was the proximate cause of the accident, or had any relation whatever to the accident.'

The objection was overruled, and this action of the court constitutes the sole assignment of error in the case.

Witnesses testified that the wagon was on the east side of Sixth street. If it had been on the west side, where the regulation required it to be, the accident would not have taken place. There was therefore sufficient evidence to justify the jury in finding that the regulation was violated, and that its violation was the proximate cause of the injury. What is the proximate cause of an injury--

'is not a question of science or of legal knowledge. It is to be determined as a fact, in view of the circumstances of fact attending it. ' Milwaukee & St. P. Ry. Co. v. Kellogg, 94 U.S. 469, 474 (24 L.Ed. 256).

It was urged in argument that the regulation was not intended for the protection of persons traveling across the street, as the plaintiff was doing when the collision took place, but for the benefit of vehicles approaching other vehicles from the rear-- 'for overtaking traffic'; in other words, that the plaintiff was not within the class of persons for whose benefit the regulation was enacted. St. Louis & S.F.R. Co. v. Conarty, 238 U.S. 243, 249, 35 Sup.Ct. 785, 59 L.Ed. 1290; District of Columbia v. White, 48 App.D.C. 44, 48; Railroad Co. v. Feathers, 78 Tenn. (10 Lea) 103. Even if this were true, it would be immaterial, because the trial court was not asked to reject the instruction on that ground. McMahon v. Matthews, 47 Wash. Law Rep. 37; Lilly v. Hamilton Bank, 178 F. 53, 59, 102 C.C.A. 1, 29 L.R.A. (N.S.) 558. The basis of the company's objection was, as appears above, that there was--

'no evidence * * * that the violation of said regulation * * * was the proximate cause of the accident, or had any...