Standard Oil Co. v. Parrish

• Decision Date: 10 April 1906
• Docket Number: 1,213.
• Citation: 145 F. 829
• Parties: STANDARD OIL CO. v. PARRISH.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

145 F. 829

STANDARD OIL CO. v. PARRISH.

No. 1,213.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

April 10, 1906

C. C LeForgee, for plaintiff in error.

Isaac A. Buckingham, for defendant in error.

At Decatur, Ill., on March 7, 1904, the deceased, a child 10 years old, was burned so severely that within a few days she died. The declaration was in three counts. The first charged that defendant (plaintiff in error) negligently sold to William A. Parrish, father of Jessie, for illuminating purposes five gallons of coal oil which was below the standard of ignition at

150 degrees Fahrenheit, fixed by chapter 104 of the Illinois Revised Statutes of 1881, whereby the oil exploded a lamp in Parrish's home, with the fatal result. The second, in addition to these facts, alleged that defendant sold the oil without having it officially inspected, as required by sections 3 and 4 of chapter 104. That defendant sold to Parrish oil which was not reasonably safe for use in lamps was the basis of the third. The trial resulted in a verdict and judgment for plaintiff. The assignments of error present these questions: Was care owing by defendant to deceased? Did the evidence, without conflict establish that Parrish was contributorily negligent in using dangerous oil? If so, was his negligence imputable to deceased? Was there evidence sufficient to warrant the jury in finding that defendant's sale of dangerous oil was the proximate cause of the injury? Was error committed in permitting plaintiff's witnesses to answer certain questions?

Before GROSSCUP, BAKER, and KOHLSAAT, Circuit Judges.

BAKER Circuit Judge, delivered the opinion.

1. Parrish asked for illuminating oil of the standard quality. Defendant sold him oil which contained gasoline to such an extent that the mixture was liable to explode the ordinary lamp. Invoking the general rule that a manufacturer or vender is not liable to persons who have no contractual relations with him, defendant contends that for its negligent act»it was answerable only to Parrish, the purchaser. But defendant was supplying the oil for illumination, and must have contemplated that it would be burned in the ordinary and usual lamps in the households of the purchasers. Further, the case comes, not under the general rule, but under the well-established exception that one must not knowingly send out an instrumentality which is imminently dangerous without notice of its nature and qualities. Wellington v. Oil Co., 104 Mass. 64; Huset v. J. I. Case Threshing Machine Co., 120 F. 865, 57 C.C.A. 237, 61 L.R.A. 303 and cases there collated.

2. The record falls so far short from establishing affirmatively and without conflict any negligence on Parrish's part, that the jury were justified by ample evidence in finding that prior to the accident Parrish was not chargeable with actual or constructive notice of the dangerous nature of what he bought for standard illuminating oil; so the question of imputed negligence is not involved.

3. Between February 22d, when the oil was purchased, and March 7th, when the accident occurred, the lamp in which this oil was burned flickered and spluttered. Parrish and his wife thought the burner was at fault. After cleaning the old burner was found unavailing, two new ones were bought during the interval. The last one was procured on the day of the accident. It had no air...