Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson
Decision Date | 28 May 1964 |
Docket Number | 2 Div. 433 |
Citation | 165 So.2d 361,276 Ala. 578 |
Parties | STANDARD OIL COMPANY v. Murray L. JOHNSON. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
David J. Vann, White, Bradley, Arant, All & Rose, Birmingham, for appellant.
Richard L. Jones, Birmingham, and P. M. Johnston, Aliceville, for appellee.
This is an appeal by defendant from judgment for plaintiff in action for fraud based on principles stated in § 108, Title 7, Code 1940, which recites:
Errors complained of are that the court erred in: rulings on demurrers to certain pleadings, refusing affirmative charges for defendant, refusing a charge requested by defendant, and overruling defendant's motion for new trial.
Assignments 13 and 15 recite:
These assignments allege no error committed by the trial court and are insufficient to present any question for review. Thomas v. Brook, 274 Ala. 462, 149So.2d 809, and cases there cited.
Assignments 17 and 18 recite:
Such assignments of error raise nothing for review. Thomas v. Brook, supra.
In brief outline, plaintiff charges that defendant furnished to its distributor a tank mounted on a truck; that plaintiff was employed by defendant's distributor to deliver petroleum products to customers; that plaintiff, whth defendant's knowledge and consent, used the tank for making deliveries to customers; that defendant represented to plaintiff that the tank had a volume capacity of 1066 gallons; that said representation was false in that said tank had a capacity of 1069 gallons; that, as a proximate consequence of the misrepresentation, plaintiff was caused to pay to defendant for alleged shortages $2,000.00, was accused of theft and embezzlement, suffered injury to his reputation, suffered impairment to his credit, was caused to lose his employment, and his employability was impaired.
The case was submitted to the jury on Count A which recites:
'Count A
'The Plaintiff claims of the Defendant Ten Thousand ($10,000) Dollars damages for that heretofore in to-wit, November, 1950, and continuously therefrom to the date of this complaint, Defendant represented to Plaintiff that a certain petroleum products delivery tank, property of the Defendant and used by the Plaintiff with the knowledge and consent of the Defendant, had a volume capacity of 1066 gallons; that Defendant acted on said representation in that he relied upon said represented volume capacity in gauging the sale and delivery of petroleum products to wholesale and retail customers;
'That said representation was false in that said tank had a volume capacity of 1069 gallons.
'That as a proximate consequence of said misrepresentation by the Defendant the Plaintiff was injured and damaged as follows: He was caused to pay to the Defendant for alleged shortages large sums of money, to-wit: Two Thousand ($2,000) Dollars; he was accused of theft and imbezzlement; he suffered injury to his reputation; he was embarrassed, humiliated and chagrined; he was caused to borrow large sums of money at a high rate of interest; his credit was impaired; he was caused to lose his employment and his employability was impaired; all to Plaintiff's damage in the sum of Ten Thousand ($10,000); hence this suit.'
Assignment 7 is that the court erred in overruling defendant's demurrer to Count A. Defendant does not specify which ground of demurrer was good, but its argument appears to be in support of Ground 19 which recites that 'it does not appear that Plaintiff and the Defendant were opposite parties in any legal relationship which would subject the Defendant to liability under the facts alleged in the complaint.'
Defendant's argument is that, 'The innocent mistake provisions of Title 7, § 108, are unusual; they apply only where the parties are 'opposite parties." and that here there was no contractual or employment relationship such as to give rise to such a high degree of responsibility.
Neither the statute nor the cases cited, as we understand them, require that, in order to recover under § 108, Title 7, for damage caused by misrepresentation made by mistake and innocently, the deceived party must be in a contractual or employment relation to the defendant. We are of opinion that the statute does not make, between misrepresentations made wilfully to deceive and misrepresentations made by mistake and innocently, the distinction which defendant now contends for. We do not think an employment or contractual relation is essential in either case.
Einstein v. Marshall, 58 Ala. 153, 163. In the Einstein case, the defendant had no employment or contractual relation with the injured party. There defendant had written a letter representing that a merchant was good for several hundred dollars of credit and that was the representation charged to be false. The opinion indicates that the defendant would be liable if the representation was knowingly false or was made recklessly without the maker knowing whether it be true or false, and acted on to plaintiff's loss.
In another case, this court said:
(Par. Supplied.) Cartwright v. Braly, 218 Ala. 49, 52, 117 So. 477, 480.
According to the allegations of Count A, the misrepresentation of the capacity of the tank was the misrepresentation of a material fact; the tank was the property of defendant and was used by plaintiff, with defendant's knowledge and consent, to deliver petroleum products under an agreement between plaintiff and defendant's agent. We think these allegations sufficient to show that the alleged misrepresentation was made to be relied upon by plaintiff and as an inducement to plaintiff, and that plaintiff did, in making delivery of petroleum products, rely on the representation to his injury. Accordingly, we hold that the demurrer to Court A was overruled without error.
To the complaint, defendant pleaded the general issue; that plaintiff consented to the injuries for which damages are claimed; estoppel; the statutes of limitation of one, three, and six years; and the statute of limitation of one year from the date of discovery of the fact alleged to constitute fraud, § 42, Title 7, Code 1940, which recites:
The court overruled plaintiff's demurrers to all pleas except the plea of estoppel, Plea 4. The court sustained plaintiff's demurrer to Plea 4 and this ruling is Assignment 9. Plea 4 recites:
'PLEA FOUR
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...41 (1970). Fraudulent intent, or an intent to deceive, is not essential to a recovery under that section. Standard Oil Co. v. Johnson, 276 Ala. 578, 581, 165 So.2d 361, 364 (1964). Neither is knowledge by the defendant of the falsity of his or her representations. First Nat'l Bank of Auburn......
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