Standard Oil Co. v. Gentry

• Decision Date: 27 February 1941
• Docket Number: 3 Div. 338.
• Citation: 241 Ala. 62,1 So.2d 29
• Parties: STANDARD OIL CO. et al. v. GENTRY.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

1 So.2d 29

241 Ala. 62

STANDARD OIL CO. et al. v. GENTRY.

3 Div. 338.

Supreme Court of Alabama

February 27, 1941

Rehearing Denied March 27, 1941.

Jack Crenshaw, of Montgomery, for appellants.

Hill Hill, Whiting & Rives, of Montgomery, for appellee.

GARDNER, Chief Justice.

Plaintiff on June 18th, 1939, slipped and fell at the filling station in the City of Montgomery operated and maintained, as he insists, by defendants, Marvin Young and The Standard Oil Company, sustaining injuries for which he recovered judgment. Though the Standard Oil Company had prior to March 1st, 1939 operated this station, yet on that date a lease contract was entered into between said company and defendant Young, the latter agreeing to pay a flat rental of $25 per month and 1/2 cent per gallon of gasoline sold. And this lease contract continued in force and effect and was so in effect on the date of plaintiff's injury.

There is no evidence in this record indicating that this was intended as a mere subterfuge or that challenges the good faith of this transaction. The Standard Oil Company did not thereafter operate said station or in any manner control the same, though its agent supervised by way of occasional inspection this as well as all other stations dispensing its products, whether operated by the company or by its lessees.

Under these circumstances we would not be justified in the conclusion that this company was on the date of plaintiff's injury operating and maintaining this station, as alleged in the complaint. Shell Petroleum Corporation v. Linham, Miss., 163 So. 839; Goldstein v. Weiss, Sup., 172 N.Y.S. 131. But we are persuaded from the evidence in this case it was for the jury to determine whether or not the Standard Oil Company was estopped, so far as plaintiff was concerned, from claiming it was not operating and maintaining this station when his injuries were sustained. Prior to March 1st, 1939, the station had been so operated by the defendant oil company and plaintiff did business with said company at the station, and his testimony tends to show his reason for transferring his business was an unsatisfactory experience with an independent operator and a desire to do business with a more responsible party.

The sign exhibited to the public, the license exhibited in the office, both the telephone and city directory, and all other indications pointed to a continued operation of this station by the company. After as well as before March 1st, 1939, plaintiff had no basis for any belief there had been any change in the manner of operation. And plaintiff's evidence tended to show, as previously observed, that he relied upon the apparent operation by the company in continuing to do business at the station. Upon this question of estoppel a jury case was presented. Augusta Friedman's Shop v. Yeates, 216 Ala. 434, 113 So. 299.

Of course plaintiff must have relied upon such representations by the company. Augusta Friedman's Shop v. Yeates, supra; Birmingham News Company v. Birmingham Printing Company, 209 Ala. 403, 96 So. 336; American Law Institute Restatement of the Law of Agency, Sections 265-267; Patterson v. Neal, 135 Ala. 477, 33 So. 39. And perhaps charge 20, requested by defendant oil company and refused by the court, properly stated the rule. But this same principle was embraced in the oral charge of the court and emphasized at its conclusion upon suggestion of counsel for defendant. The refusal of charge 20 cannot, therefore, constitute error to reverse.

Plaintiff was upon the premises to purchase gasoline, and had gone to the office for the purpose of signing a credit ticket. He was an invitee and it was the duty of defendants to exercise reasonable care to keep the premises in a reasonably safe condition. Defendants were no insurers of his safety, but were under a duty to observe reasonable care to see that the premises were reasonably safe for him as he came in to make his purchase. F.W. Woolworth v. Ney, 239 Ala. 233, 194 So. 667, and authorities therein cited.

We have duly considered the argument of counsel for the Standard Oil Company to the effect that the principle of ostensible agency applies only to contracts and not to torts which do not arise out of contracts, and then even in such case there must be reliance thereon. American Law Institute Restatement of the Law of Agency, Sections 265-267; Mechem on Agency, Vol. 1, page 512; Birmingham News Company v. Birmingham Printing Company, supra; Augusta Friedman's Shop v. Yeates, supra.

But we consider this argument answered by the Yeates case, supra, by this court and that of the New York Court of Appeals approvingly cited therein of Hannon v. Siegel-Cooper Company, 167 N.Y. 244, 60 N.E. 597, 598, 52 L.R.A. 429.

As appropriate here, we think it well to set out the following excerpt from the opinion of the New York court: "It may very well be that where the duty, the violation of which constitutes the tort sued for, springs from no contract with nor relation to, the principal, a party could not be estopped from denying that the wrongdoer was his agent, even though he had held him out as such. In such a case the representation of the principal would be no factor in producing the injury complained of. But, whenever the tort consists of a violation of a duty which springs from the contract between the parties, the ostensible principal should be liable to the same extent in an action ex delicto as in one ex contractu. It is urged that the representation that the operating dentists were the defendant's servants did not mislead the plaintiff to her injury, and therefore should not estop the defendant from asserting the truth. There is no force in this claim. If A. contracts with the ostensible agent of B. for the purchase of goods, he relies, not only on the business...