Standard Oil Co. v. Humphries

• Decision Date: 17 May 1923
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 759.
• Citation: 209 Ala. 493,96 So. 629
• Parties: STANDARD OIL CO. v. HUMPHRIES.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

96 So. 629

209 Ala. 493

STANDARD OIL CO. v. HUMPHRIES.

6 Div. 759.

Supreme Court of Alabama

May 17, 1923

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; J. C. B. Gwin, Judge.

Action for damages for false imprisonment by W. S. Humphries against the Standard Oil Company. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed conditionally.

In an action against a corporation for false imprisonment, based on the theory that defendant's agent had instigated the arrest, defendant's requested charge that, if the jury believed that the officer arrested plaintiff, and that he was not induced to make the arrest by the direction or request of the agent acting within the line and scope of his employment it was immaterial whether such agent did or did not request or direct that the arrest be made, and, if he did, it was immaterial how malicious may have been his motive or how palpable the want of probable cause, held properly refused as being confused and self-contradictory, and as proceeding on the erroneous theory that, in order to recover, plaintiff must prove defendant's agent directed or requested the officer to arrest plaintiff.

Count A is as follows:

"Count A. Plaintiff claims of defendant $3,000 damages, for that theretofore, on, to wit, May 5, 1919, the defendant's agent or servant, viz. W. N. Benton, whose name to the plaintiff is otherwise unknown, while acting within the line and scope of his employment, wrongfully caused the plaintiff to be arrested and imprisoned by Ross Thomas, a police officer, on a charge of burglary and grand larceny. And plaintiff says that as a proximate result of said wrong he was deprived of his liberty for a long time, to wit four days, and was greatly frightened, humiliated and chagrined, and was caused to appear in open court before the general public to defend said charge, and was made nervous and sick, and caused to suffer great mental anguish, and was compelled to pay out a large sum of money to attorneys to defend him against said charge, to his damage aforesaid."

Charges 1 and 2, refused to defendant, are as follows:

"(1) The court charges the jury that want of probable cause cannot be inferred from the failure of the prosecution of the plaintiff.

"(2) The court charges the jury that an acquittal does not tend to establish want of probable cause."

Given charge (a) is as follows:

"The court charges the jury that neither malice nor want of probable cause can be inferred from the failure of the prosecution of the plaintiff."

Refused charges, made the basis of assignments of error 14, 16, 18, 19, 20, and 22, are as follows: "(14) In no event can the jury find a verdict for the plaintiff in this case if they believe from the evidence that there was no malice on the part of the defendant instituting the prosecution in this case toward the plaintiff.

"(16) The court charges the jury that, whether you believe from the evidence that the plaintiff was guilty of the charge preferred against him or not, if you are reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the prosecution was not maliciously and without probable cause therefor instigated by the defendant, it is your duty to return a verdict in favor of the defendant.

"(18) It matters not how causeless in fact may have been the prosecution; if defendant acted in good faith, and without malice, in perfecting the charge, this is a full defense to the action.

"(19) Malicious prosecution does not lie at the instance of the guilty party, and the right of recovery does not depend upon the innocent conduct of the plaintiff that there was no reasonable ground for believing him guilty when the prosecution was instituted.

"(20) The court charges the jury that the burden is on the plaintiff to reasonably satisfy you by the evidence that the defendant instituted the prosecution against the plaintiff; that the prosecution has been terminated, that W. N. Benton instituted it without probable cause, that W. N. Benton maliciously instituted such prosecution, that W. N. Benton in instituting such prosecution was the agent of the defendant, authorized by it to institute such prosecution, or that the defendant ratified his acts in starting such prosecution after it was started, and, if plaintiff has not so satisfied you by the evidence, you cannot find a verdict for the plaintiff.

"(22) The court charges the jury that, if you believe from the evidence that the chief of police of Bessemer arrested the plaintiff, and that the chief was not moved or induced to make the arrest by the direction or request of W. N. Benton while acting within the line and scope of his employment, it is immaterial whether Benton did or did not request or direct that the arrest be made, and, if he did, it is immaterial how malicious may have been his motive in giving it or how palpable the want of probable cause."

Tillman, Bradley & Baldwin, of Birmingham, and Huey & Welch, of Bessemer, for appellant.

Goodwyn & Ross, of Bessemer, for appellee.

SAYRE J.

This is the second appeal in this cause. 205 Ala. 529. ^[1] The trial now under review was had on count A and several pleas amounting to the general issue. Appellant, defendant, attacks that ruling of the trial court sustaining the sufficiency of this count against demurrer. In Standard Oil Co. v. Davis, 208 Ala. 565, 94 So. 754, this court held a similar count good, and no sufficient reason now appears why that judgment should be changed or doubted. See, also, Epperson v. First Nat. Bank of Reform (Ala. Sup.) 95 So. 343. As for the facts, under the pleadings in the cause the only proper inquiries were as to defendant's responsibility for plaintiff's arrest, and, if responsible, the amount of damages to be awarded. Rhodes v. McWilson, 192 Ala. 675, 69 So. 69, and authorities there cited.

Appellant insists that it was due the general affirmative charge. This contention was made in Standard Oil Co. v. Davis, supra, a companion case, in which the evidence was substantially the same as it is here, and was there denied. The evidence has been again examined, and the court is of opinion that the general charge was properly refused.

Reversible error cannot be predicated of the refusal...