Standard Oil Co v. Commonwealth

• Decision Date: 17 November 1921
• Citation: 109 S.E. 316
• Court: Virginia Supreme Court
• Parties: STANDARD OIL CO. v. COMMONWEALTH.

109 S.E. 316

STANDARD OIL CO.

v.COMMONWEALTH.

Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia.

Nov.17, 1921.

Error to Circuit Court, Rockbridge County.

The Standard Oil Company was convicted of an offense, and it brings error. Affirmed.

Hugh A. White, of Lexington, and Eppa Hunton, Jr., of Richmond, for plaintiff in error.

John R. Saunders, Atty. Gen., J. D. Hank, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., and Leon M. Bazile, Second Asst. Atty. Gen., for the Commonwealth.

PRENTIS, J. By an act approved March 13, 1912 (Acts 1912, p. 503), Code 1919, § 2013, It is provided that—

"The boards of supervisors of the several counties of the commonwealth shall have power to enact such special and local legislation in their respective counties, not in conflict with the Constitution and the general laws of the commonwealth, as they may deem expedient to protect the public roads, ways and bridges of the such county from encroachment or obstruction, or from any improper or exceptionally injurious use thereof."

By authority of that statute the board of supervisors of Rockbridge county adopted a resolution declaring that—

"It shall be unlawful for any person, firm, or corporation to operate or cause to be operated over the highways of Rockbridge county any engine, threshing machine, logging or lumber wagons, heavy machinery, wagons or tanks, automobile trucks and all heavily laden wagons or trucks, at any time at which the said roads are wet to a sufficient extent to be materially damaged by such hauling or use: Provided, however, that this enactment shall not be construed to prevent the hauling of farm produce."

The Standard Oil Company was charged with a violation of this resolution, in that it operated a heavily loaded truck over a certain road while it was so wet as to cause the highway to be materially damaged by such hauling or use. After a conviction before a justice of the peace, an appeal was taken to the circuit court of Rockbridge county, and upon a jury trial the accused was again convicted, and subjected to a fine of $50, of which it is here complaining.

The point chiefly relied on was in the trial court first raised upon the demurrer of the defendant and its motion to dismiss the warrant, upon the ground that the resolution of the board of supervisors upon which the prosecution was based was unconstitutional and void for uncertainty in its description and definition of the alleged crime. This contention is based upon the general rule that an ordinance of a regulatory nature must he clear, certain,, and definite, so that the average man may, with due care, after reading the same, understand whether he will incur a penalty for his action or not, and, if not of this character, it Is void for uncertainty.

Many cases may be cited to support this rule, and we do not question its validity where It is properly applicable. It may be also conceded that there are instances in which It has been applied by the courts to statutes bearing some resemblance to that here involved. It is, however, also easy to cite eases in which other courts have refused to apply it to statutes equally indefinite as that here criticized.

It has long been held that to obstruct or unlawfully injure a public highway is a nuisance—a serious encroachment upon the public right.

In 3 Salk. 183, we find this precedent in Egerly's Case:

"Information against a common carrier, setting forth that no waggon ought to carry more than 2, 000 weight, and that the defendant used a waggon with four wheels, and cum inusitato numero equorum, in which he carried 3, 000 or 4, 000 weight at one time, by which he spoiled the highway leading from Oxford to London (viz.) at Lobb lane, in the parish of Hosely. This was adjudged good, though it was laid generally at Lobb lane, without shewing how many perches in length, because the nuisance was alleged, for all the way leading 'from Oxford to London, and Lobb lane was mentioned only for the venue; and though there was noparticular measure expressed how much of the way was spoiled, it shall be intended all Lobb lane was spoiled. Likewise, though it said that he went inusitato numero equorum without setting forth what number, yet the information is good, because it was the excessive weight which he carried that made the nuisance."

In Congreve v. Smith, 18 N. T. 79, it is said, incidentally, that the general doctrine is that the public are entitled to the use of a highway in the condition in which they placed it, and whoever without sufficient authority materially obstructs it is guilty of a nuisance.

The general rule is that municipalities have the power to maintain such actions at law or in equity as may be appropriate to prevent and abate nuisances obstructive of highways, or rendering them useless. Stearns County v. St. Cloud, M. & A. R. Co., 36 Minn. 425, 32 N. W. 91; Hooksett v. Amoskeag Mfg. Co., 44 N. H. 105; Troy v. Cheshire R. Co., 23 N. H. 83, 55 Ami. Dec. 177; Springfield v. Connecticut River R. Co., 4 Cush. (Mass.) 63; Easton, & A. R, Co. v. Greenwich Tp., 25 N. T. Eq. 565; Rio Grande R. Co. v. Brownsville, 45 Tex. 88; Philadelphia v. Thirteenth & Fifteenth Sts. Pass. R. Co., 8 Phila. (Pa.) 648; 39 L. R. A. 650, note.

These cases, relating to statutes which were attacked upon the ground that they were vague and indefinite, are pertinent:

, Tn State v. Ayers, 49 Ore. 61, 88 Pac. 653, 10 L. R. A. (N. S.) 992, 124 Am. St. Rep. 1036, it is held that naming the offense is not necessary to warrant its punishment, where it is described by statute sufficiently to justify a resort to the common law for its definition, although no common-law offenses are recognized in that particular state. There, under a statute which provided for the punishment of any act which grossly disturbs the public peace or health, or which openly outrages the public decency and is injurious to the public morals, it is held that the court was competent to determine what acts come within the description. The particular offense charged in that case was the habitual sale of pools on horse races, at a track where many persons were assembled to witness the races, and this was construed to be an act which grossly disturbed the public peace and openly outraged public decency, within the meaning of the statute referred to, and the accused was convicted.

Katzman v. Commonwealth, 140 Ky. 124, 130 S. W. 990, 30 L. R. A. (N. S.) 519, 140 Am. St. Rep. 359, holds that a statute forbidding druggists to sell poisons at retail, except under certain conditions, one of which is that they shall satisfy themselves that they are to be used for legitimate purposes, is not invalid for not defining the meaning of the words "retail" and "legitimate purposes." Whether or not a druggist, in selling opium without a prescription, used reasonable care to satisfy himself that it was obtained for a legitimate purpose, as required by statute, was held toa statute shall be so elaborate in its details as to attempt to meet every possible state of fact that may arise under it."

In Stewart v. State, 4 Okl. Cr. 5G4, 109 Pac. 243, 32 L. R. A. (N. S.) 505, it] is held that a statute, which provided that "every person who willfully and wrongfully commits any act * * * which grossly disturbs the public peace or health, * * * although no punishment is expressly prescribed therefor by this Code, is guilty of a misdemeanor, " is not void for uncertainty; and that whooping and yelling and uttering loud and vociferous language are acts prohibited thereby, if they grossly disturb the public peace; and it is said that the Legislature, in creating an offense, may define it by a particular description of the act or acts constituting it, or it may define it as any act which produces, or is reasonably calculated to produce, a certain defined or described result. There being no common-law crimes in Oklahoma, it is held that where the Legislature creates without defining an offense which was a crime under the common law, the common-law definition of the crime will be adopted.

Several recent cases in the Supreme Court of the United States illustrate and follow the same liberal rule of construction.

In Waters-Pierce Oil Co. v. Texas, 212 U. S. 108, 29 Sup. Ct. 226, 53 L. Ed. 429, this is said with reference to the Texas statute relating to monopolies and combinations in restraint of trade:

"It is further insisted that the acts in question are so vague, indefinite and uncertain as to deprive them of their constitutionality, in that they punish by forfeiture of the right to do business, and the imposition of penalties, under provisions of an act which do not advise a citizen or corporation, prosecuted under them, of the nature and character of the acts constituting a violation of the law. These objections are found in the words of the act of 1899, denouncing contracts and arrangements 'reasonably calculated' to fix and regulate the price of commodities, etc. And in the act of 1903 acts are prohibited which 'tend' to accomplish the prohibited results. It is insisted that these laws are so indefinite that no one can tell what acts are embraced within their provisions. In support of this contention it is argued that laws of this nature ought to be so explicit that all persons subject to their penalties may know what they can do, and what it is their duty to avoid. And reference is made to decisions which have held that criminal statutes should be so definite as to enable those included in its terms to know in advance whether the act is criminal or not. [Citing cases.] * * * But the Texas statutes in question do not give the broad power to a court or jury to determine the criminal character of the act in accordance with their belief as to whether it is reasonable or unreasonable, as do the statutes condemned in the cases cited."

The statutes are held to be valid as sufficiently definite and certain in their definition of the crime denounced.

Nash v. United States, 229 U. S. 373, 33 Sup. Ct. 780, 57 L. Ed. 1232, was a prosecution for a...