Standard Oil Co. v. City of Birmingham

Decision Date30 May 1918
Docket Number6 Div. 782
PartiesSTANDARD OIL CO. v. CITY OF BIRMINGHAM.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; John H. Miller, Judge.

Action by the city of Birmingham against the Standard Oil Company to recover inspection fees for the inspection of oils, etc. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Tillman Bradley & Morrow, of Birmingham, and Roy M. Sterne, of New York City, for appellant.

M.M Ullman and W.A. Jenkins, both of Birmingham, for appellee.

MAYFIELD J.

The city of Birmingham sued appellant oil company to recover the inspection fees, for the inspecting of oils gasolines, benzine, naphtha, etc. The payment was resisted on the grounds that the ordinance under which the inspection was made and the fees were fixed, and penalties were provided for failure to comply therewith, was void for uncertainty; that the ordinance was unreasonable, and that a compliance with some of its provisions is impossible; and that for these reasons the ordinance ought not to be enforced, even as for the collection of the inspection fees. The reporter will set out the ordinance in full, so that the questions raised and decided may be better understood. That part of the ordinance most urged as being void for uncertainty is part of section 8 as amended, and it reads as follows:

"Gasolines, benzines and naphthas kept for sale shall be subjected to the same supervision and control as is provided by this ordinance for coal or mineral oil or petroleum or products manufactured therefrom for illuminating or heating purposes, except that the inspectors shall only be required to test gasolines, benzines and naphthas by ascertaining their specific gravity at 60 degrees Fahrenheit, and such gasolines, benzines and naphthas shall have a specific gravity at 60 degrees Fahrenheit of not less than 58 or more than 84."

It is not denied that if this quoted part of the ordinance means what it says, it is void because unreasonable and impossible of performance. It is insisted by the city, however, that it does not say what it means--that it means, and should be construed as if the word "specific" before the word "gravity" were omitted, and the phrase "degrees Baume" were added at the end of the quoted provision. In other words, the contention of the city is that the part quoted above should be construed as if it reads as follows:

"Gasolines, benzines and naphthas kept for sale shall be subjected to the same supervision and control as is provided by this ordinance for coal or mineral oil or petroleum or products manufactured therefrom for illuminating and heating purposes, except that the inspectors shall only be required to test gasolines, benzines and naphthas by ascertaining their gravity at 60 degrees Fahrenheit, and such gasolines, benzines and naphthas shall have a gravity at 60 degrees Fahrenheit of not less than 58 or more than 84 degrees Baume."

It is also contended by the city that if the word "Baume" be inserted or added, just after the word "gravity," the uncertainty would be thereby removed, leaving the ordinance reasonable and capable of enforcement. Both parties introduced expert witnesses as to the meaning of the various words and phrases, "specific," "gravity," "Baume," "specific gravity," "degrees Baume," etc.

It is certain that unless some word or words are omitted from the quoted provision, or some word or phrase is added thereto, it is void for uncertainty, or is wholly unreasonable and incapable of performance. Is this court authorized, in construing this provision in connection with the whole ordinance, and with the context, to omit, or to add, the words or phrases necessary to render the ordinance certain and definite enough to be valid and enforceable?

It is agreed, if the court does not judicially know, that there is no gas, liquid, or solid, that has a specific gravity of 58, much less of 84. The specific gravity of platinum, the heaviest substance known, is only 22.5, so the expert witnesses and standard authorities on the technical subject inform us. So if the ordinance be construed literally as written, it requires the oils, or the products thereof, mentioned, to be more than twice as heavy as the heaviest substance known to science. Such an ordinance, of course, is unreasonable, and incapable of enforcement. To construe it as the city contends it should be construed would render it enforceable and probably reasonable. We know of no rules or canons of construction, however, which would authorize us to construe the language used in this ordinance to mean what the city contends it means. This trouble is the language used in the ordinance, standing alone, is not of doubtful meaning or interpretation; nor does it suggest any omissions of words or phrases to make it complete or carry out the intent of those who drafted or ordained it. If there were any oils, or products thereof, mentioned in the ordinance which would meet the specific gravity named, the ordinance would be perfectly valid, certain in meaning, and easy of enforcement. But the proof shows that there is no substance known to commerce or to science that can meet the tests required, and that the provision is therefore wholly unreasonable, as requiring the impossible. The city says we ought to construe it to apply to those very oils or products mentioned which have been inspected by it, and stored or sold in the city by the oil company. The infirmity of this insistence is twofold: First, it is agreed, or not disputed, that these oils did not have the specific gravity specified by the ordinance; second, that the language used in the ordinance is not susceptible of any reasonable construction which would authorize the application of the ordinance to the products inspected and for which charges are made and suit to enforce payment is brought.

Common or popular words are to be construed in their popular sense; common-law words according to their common-law meaning, and technical words according to their technical meaning. As a general rule, words are to be taken in their ordinary or popular sense, unless it plainly appears that they were used in a different sense. Mobile Dry Docks Co. v. City of Mobile, 146 Ala. 198, 40 So. 205, 3 L.R.A. (N.S.) 822, 9 Ann.Cas. 1229.

When the law is plain and unambiguous, whether it be expressed in general or limited terms, the Legislature should be intended to mean what they have plainly expressed, and consequently no room is left for construction. The court is not at liberty to search for probable or possible meaning. Johnson v. State, 141 Ala. 7, 37 So. 421, 109 Am.St.Rep. 17; State v. McGough, 118 Ala. 166, 24 So. 395.

The construction of statutes or ordinances is correct that gives to each the effect which the makers intended. The intent of the lawmaker is the law. Courts are to construe and interpret the meaning and then declare the intent of the lawmaker, which is the law. If the meaning of the words used by the lawmaker is clear and certain, then there is no room or occasion for construction or interpretation. It is only when the meaning of the language and intent of the lawmaker is not obvious or certain that courts are needed or required to interpret. When the meaning of the language used, or the intent of the lawmaker rests in inference, then construction and interpretation are useful. If the meaning or intent is obvious and clearly expressed, then it does not rest in inference. The clearly expressed meaning or intent must and should prevail, though others could be assigned. If one meaning be certainly expressed, and another left to inference, the one expressed should prevail. Birmingham v. Southern Express Co., 164 Ala. 537, 51 So. 159.

The meaning and intention of a statute or ordinance must be gathered by the courts from the law itself, and not from the contemporaneous declarations of the individual lawmakers. Barnes v. Mayor of Mobile, 19 Ala. 707.

A literal interpretation will not be adopted, when it would defeat the purposes of a statute, if any other reasonable construction can be given to the words. Thompson v. State, 20 Ala. 54.

No principle is more firmly established or rests on more secure foundations than the rule which declares, when a law is plain and unambiguous, whether it be expressed in general or limited terms, the Legislature shall be intended to mean what they have plainly expressed, and consequently no room is left for construction. Bartlett & Waring v. Morris, 9 Port. 266.

Where a statute is plain and unambiguous, its history or the mischief intended to be remedied cannot be looked to to qualify its plain meaning and import. Kelly v. Burke, 132 Ala. 235, 31 So. 512.

It is very true, as is argued by the city, that courts will give ordinances or statutes that interpretation which will give them effect, if the language used is reasonably susceptible of such construction. As a rule, ordinances and statutes are to be given that construction which will uphold them if that construction be a reasonable one, and consistent with the language used. In a recent case, construing an ordinance of Birmingham, it was said:

"In determining the validity of ordinances, a reasonable construction will be given them; the judicial inclination being to sustain, rather than overthrow, them. 2 Dillon's Munic.Corp. (5th Ed.) § 646; Orme v. Tuscumbia, 150 Ala. 520, 43 So. 584. 'Ordinances must, by fair and natural construction, be certain to a common intent.' 28 Cyc. p. 354. 'Common intent' is defined as 'the natural sense given to words.' 1 Bouv.Law Dict.; Black's Law Dict." Sloss-Sheffield Co. v. Smith, 175 Ala. 260, 264, 57 So. 29, 30.
"Municipal ordinances are construed by the same rules as are statutes. Harbor Master, etc., v.
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  • Christopher v. Christopher (In re Christopher.)
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    • October 4, 2013
    ...57, 60, 22 So.2d 525, 528 (1945) (noting that statutes must be read “in the light of the common law”); Standard Oil Co. v. City of Birmingham, 202 Ala. 97, 98, 79 So. 489, 490 (1918) (“[C]ommon-law words [are to be construed] according to their common-law meaning.”); Cook v. Meyer Bros., 73......
  • City of Montgomery v. Smith
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    • April 21, 1921
    ... ... 33, 86 So. 73; Ex parte Walker D ... Hines, Director General (In re Hines v. McMillan) 87 So ... 691; McWilliams v. Birmingham Southern R. Co., 85 ... So. 293; Ex parte Payne Lumber Co., 85 So. 9; ... Sugar ... Valley Land Co. v. Johnson (App.) 85 So. 871 ... 289, 69 So. 466. And such is the rule ... of construction and field of operation to be given to ... municipal ordinances. Standard Oil Co. v. City of ... Birmingham, 202 Ala. 97, 79 So. 489; Sloss-S.S. & I ... Co. v. Smith, 175 Ala. 260, 265, 57 So. 29; Orme v ... Mayor, ... ...
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    ... ... v. Nat. Co., 155 ... F. 77, 83 C.C.A. 593, 11 L.R.A. (N.S.) 713; Standard ... Silk, etc., Co. v. Roessler Chem. Co. (D.C.) 244 F. 250; ... Bache Co. v. Coppes, etc., Co., ... ...
  • Southern Ry. Co. v. Montgomery
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    • October 4, 1934
    ... ... [157 So. 855] ... Stokely, ... Scrivner, Dominick & Smith, of Birmingham, for appellant ... W. A ... Denson, of Birmingham, for appellee ... THOMAS, ... rule of exclusion; a matter of legislative intent for ... decision. Standard Oil Co. v. City of Birmingham, ... 202 Ala. 97, 98, 79 So. 489 ... In ... Richardson ... ...
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1 books & journal articles
  • HOW DO JUDGES DECIDE SCHOOL FINANCE CASES?
    • United States
    • Washington University Law Review Vol. 97 No. 4, April 2020
    • April 1, 2020
    ...and shall control."). (279.) Geringer v. Bebout, 10 P.3d 514, 521 (Wyo. 2000); see also, e.g., Standard Oil Co. v. City of Birmingham, 79 So. 489, 492 (Ala. 1918) (noting that although the "intent [of the framers] is to be found in the instrument itself," it may be permissible to "search fo......

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