Standard Oil Company of Louisiana v. Brodie

• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: MCCULLOCH, C. J.
• Citation: Standard Oil Company of Louisiana v. Brodie, 153 Ark. 114, 239 S.W. 753 (Ark. 1922)
• Decision Date: 10 April 1922
• Docket Number: 287
• Parties: STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF LOUISIANA v. BRODIE

239 S.W. 753

153 Ark. 114

STANDARD OIL COMPANY OF LOUISIANA v. BRODIE

No. 287

Supreme Court of Arkansas

April 10, 1922

Appeal from Pulaski Chancery Court; John E. Martineau, Chancellor affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

Gus Ottenheimer, Reid, Gray, Burrow & McDonnell, for appellants.

The act imposes a tax either upon property, the sale thereof or purchase and ownership thereof, and is therefore a tax upon the property itself, and void. 12 Wheaton 419; 197 U.S. 60; 91 U.S. 275; 73 Sou. 193; 23 R. C. L. 36; 41 S.Ct. 272; 72 Sou. 892. The title of the act should be considered in arriving at the intention of the Legislature. 234 S.W. 45 124 Ark. 475; 138 Ark. 131.

The tax imposed is not a privilege tax. 32 Cyc. 390; 6 Words & Phrases, p. 5586; 23 R. C. L. p. 236. Since the act does not so expressly declare, act 606 cannot be construed as conferring a privilege for the use of the highways of the State. 70 Ark. 554; 36 Cyc. 1179. A statute is not presumed to make any alteration of the common law other than as expressly declared. 115 Ill.App. 31; 23 Ind. 32; 125 Ind 176; 50 Am. St. Rep. 334; 40 Mo. 253; 55 S.W. 92; 117 F. 452; 12 Ky. Law Rep. 839; 13 Ky. Law Rep. 89; 86 N.Y. 8, 49; 57 A 910; 44 S.E. 760; 80 Ala. 219; 6 Ark. 280; 32 Ark. 59; 47 Ark. 442; 59 Ark. 344; 71 Ark. 556; 59 Ark. 81; 70 Ark. 481. The act being penal must be strictly construed. 6 Ark. 131; 13 Ark. 405; 43 Ark. 413; 59 Ark. 341; 53 Ark. 334; 56 Ark. 45; 38 Ark. 519; 79 Ark. 517; 68 Ark. 34.

The tax construed as a privilege tax is unconstitutional, because violative of art. 2 sec. 18 of the Constitution. 85 Ark. 573; 12 C. J. 117; 70 Ark. 549.

The act violates the due process clauses of the State and Federal Constitutions in that dealers are required to perform services for the State without compensation. 94 Ark. 27; 113 Ark. 149; 91 F. 93; 55 F. 26.

The act is void for uncertainty. 34 Ark. 224; 45 Ark. 158; 105 Ark. 280; 52 F. 917; 39 Cyc. 969; 25 R. C. L. 810; 6 D. C. 75; 59 N.E. 489.

J. S. Utley, Attorney General, Elbert Godwin and Wm. T. Hammock, Assistants, and Geo. W. Emerson, prosecuting attorney, for appellee.

The tax is not a property tax but rather a tax on the use of the highways by certain vehicles using gasoline.

The legislative intention must be inferred from the plain meaning of the words used. 133 Ark. 1; some meaning must be given every word, if possible. 135 Ark. 262; and sections must be read and construed in the light of each other. 131 Ark. 129; 140 Ark. 398. The title of an act is not conclusive of legislative intent. 138 Ark. 381.

The act does not contravene sec. 2, art. 18, Const. because no immunity is granted to any class. The tax is laid alike on all persons similarly situated, and is a valid act. 70 Ark. 549; 85 Ark. 512.

The due process clause of the Constitution is not violated by the act. No fundamental rights are infringed. 204 U.S. 241; 74 Ark. 174; 95 U.S. 714; 134 U.S. 232; 113 U.S. 703; 160 U.S. 452; 115 U.S. 321.

The act does not contravene sec. 2, art. 18, Const. be-Constitution of Arkansas. 99 Ark. 1; 49 Ark. 100. The Legislature has power to make such laws as are not prohibited by the Constitution. 112 Ark. 342; 43 Ark. 527; 1 Ark. 513; 4 Ark. 473; 130 U.S. 641; 173 U.S. 592. Nor does it violate the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. 113 U.S. 27; 127 U.S. 678; 128 U.S. 82.

OPINION

MCCULLOCH, C. J.

This litigation calls for an interpretation, and involves the validity, of a statute enacted by the General Assembly of 1921, providing for the collection of a tax upon the sale of "gasoline, kerosene or other products to be used by the purchaser thereof in the propelling of motor vehicles using combustible type engines over the highways." (Acts 1921 p. 685). The validity of the tax is challenged on numerous grounds, which will be discussed in the order presented in the briefs of counsel.

The title of the statute is as follows: "An Act to levy a tax upon gasoline used in the propelling of motor vehicles, and for other purposes."

Section 1 of the statute, which is the one imposing the tax, reads as follows:

"That all persons, firms or corporations who shall sell gasoline, kerosene or other products to be used by the purchaser thereof in the propelling of motor vehicles, using combustible type engines, over the highways of this State, shall collect from such purchaser, in addition to the usual charge therefor, the sum of one cent (1c) per gallon for each gallon so sold."

Section 2 requires all dealers in the sale of gasoline for use in propelling motor vehicles to register with the county clerk of their respective counties and to file a report on or before the tenth day of each month, showing the sales of gasoline, kerosene or other products purchased for use in the propelling of motor vehicles.

Section 3 provides that all dealers who shall sell gasoline or other products upon which the tax is imposed and who shall fail to collect the same "shall be personally liable for the amount of such tax so uncollected," and that such dealers shall pay to the treasurer of the county the sum of one cent per gallon for all gasoline sold for the purposes named.

Section 4 requires all wholesale distributers of gasoline and like products suitable for the use of propelling motor vehicles to file with the county clerk of their respective counties a statement showing the amount of gasoline and other such products sold by them to retailers. A penalty of not less than ten nor more than one thousand dollars is imposed on dealers who shall fail to account for all moneys due by them under the terms of the statute.

Another section provides that of the tax so collected one-half shall be credited to the general road fund of the county, and the other half shall be transmitted to the treasurer, to be placed to the credit of the highway improvement fund.

It is first contended, in the attack on the validity of the statute, that it constitutes the imposition of a property tax on gasoline and the other commodities mentioned, and that it is void because in violation of the uniformity clause of the Constitution of this State. It is conceded in all quarters that if the imposition is, in effect, a property tax it is void. This calls for an interpretation of the statute for the purpose of determining the character of tax sought to be imposed.

In the outset of the discussion it is well to call attention to certain rules of interpretation for the purpose of determining the constitutionality and validity of a legislative enactment.

The Supreme Court of the United States has said that "the elementary rule is that every reasonable construction must be resorted to in order to save the statute from unconstitutionality." Hooper v. California, 155 U.S. 648, 39 L.Ed. 297, 15 S.Ct. 207.

In the recent case of Dobbs v. Holland, 140 Ark. 398, 215 S.W. 709, we announced the same rule, and we treated it as so familiar in the rules of interpretation of statutes that it was unnecessary to cite authorities in support. We have also said that if a statute is susceptible to two constructions, one of which would lead to an absurdity and the other not, the latter would be adopted. State v. Jones, 91 Ark. 5, 120 S.W. 154. There are many decisions of this court announcing and adhering to those rules and giving them application under a variety of circumstances. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. State, 76 Ark. 303, 89 S.W. 42; Pryor v. Murphy, 80 Ark. 150, 96 S.W. 445; Bowman v. State, 93 Ark. 168, 129 S.W. 80; Garland Power & Dev. Co. v. State Board of R. R. Incorporation, 94 Ark. 422, 127 S.W. 454; Hughes v. Kelley, 95 Ark. 327, 129 S.W. 784; Leonard v. State, 95 Ark. 381, 129 S.W. 1089; State v. Handlin, 100 Ark. 175, 139 S.W. 1112; Snowden v. Thompson, 106 Ark. 517, 153 S.W. 823; State v. Trulock, 109 Ark. 556, 160 S.W. 516.

In the case of State v. Trulock, supra, we quoted, with approval, the following statement on this subject by Mr. Sutherland:

"The mere literal construction of a section in a statute ought not to prevail if it is opposed to the intention of the Legislature apparent by the statutes; and if the words are sufficiently flexible to admit of some other construction, it is to be adopted to effectuate that intention. The intent prevails over the letter, and the letter will, if possible, be so read as to conform to the spirit of the act." 2 Lewis' Sutherland, Statutory Construction, § 376.

When the interpretation of this statute is approached in conformity with the rules thus stated, it is easy to discover in the language an intention on the part of the lawmakers to impose a tax, not on property, but on a privilege, so as to bring the enactment within constitutional limits. The tax is not imposed on the sale or purchase of gasoline, nor on the gasoline itself, nor even on the use of the gasoline. On the contrary, the final and essential element in the imposition of the tax is that the gasoline purchased must be used in propelling a certain kind of vehicle over the public highways. In the final analysis of this language it comes down to the point that the thing which is really taxed is the use of the vehicle of the character described upon the public highway, and the extent of the use is measured by the quantity of fuel consumed, and the tax is imposed according to the extent of the use as thus measured.

If it had been intended merely to tax the gasoline or its use, it would have been wholly unnecessary to describe the character of the use or the place where it was to be used, and the fact that the lawmakers incorporated these elements in laying the bases of the taxation shows unmistakably that it was intended to impose a tax upon the use of the public highways by the method described. It is clear that...