Standard Oil Company v. Foster, 18096.
Decision Date | 18 July 1960 |
Docket Number | No. 18096.,18096. |
Citation | 280 F.2d 912 |
Parties | STANDARD OIL COMPANY, Appellant, v. Mrs. Josephine FOSTER, as Guardian ad Litem for Harry L. Cookson, Appellee. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
David W. Dyer, L. L. Robinson, Miami, Fla., Louis S. Bonsteel, Miami, Fla., Smathers Thompson & Dyer, Miami, Fla., of counsel, for appellant.
Sam Daniels, Walter H. Beckham, Jr., William S. Frates, Miami, Fla., Nichols, Gaither, Green, Frates & Beckham, Miami, Fla., for appellee.
Before RIVES, Chief Judge, and JONES and WISDOM, Circuit Judges.
This appeal is from a judgment in the amount of $150,000 for personal injuries suffered by Harry L. Cookson.1 On August 28, 1956, Cookson was an employee of the corporate lessee-operator2 of a Standard Oil Company service station in Miami, Florida. He was underneath an automobile which had been hoisted on a grease rack. The grease rack safety flaps3 failed, and the car rolled off the rack, crushing Cookson's head.
The evidence showed that the failure of the safety flaps to function properly was caused by improper maintenance of the moving parts of the grease rack; that is, by a failure to keep those parts clean and oiled. There is testimony that one of the flaps had been out of order4 for more than a month before Cookson was injured.
The sole insistence on appeal is that the district court erred in refusing to direct a verdict, or, in the alternative, to enter judgment for the defendant, Standard Oil Company, notwithstanding the verdict. Determination of that insistence turns on the answer to one narrow question, viz.: Was there evidence from which the jury could reasonably find that Standard Oil owed the plaintiff a duty to maintain the grease rack, and specifically the parts thereof which failed, in reasonably safe condition?
Standard Oil Company had built the filling station and installed this grease rack in 1954. Under date of June 1 of that year it had entered into a "Lease Agreement" of the premises with Otis E. Brown5 at a rental based upon the volume of petroleum products purchased from Standard. Paragraphs 9 and 10 of that agreement read as follows:
Standard did not claim, however, that this particular piece of equipment was covered by the "Lease Agreement." Its attorney stated to the Court: "The equipment was not leased, your Honor, it was loaned." And Standard introduced in evidence a separate "Equipment Loan Agreement" bearing the same date, June 1, 1954, signed by Brown, the lessee, but made "subject to the approval of an Officer, Division Manager or Assistant Division Manager of the First Party (Standard)" and never so approved. No objection was made when the district court instructed the jury that it "is not a legal contract since not signed by Standard and is merely a proposed contract by Brown." Whether proposal, contract, or simply some evidence of the practice, that "Equipment Loan Agreement" provided that "the First Party (Standard) hereby lends without charge to Second Party (Brown) the following described and enumerated equipment to be used exclusively for the storage and delivery of petroleum products purchased by Second Party (Brown) from First Party (Standard): * * *." The long list of equipment which follows includes the grease rack in question, described as "1 — G & B ML4 roll on hyd lift." The instrument further provided:
It would thus appear that the present case actually involves a bailment rather than a lease of the grease rack, but that is of little or no moment, for the parties are in agreement that the pertinent legal principles are the same in either case. The relationship plus the written instruments which have been described very clearly do not, by themselves, impose upon Standard any duty to maintain the grease rack in reasonably safe condition.
The appellant invokes as controlling the well-established rule followed by this Court in Miller v. Sinclair Refining Company, 5 Cir., 1959, 268 F.2d 114, that a lessor is not liable for injuries to one on premises in possession of a lessee unless the condition causing injury is a violation of law, is a pre-existing defect in construction or is inherently dangerous, or unless the lessor undertakes to keep the premises in repair. (Emphasis ours.) The appellee does not challenge the validity of that rule, but rather relies upon the last stated exception, which we have emphasized, and insists that the jury could properly find from the evidence that Standard Oil...
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