Standridge v. State
| Decision Date | 29 April 2004 |
| Docket Number | No. CR 03-558.,CR 03-558. |
| Citation | 357 Ark. 105,161 S.W.3d 815 |
| Parties | David O. STANDRIDGE v. STATE of Arkansas. |
| Court | Arkansas Supreme Court |
Ramey Law Firm, P.A. by: Jerry Don Ramey, for appellant.
Mike Beebe, Att'y Gen., by: Kent G. Holt, Ass't Att'y Gen., for appellee.
Appellant David Standridge was arrested on July 11, 2001, and charged with rape after his wife and stepdaughter reported to the police that he had sexually abused the daughter. Standridge was eventually also charged with third-degree carnal abuse and incest. After a jury trial on November 13, 2002, Standridge was convicted of all three counts; the jury sentenced him to twenty-five years for the rape conviction, twenty-five years for incest, and six years for carnal abuse. On appeal, he raises six arguments for reversal. Because of double-jeopardy concerns, his sixth point, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, will be addressed first. See Grillot v. State, 353 Ark. 294, 107 S.W.3d 136 (2003).
Standridge argues that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction because no witness actually identified him in the courtroom during trial, and thus his conviction should be set aside. He notes that his wife, Denise Standridge, was asked if she "kn[e]w David Standridge, the defendant," and she answered "Yes, I do." He further argues that the victim also answered affirmatively to the same question, but Standridge asserts that these in-court identifications are insufficient. Standridge concedes that he confessed to raping his stepdaughter, but asserts that a confession, unless made in open court, will not warrant a conviction unless accompanied by other proof that the offense was committed.
Clearly, it is essential to every case that the defendant be shown as the one who committed the crime, and this court has held that an element to be proved in every case is that the person who stands before the court in the position of the defendant is the one whom the indictment or information accuses and to whom the evidence is supposed to relate. Womack v. State, 301 Ark. 193, 783 S.W.2d 33 (1990); Moore v. State, 297 Ark. 296, 761 S.W.2d 894 (1988). However, that connection can be inferred from all the facts and circumstances of the case. Williams v. State, 308 Ark. 620, 825 S.W.2d 826 (1992); Becker v. State, 298 Ark. 438, 768 S.W.2d 527 (1989). In Williams, supra, this court cited Becker, supra, as follows:
Here, there were no co-defendants; the defendant was tried alone. He was specifically identified as "Mr. Becker" and "the defendant" throughout the trial. The witnesses were eyewitnesses to the robbery, and the fact that none of them pointed out that the wrong man had been brought to trial was eloquent and sufficient proof of identity.
Williams, 308 Ark. at 622, 825 S.W.2d 826.
Likewise, in the present case, only Standridge was on trial. Both his wife and his stepdaughter testified that they knew "the defendant, David Standridge." Further, the victim testified that Standridge would tell her to put her mouth on his penis, and that he licked her "private parts." In addition to the identifications above, this court has frequently held that the uncorroborated testimony of a rape victim alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction. See, e. g., Jones v. State, 348 Ark. 619, 74 S.W.3d 663 (2002); Russey v. State, 336 Ark. 401, 985 S.W.2d 316 (1999); Williams v. State, 331 Ark. 263, 962 S.W.2d 329 (1998). Therefore, there was sufficient evidence to support Standridge's convictions, and the trial court did not err in denying his directed-verdict motion.
For his next point on appeal, Standridge argues that the trial court erred in applying Arkansas' rape shield statute, Ark.Code Ann. § 16-42-101 (Repl.1999), to exclude evidence relating to previous sexual molestation charges brought by the victim against others. Particularly, Standridge contends that the trial court erred in excluding evidence relating to an accusation by the victim and her mother against the mother's former husband, Douglas Webb, and accusations made by the victim's mother, Denise Standridge, against her father, James Brents (the victim's maternal grandfather).
The rape shield statute prevents the use of evidence of a rape victim's prior sexual conduct; in pertinent part, the statute provides as follows:
In any criminal prosecution under § 5-14-101 et seq. [rape] or § 5-26-202 [incest], ... opinion evidence, reputation evidence, or evidence of specific instances of the victim's prior sexual conduct with the defendant or any other person, evidence of a victim's prior allegations of sexual conduct with the defendant or any other person, which allegations the victim asserts to be true, or evidence offered by the defendant concerning prior allegations of sexual conduct by the victim with the defendant or any other person if the victim denies making the allegations is not admissible by the defendant, either through direct examination of any defense witness or through cross-examination of the victim or other prosecution witness, to attack the credibility of the victim, to prove consent or any other defense, or for any other purpose.
The purpose of the statute is to shield victims of rape or sexual abuse from the humiliation of having their personal conduct, unrelated to the charges pending, paraded before the jury and the public when such conduct is irrelevant to the defendant's guilt. Martin v. State, 354 Ark. 289, 119 S.W.3d 504 (2003). Accordingly, the trial court is vested with a great deal of discretion in determining whether the evidence is relevant, and we will not overturn the trial court's decision unless it constituted clear error or a manifest abuse of discretion. Id.
As noted above, Standridge argues that he should have been permitted to introduce evidence that the victim had made prior allegations regarding other events of sexual abuse. With respect to the victim's former stepfather, Webb, Standridge asserts that the allegations against him in the present case are remarkably similar to the allegations the victim raised against Webb, and as such, the allegations against Webb were relevant and probative, and the trial court erred in excluding any evidence of those allegations. He also claims that the allegations against Webb were important "to show the history of the pattern of the allegations with this family."
However, at the rape shield hearing, the victim here testified that, although she did not remember much of the circumstances surrounding the allegations against Webb, because she was only four years old at the time, she remembered what he did to her, and she stated that the allegations against Webb were true. This testimony falls squarely within the ambit of § 16-42-101(b), which excludes "evidence of a victim's prior allegations of sexual conduct with ... any other person, which allegations the victim asserts to be true[.]" See also Taylor v. State, 355 Ark. 267, 138 S.W.3d 684 (2003) ().
The second area of evidence Standridge sought to introduce related to the victim's maternal grandfather, James Brents. Standridge argues on appeal that he should have been permitted to question the victim's mother, Denise Standridge, about the fact that she had filed a complaint against Brents. Standridge claims that this evidence was relevant both to show Denise's state of mind, and also to demonstrate that she exercised a degree of influence over her daughter with regard to making allegations of sexual abuse.
We glean from Standridge's argument that he wished to delve into his ex-wife's history of making sexual accusations against family members in order to demonstrate that Denise may have "imposed a predisposition regarding sexual abuse allegations" upon the victim. However, this evidence does not fall under the rape shield statute. It is not evidence of the victim's prior sexual contact with the defendant or any other person, nor is it evidence of the victim's prior allegations of sexual conduct with the defendant or any other person. At best, evidence that Denise Standridge once accused her father of sexual abuse would be relevant to show Denise's bias and credibility as a witness in this case, and the trial court ruled to this effect, stating the following:
If this lady over here [Denise Standridge], if you think she's biased and she put her kid up to making allegations on this case, you can ask her that.... And, then, you'll accept her answer; but there's not anything — this doesn't allow you to go to about anything else she may have made or any other alleged misconduct by some other person. If all you're trying to do is get at this lady and not the victim, that she is the one that has encouraged the child, you ask her that. It's not something that the child will be called to account for.
It appears that the court was perfectly willing to allow Standridge to question Denise about her own allegations against her father to demonstrate her bias or call her credibility into question. However, an examination of Denise Standridge's trial testimony reveals that Standridge did not broach the subject on cross-examination. Standridge cannot complain on appeal when he failed to take advantage of the court's determination that evidence of Denise's bias was admissible.1
Standridge's next point on appeal is that the trial court erred by denying his motion to dismiss on speedy trial grounds. Arkansas Rules of Criminal Procedure 28.1 and 28.2(a) require the State to try a defendant within twelve months, excluding any periods of delay authorized by Ark. R.Crim. P. 28.3. Miles v. State, 348 Ark. 544, 75 S.W.3d 677 (2002). The twelve-month period for bringing an accused to trial begins to run on the date the information is filed, or the date of arrest,...
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