Stanek v. State
Decision Date | 17 November 1992 |
Docket Number | No. 71S03-9211-CR-914,71S03-9211-CR-914 |
Citation | 603 N.E.2d 152 |
Parties | Marlo A. STANEK, Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee. |
Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Anthony V. Luber, South Bend, for appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Preston W. Black, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for appellee.
This cause comes to us on a petition to transfer from the Third District Court of Appeals. Following a jury trial in September, 1990, appellant, Marlo A. Stanek, was convicted of Count I, operating a motor vehicle after driving privileges are forfeited for life, a class C felony, Ind.Code 9-12-3-2 (repealed by P.L.2-1991, Sec. 109) (current version at I.C. 9-30-10-17); and Count II, habitual offender, I.C. 35-50-2-8. Appellant received a four (4) year sentence on Count I, which sentence was enhanced by twenty (20) years for being a habitual offender. A divided Court of Appeals affirmed. Stanek v. State (1992), Ind.App., 587 N.E.2d 736. We now grant transfer and affirm appellant's conviction on Count I, but reverse the habitual offender determination and remand for resentencing.
The facts most favorable to the judgment are as follows: At approximately 2:30 a.m. on January 19, 1990, St. Joseph county police officers observed a speeding automobile. When the officers stopped the vehicle, they observed appellant, the driver of the car, switch places with the back seat passenger. The officers determined that appellant's driving privileges had been forfeited for life and placed him under arrest.
Appellant raises seven issues in his petition for transfer: (1) denial of motion for continuance in order to challenge prior convictions; (2) proportionality of sentence; (3) suspendability of habitual offender enhancement; (4) admissibility of driving record at habitual offender phase; (5) admission of portions of driving record at guilt phase over relevancy and variance objections; (6) admissibility of advisement of guilty plea consequences for a prior conviction; and (7) sufficiency of the evidence. Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 11(B)(3) we adopt and incorporate the opinion of the Court of Appeals with respect to Issues 1 and 3-7, and vacate that portion of the opinion upholding appellant's twenty-four year sentence.
Appellant was convicted of operating a motor vehicle after his driving privileges were forfeited for life, pursuant to I.C. 9-12-3-2. Article 12 was that part of the motor vehicles law entitled "Habitual Violators of Traffic Laws," now found at I.C. 9-30-10. The structure of the statute first provides for a suspension of driving privileges for up to ten years for being a habitual traffic violator, I.C. 9-12-2-1, then makes it a class D felony to drive while privileges are suspended or in violation of probation, I.C. 9-12-3-1. Conviction for a class D felony under that section also results in a forfeiture of driving privileges for life. Finally, operating a motor vehicle while privileges are forfeited for life results in conviction of a class C felony, I.C. 9-12-3-2.
In reviewing a statute, ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
1997 -NMSC- 10, State v. Anaya
... ... Cf. Freeman v. State, 658 N.E.2d 68 (Ind.1995) (no enhancement under general habitual substance offender statute of repeat conviction for operating a vehicle while intoxicated) with Stanek v. State, 603 N.E.2d 152 (Ind.1992) (no enhancement under general habitual offender statute for conviction of habitual traffic law violator). See also Lawson v. State, 295 Ark. 37, 746 S.W.2d 544 (1988); State v. Chapman, 205 Neb. 368, 287 N.W.2d 697 (1980). However, the language of the statute ... ...
-
Conrad v. State
...habitual offender statute may be used to enhance the sentence of a defendant convicted of his or her third felony. In Stanek v. State, 603 N.E.2d 152 (Ind.1992), it held a Class C felony conviction for operating a motor vehicle after a lifetime revocation of driving privileges could not be ......
-
Dye v. State
...superseded, Pub. L. No. 96–1996, § 8, 1996 Ind. Acts 1725, 1731 (codified as amended at Ind.Code § 35–50–2–10 (2008)); Stanek v. State, 603 N.E.2d 152, 153–54 (Ind.1992). But double enhancements are permissible when there is explicit legislative direction authorizing them. See, e.g., Beldon......
-
Baxter v. State
...was denied retroactive application in Williams v. State, 601 N.E.2d 347, 348 (Ind.Ct.App.1992), trans. denied. Application of Stanek v. State, 603 N.E.2d 152 (Ind.1992), holding that the State may not seek an habitual offender enhancement under the general habitual offender statute for habi......