Stanfill v. Mountain

Decision Date03 December 2009
Docket NumberNo. M2006-01072-SC-R11-CV.,M2006-01072-SC-R11-CV.
Citation301 S.W.3d 179
PartiesRobin Lee STANFILL et al. v. John T. MOUNTAIN et al.
CourtTennessee Supreme Court

John E. Herbison, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellants, Robin Lee Stanfill and Robyn Ann Stanfill.

Scott C. Williams and Rhonda A. Scott, Nashville, Tennessee, for the appellees, John T. Mountain and Melony Mountain.

David A. Bates and C. Nicholas Fossett, Tennessee, for the appellee, Carl Brooks.

OPINION

SHARON G. LEE, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which CORNELIA A. CLARK, GARY R. WADE, and WILLIAM C. KOCH, JR., JJ., joined. JANICE M. HOLDER, C.J., filed a separate opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part.

The buyers of real property brought this action against the sellers and the real estate agent after discovering numerous allegedly dangerous and defective conditions in the house and on the property. The issue in this case is the propriety of the trial court's grant of summary judgment to the defendants. After review, we conclude that there are no genuine issues of material fact and the defendants are entitled to judgment as a matter of law on the plaintiffs' claims regarding the alleged mold infestation of the house, and that Mrs. Mountain is entitled to summary judgment on the plaintiffs' claim regarding the underground fuel storage tanks. As to the remainder of the plaintiffs' claims, we conclude that summary judgment was improper because the plaintiffs met their burden in establishing the existence of several genuine issues of material fact. We affirm in part and reverse in part the trial court's judgment and remand for further proceedings.

I. Background and Procedural History

On June 19, 1999, the Defendants, John T. Mountain and Melony Mountain, entered into an agreement for the sale of their real property in Maury County, Tennessee, to the Plaintiffs, Robin Lee Stanfill and Robyn Ann Stanfill. Prior to closing, the Mountains completed a residential property condition disclosure form indicating that they were not aware of any significant defects or malfunctions in the house. Defendant Carl Brooks, a realtor, worked for the Mountains in the transaction, but also testified that he served as a facilitator.1 The sale closed on August 2, 1999.

The Plaintiffs alleged that Mrs. Stanfill and their two young daughters began experiencing health problems shortly after moving into the house. The children suffered frequent high fevers, diarrhea, and vomiting. Following numerous trips to the doctor, the children were tested for lead poisoning in the spring of 2000, and the results indicated a high level of lead in their bodies. The Stanfills also allegedly discovered defects in the house, including mold contamination and structural problems, as well as defects in the septic system. The Stanfills had the house tested by an environmental firm, and the results revealed the presence of lead-based paint and a toxic mold infestation in the house. The Stanfills also discovered old underground fuel storage tanks located approximately fifteen feet from a well that the Stanfills used for their swimming pool, irrigation, and other outside uses on the farm. Subsequent testing of the well water revealed that it was contaminated with unacceptably high levels of lead and several other metals.

In February of 2001, the Stanfills filed for bankruptcy. In May of 2001, they moved out of the house. On June 14, 2004,2 the Stanfills filed this action alleging intentional and/or negligent misrepresentation by the Defendants, in that they allegedly knew of the defects in the property, including the underground fuel storage tanks, and concealed or misrepresented the true condition of the property on the residential property condition disclosure form and in discussions prior to the sale. The Stanfills also alleged that the Defendants violated the Tennessee Consumer Protection Act ("TCPA") and failed to provide the Stanfills a lead disclosure statement or lead hazard information pamphlet as required by 42 U.S.C. § 4852d.

All the Defendants moved for summary judgment. In support of his summary judgment motion, Mr. Brooks filed his affidavit, copies of the Tennessee Residential Property Condition Disclosure and Lead Paint Disclosure forms, the report of the results from the environmental testing of the well water, and excerpts from the depositions of Dr. Roy Dallas Crowder and Mrs. Stanfill. In support of their summary judgment motion, the Mountains filed their affidavits, the property condition and lead paint disclosure documents and well water test results, and the depositions of Dr. Crowder and of Mr. and Mrs. Stanfill.

In response, the Stanfills filed their depositions, the depositions of several of the Mountains' neighbors, the deposition of geologist Christopher Ian Barrett, the affidavit of geologist Mark Quarles, and portions of the depositions of Mr. Brooks and Dr. Crowder to support their assertion that genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. The trial court entered an order and memorandum opinion on April 18, 2006, granting summary judgment in favor of the Defendants on all of the Stanfills' claims. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's judgment. Stanfill v. Mountain, No. M2006-01072-COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 427281 (Tenn.Ct.App. Feb.12, 2008). We granted the Plaintiffs' application for permission to appeal to review the grant of summary judgment in favor of the Defendants.3

II. Analysis
A. Summary Judgment Standard

Summary judgment is appropriate only when the moving party can demonstrate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 56.04; Hannan v. Alltel Publ'g Co., 270 S.W.3d 1, 5 (Tenn.2008); Byrd v. Hall, 847 S.W.2d 208, 214 (Tenn.1993). In Hannan, this Court reaffirmed the basic principles guiding Tennessee courts in determining whether a motion for summary judgment should be granted, stating:

The moving party has the ultimate burden of persuading the court that "there are no disputed, material facts creating a genuine issue for trial ... and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 215. If the moving party makes a properly supported motion, the burden of production then shifts to the nonmoving party to show that a genuine issue of material fact exists. Id.

. . .

[I]n Tennessee, a moving party who seeks to shift the burden of production to the nonmoving party who bears the burden of proof at trial must either: (1) affirmatively negate an essential element of the nonmoving party's claim; or (2) show that the nonmoving party cannot prove an essential element of the claim at trial.

Hannan, 270 S.W.3d at 5, 8-9. It is insufficient for the moving party to "merely point to omissions in the nonmoving party's proof and allege that the nonmoving party cannot prove the element at trial." Id. at 10. "Similarly, the presentation of evidence that raises doubts about the nonmoving party's ability to prove his or her claim is also insufficient." Martin v. Norfolk S. Ry. Co., 271 S.W.3d 76, 84 (Tenn. 2008).

The standard by which our courts must assess the evidence presented in support of, and in opposition to, a motion for summary judgment is also well established:

Courts must view the evidence and all reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Robinson v. Omer, 952 S.W.2d 423, 426 (Tenn.1997). A grant of summary judgment is appropriate only when the facts and the reasonable inferences from those facts would permit a reasonable person to reach only one conclusion. Staples v. CBL & Assocs., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 83, 89 (Tenn.2000). In making that assessment, this Court must discard all countervailing evidence. Byrd, 847 S.W.2d at 210-11.

Giggers v. Memphis Housing Auth., 277 S.W.3d 359, 364 (Tenn.2009). "Because the resolution of a motion for summary judgment is a matter of law, we review the trial court's judgment de novo with no presumption of correctness." Martin, 271 S.W.3d at 84.

Applying these principles to the evidence presented by the parties in this case, we address each issue in turn.

B. Fraudulent Concealment Claims

The Stanfills' claims regarding the mold infestation and underground fuel storage tanks4 are grounded in the theory of fraudulent concealment. This Court has observed that "[t]he tort of fraudulent concealment is committed when a party who has a duty to disclose a known fact or condition fails to do so, and another party reasonably relies upon the resulting misrepresentation, thereby suffering injury." Chrisman v. Hill Home Dev., Inc., 978 S.W.2d 535, 538-39 (Tenn.1998) (emphasis added); accord Simmons v. Evans, 185 Tenn. 282, 206 S.W.2d 295, 296 (1947). The Chrisman Court recognized that "an essential element of the tort" is knowledge — in the case of a house sale, the buyer must show, among other things, that the seller had knowledge of the defective condition. Chrisman, 978 S.W.2d at 539.

Both Mr. Brooks and the Mountains presented evidence that negated the element of knowledge regarding the mold infestation of the house, thus shifting the burden to the Stanfills to respond with evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact on the mold claims, which the Stanfills failed to do in this case. Regarding the claim that the Defendants fraudulently concealed the existence of the old underground storage tanks, both Mr. Brooks and the Mountains again presented evidence that negated the element of knowledge, thus shifting the burden to the Stanfills to respond with evidence creating a genuine issue of material fact. The Stanfills presented evidence that successfully creates a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Mr. Mountain had knowledge of the tanks, but the evidence was insufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether Mrs. Mountain and Mr. Brooks knew of the tanks....

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