Stanford Land Co. v. Steidle

• Decision Date: 21 March 1902
• Citation: Stanford Land Co. v. Steidle, 28 Wash. 72, 68 P. 178 (Wash. 1902)
• Court: Washington Supreme Court
• Parties: STANFORD LAND CO. v. STEIDLE et al.

68 P. 178

28 Wash. 72

STANFORD LAND CO. v. STEIDLE et al.

Supreme Court of Washington

March 21, 1902

Appeal from superior court, Suohomish county; John C. Denney, Judge.

Action by the Stanford Land Company against Louis Steidle and another. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Herbert E. Snook, for appellants.

Francis H. Brownell, for respondent.

WHITE J.

Respondent commenced an action of unlawful detainer against the appellants to recover a parcel of land described as follows 'The land actually occupied by R. L. McKenzie's old house, north of Johanna McKenzie's new house. Said house is about thirty rods southeast of the old Kromer house, on an unrecorded plat of lands south of Wall street and west of Rucker avenue, known as the 'Kromer Tract,' in the city of Everett, Snohomish county, Washington.' Respondent alleged that it was a corporation, and set forth an abstract of its title to the land. The only allegation of notice to quit, or demand for the surrender of the premises is as follows: 'That plaintiff has made demand upon the defendant that he quit and vacate said premises, and defendant has refused and still refuses so to do.' Respondent show in its complaint that the manner in which appellants were in possession of the land was as follows: 'That on December 1, 1899, the Everett Land Company and W. J. and B. J. Rucker, the then owners of the land hereinafter described, leased the same to R. L. McKenzie for a period of one month, or until the 1st day of January 1900; that said R. L. McKenzie duly assigned the said lease to this defendant, Louis Steidle, who, on the expiration of said lease, continued to remain in possession of the said land.' Appellants demurred to the complaint on the ground that the same did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action. The court overruled the demurrer. The appellants then filed their answer, admitting that the land described in the complaint was leased to R. L. McKenzie for a period of one month, or until the 1st day of January, 1890 and that said R. L. McKenzie assigned the said lease to the defendant Louis Steidle, who, on the expiration of said lease, continued to remain in possession of the said land. Then follows a description of the land as above set out. Appellants set up an affirmative defense, and asked for the specific performance of a verbal agreement to convey, and prayed that the respondent be decreed to specifically perform the agreement set up by the appellants. It is not material to set out this agreement, considering the shape which the action assumed at the trial. After the respondent had introduced its testimony, appellants moved to dismiss the action upon the ground and for the reason that respondent has offered ono proof that it was a corporation, though its corporate existence was denied by the answer, and for the further reason that no written notice had ever been served upon either of said appellants of termination of tenancy, requiring them to vacate and surrender said premises, and that it did not appear that any notice of any kind had been served upon said appellants 20 days prior to any day for the payment of the rent. The court denied this motion. Appellants elected to stand on their motion to dismiss, whereupon the court directed the jury to render a verdict in favor of respondent and for recovery of said premises, and judgment was thereafter rendered and entered pursuant to the verdict. From this judgment appellants prosecute this appeal, assigning as error and refusal of the court to dismiss the action, and the overruling of appellants' demurrer to respondent's complaint.

The points urged by appellants may be grouped under four heads: (1) The alleged insufficient description of the premises; (2) lack of an allegation in the complaint that the appellants unlawfully and wrongfully kept possession of the premises; (3) the alleged insufficiency of the notice to vacate; (4) the alleged failure of the respondent to prove its corporate character. The complaint alleges unlawful detainer by the appellants after the expiration of a written lease. The complaint described the land as it is described in the lease. Appellants do not point out wherein this description is insufficient. The state, county, and city are given, and also the streets which bound the small plot leased, which is described as the land actually occupied by a certain house, of which the appellants are in possession. Any one, by taking the complaint or lease, could go to within a few feet of the exact house, and there find out which was 'R. L. McKenzie's old house,' or he could go to within a few feet of the plot, and ascertain what house was occupied by the appellants. The description seems to have been amply sufficient to enable appellants to know of what to take possession, and ought then to be sufficient for them to know what to vacate.

Appellants complain because the complaint contains no allegation that appellants unlawfully and wrongfully kept possession of the premises. It is true that there is no distinct allegation to that effect. Nor is any such necessary. The lease provided specifically that the tenancy should expire on the 1st day of January, 1900. Section 5527, subd. 1, 2 Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St., provides that a person is guilty of an unlawful detainer when he holds over or continues in possession after the expiration of the specific term for which real property is let to him. The complaint distinctly alleges that the appellants did remain in possession after the specified term of the lease. It was not necessary to allege anything more. To...