Stanford v. Iowa State Reformatory

• Decision Date: 30 May 1979
• Docket Number: No. 60201,60201
• Citation: 279 N.W.2d 28
• Parties: Jerome LeRoy STANFORD, Appellant, v. The IOWA STATE REFORMATORY, Anamosa, Iowa, Calvin Auger, Warden, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 28

279 N.W.2d 28

Jerome LeRoy STANFORD, Appellant, v. The IOWA STATE REFORMATORY, Anamosa, Iowa, Calvin Auger, Warden, Appellee.

No. 60201.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

May 30, 1979.

W. H. Gilliam of Mattson & Gilliam, P. C., Waterloo, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Lona J. Hansen, Asst. Atty. Gen., and David H. Correll, County Atty., for appellee.

Considered by REYNOLDSON, C. J., and REES, McCORMICK, McGIVERIN and LARSON, JJ.

REES, Justice.

This case is another in a series of appeals arising from convictions for drug-related offenses in the Black Hawk District Court, all of which arose from the use by the prosecution of an informant, one Roosevelt Nabors. See Howard v. State, 248 N.W.2d 108 (Iowa 1976), and State v. Johnson, 219 N.W.2d 690 (Iowa 1974). The appellant, Jerome LeRoy Stanford, was convicted in 1973 of having made an alleged sale of heroin to Nabors. In 1975 Stanford filed his application for post-conviction relief pursuant to chapter 663A, The Code, 1975. The trial court denied relief and upon appeal that ruling was affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Stanford then successfully petitioned this court for further review of the decision of the Court of Appeals.

In his application, Stanford asserted the following grounds for relief:

(1) The trial court erred in refusing to permit Stanford to reopen his case to pursue and present potential evidence regarding Nabors' alleged implication of innocent persons while he was acting as an informant in the state of Michigan.

(2) The prosecution at the original trial withheld "exculpatory evidence" from the defense, i. e., evidence that Nabors had implicated innocent persons in Michigan drug prosecutions.

(3) The dismissal of criminal charges against Nabors approximately one year after Stanford's trial constitutes "newly discovered evidence" justifying the granting of a new trial. These arguments, which were rejected by the trial court, arose in the following context. After the close of evidence in Stanford's 1973 trial, but before the case was submitted to the jury, Stanford made a motion to reopen his case, contending he had just learned, through a Michigan newspaper article, of Nabors' allegedly unreliable performance as an informant in Michigan. Stanford's counsel requested time to pursue and present evidence on the subject of Nabors' purported implication of innocent persons in Michigan. The trial court denied Stanford's motion.

Stanford filed a direct appeal from his conviction. On petition of Stanford's counsel, the appeal was dismissed as frivolous pursuant to former Supreme Court Rule 16, now Iowa Rule of Appellate Procedure 104. Stanford resisted the dismissal.

At the time Nabors testified against Stanford, charges of armed robbery and conspiracy were pending against him in Black Hawk County. In 1974, more than a year after Stanford's conviction, the charges against Nabors were dismissed.

Stanford perfected a timely appeal from the denial of postconviction relief. After the case was transferred to the Court of Appeals, a limited remand was ordered. The district court was directed to conduct an in camera examination, in the presence of counsel for the State and Stanford, of the Department of Public Safety records regarding Nabors, and to render supplemental findings determining whether the prosecution had possessed evidence about Nabors which was exculpatory to Stanford, and whether Nabors' testimony was secured in whole or in part by an agreement not to prosecute the charges pending against Nabors. The district court found nothing in the record to indicate that Nabors had testified in return for an agreement not to prosecute him, or that the State had possessed and withheld evidence exculpatory to Stanford. In conducting the examination, the court did not allow counsel to view the records due to the ongoing nature of the investigations relating to the content of the files and the literal language of the remand order, but did describe their content as he reviewed the files. Stanford excepted to this procedure.

The Court of Appeals affirmed the denial of post-conviction relief, with two judges dissenting. We then granted Stanford's petition for further review. The particular rulings of the Court of Appeals will be discussed under the relevant issue headings.

The following issues are presented for review:

(1) In conducting the in camera examination on remand, did the trial court err in viewing the relevant files in the presence of counsel without their active participation in the process?

(2) Does the record disclose the State possessed and withheld evidence from Stanford regarding Nabors' performance as an informant in Michigan?

(3) Did the dismissal of charges pending against Nabors constitute "newly discovered evidence" justifying or mandating post-conviction relief?

(4) Is Stanford barred from raising the issue of the denial of his motion to reopen testimony to introduce further evidence due to the dismissal of his direct appeal pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 16?

(5) If Stanford is not so barred, did the trial court err in not permitting Stanford to reopen his case to pursue and present evidence regarding Nabors' purported accusation and implication of innocent persons in Michigan?

As a preliminary matter, we note that one seeking post-conviction relief is required to establish the facts asserted by a preponderance of the evidence. Watts v. State, 257 N.W.2d 70, 71 (Iowa 1977). If the trial court's findings of fact in support of its judgment denying post-conviction relief are supported by substantial evidence and are justified as a matter of law, the reviewing court will not disturb the judgment. Benton v. State,199 N.W.2d 56, 57 (Iowa 1972). Where there is an alleged violation of a constitutional safeguard, we will make our own evaluation of the totality of the circumstances under which the post-conviction court ruling was made. State v. Lemburg, 257 N.W.2d 39, 45 (Iowa 1977).

I. Because it involves the adequacy of the record for this appeal, we will first address the issue of the manner in which the trial court conducted its in camera inspection of the Department of Safety files concerning Roosevelt Nabors, as directed by the Court of Appeals. The hearing was held in the presence of counsel for the State and Stanford, but without their direct participation. The presiding judge orally described the contents of the files and allowed Stanford's counsel to have copies of those items which counsel thought might be of benefit to the petitioner. Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals held that the State did not have to show the files to be privileged to preclude full participation by counsel in the inspection, and that no error resulted. We agree.

The question of the extent of participation by counsel in in camera examinations of documents has been considered several times by this court. State v. Deanda, 218 N.W.2d 649, 651 (Iowa 1974); State v. Mayhew, 170 N.W.2d 608, 614 (Iowa 1969). In State v. Deanda, at 651 of 218 N.W.2d, we said:

Defendant urges his attorney should have been allowed at the hearing to examine the materials themselves in order to participate as counsel in the judge's determination of whether the materials should be made available. It must be conceded an accused may feel little profit to him in the privilege of having his lawyer present while the judge examines police records. It should also be observed there would often be no harm in allowing defense counsel to actively participate in the examination. On the other hand the trial judge has the task of balancing the interests of the accused and the interests of the law enforcement agencies. In some cases the safety of an informer might be involved. At hearings where the trial court declines to allow defense counsel to view the materials the presence of such counsel can nevertheless satisfy any defendant's fear as to the integrity of the record for any later appeal.

Absent a showing of abuse of discretion, a trial court will not be held to have erred in making such a determination.

Here Stanford sought access to the files of the Bureau of Criminal Investigation concerning or mentioning the informant Nabors. Included were files relating to suspected drug traffickers, as well as general data concerning the drug situation in the Waterloo vicinity. Due to the fact that information concerning ongoing police investigations was contained in the files, the trial court operated well within the permissible range of its discretion. We note with approval the manner in which the hearing was conducted; the presiding judge describing the references to Nabors in the documents and making available to counsel those documents in which counsel expressed interest. Such accommodation is consistent with, if not beyond, that required by the federal Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. 3500, ¹ and does much to further the interests of both the State and the defendant.

As we find no error in the court's hearing on remand, we now proceed to a consideration of the merits of petitioner's remaining contentions.

II. Stanford contends the prosecution and state law enforcement officials withheld requested exculpatory evidence from him and his counsel. Specifically he contends that the prosecution and the Bureau of Criminal Investigation knew of Nabors' history of having allegedly implicated innocent people when working as an informant in Michigan. It is clear that withholding exculpatory evidence, regardless of the good or bad faith of the prosecution, is a violation of due process "where the evidence is material either to guilt or to punishment," Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87, 83 S.Ct. 1194, 1196-97, 10 L.Ed.2d 215, 218 (1963); State v. Peterson, 219 N.W.2d 665, 674 (Iowa 1974).

Stanford contends the State knew or should have known of Nabors' alleged Michigan misconduct and failed to produce such information on request. The trial court and the Court of Appeals found that the...