Stanford v. McLean Trucking Co.
| Citation | 506 F. Supp. 1252 |
| Decision Date | 23 January 1981 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. M-79-110-CA. |
| Parties | Reid STANFORD et al. v. McLEAN TRUCKING CO. et al. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas |
Doyle Curry of Jones, Jones & Baldwin, Marshall, Tex., for plaintiffs and intervenors.
Norman Russell of Atchley, Russell, Waldroup & Hlavinka, Texarkana, Tex., for defendants.
This is an action for damages under the Texas Wrongful Death Act, the Texas Survival Statute, and the Texas common law of negligence, brought in the Eastern District of Texas, Marshall Division, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1332.
On July 17, 1978, in Mexia, Texas, a car driven by Connie Crook, with passengers Rebecca Stanford and Holly Crook, was struck from the rear by a loaded tanker truck owned and operated by Defendants McLean Trucking Company and Herrin Petroleum Transport Equipment Corporation. The car was pushed a substantial distance down the highway and into a used car lot, crushing the car against the vehicles in the car lot and under the loaded tanker truck. As a result of this accident, all persons within the car were killed and property damage resulted to several vehicles in the car lot.
Plaintiff Reid Stanford contends he is entitled to damages for the wrongful death of his wife, Rebecca Stanford. He further claims that, as beneficiary of her estate, he is entitled to damages for the conscious pain, suffering and mental anguish suffered by her from the time of the impact until the time of her death; Plaintiff Lee Roy Crook contends he is entitled, individually and as next friend of the deceased's surviving daughter Kelly Crook, to damages for the wrongful death of his wife Connie Crook. He further claims that, as beneficiary of her estate and as next friend of Kelly Crook, he is entitled to damages for the conscious pain, suffering and mental anguish suffered by her from the time of the impact until the time of her death; Intervenors Dennis Fowler and James West contend they are entitled to recover under the Texas common law of negligence for damage to various vehicles.
Defendants McLean Trucking Company and Herrin Petroleum Transport Equipment Corporation stipulated jurisdiction, venue and liability. In consideration for such stipulation, Plaintiffs renounced any claim for punitive damages arising by reason of alleged conduct claimed to constitute gross negligence. All parties agreed to withdraw the case from the jury docket and try the case before the Court.
There remain only two questions for the Court to decide: (1) whether the deaths of Connie Crook, Holly Crook and Rebecca Stanford were instantaneous, or if such deaths occurred significantly later than the moment of impact, thus, giving rise to a cause of action for the conscious pain, suffering and mental anguish of the deceased; and (2) the amount of damages to be awarded to each of the Plaintiffs and Intervenors.
There are three distinct causes of action involved in this case. The first is a cause of action arising under the Texas common law of negligence. The second is a cause of action arising under the Texas Wrongful Death Act. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 4671-78 (Vernon's 1952 & supp. 1979). The third is a cause of action arising under the Texas Survival Statute. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat. Ann. art. 5525 (Vernon's 1952).
The action brought by Intervenors Dennis Fowler and James West arises under the Texas common law of negligence. Such Intervenors seek recovery for damage to five vehicles in their car lot due to the accident. Evidence of such damage was not significantly controverted by the Defendants. The Court finds that such Intervenors sustained property damage in the amount of $15,775.00 as a result of the negligence of the Defendants.
Under the Texas Wrongful Death Act, beneficiaries, which include the surviving husband, wife, children and parents of the deceased, may recover damages proportionate to the injury resulting from the death. Tex.Rev.Civ.Stat.Ann. art. 4675 § 4677 (Vernon's 1952). Damages in a wrongful death action are not limited to money, but include things that can be valued in money. Gill v. United States, 285 F.Supp. 253 (E.D.Tex.1968), affirmed in part, reversed in part on other grounds, 429 F.2d 1072 (5th Cir. 1970), appeal after remand, 449 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1971). Such damages are assessed according to the present value of anticipated benefits. Miller v. Alexandria Truck Lines, Inc., 273 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1960), opinion corrected, reh. denied, 274 F.2d 942 (5th Cir. 1960).
Generally, under the Texas Survival Statute and the Texas Wrongful Death Act, beneficiaries are allowed to recover for the pain and suffering of the deceased, medical expenses, funeral expenses, and property damage resulting from the collision. Mosier v. American Motors Corporation, 303 F.Supp. 44 (S.D.Tex.1967), affirmed, 414 F.2d 34 (5th Cir. 1967). Beneficiaries under the statute may also recover for pecuniary benefits which they might reasonably have expected to receive had the wrongful death not occurred. Simpson v. United States, 322 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1963).
The evolution of the role of a woman as an economic contributor or producer of income in our society is quite evident by the facts of this case. It is also evident that such evolution has not always eroded other traditional role functions and did not in this case. Household services, counsel, guidance and nurture performed in these families were not diminished.
The Court's view of the impact in our modern society of the loss of a wife and mother must, in order to do justice, encompass an appreciation for this dual role to fairly and reasonably compensate her beneficiaries.
Under Texas law, the only pain and suffering for which there can be recovery on behalf of the deceased is that which the deceased consciously experienced. Events that occurred subsequent to unconsciousness cannot prolong nor increase suffering and are not compensable. Sharpe v. Munoz, 256 S.W.2d 890 (Tex.Civ.App. — San Antonio 1953, writ ref. n. r. e.); Burrous v. Knotts, 482 S.W.2d 358 (Tex.Civ.App. — Tyler 1972, no writ). There is no award for pain and suffering where the deceased was immediately rendered unconscious as a result of the injuries. Mpiliris v. Hellenic Lines, Ltd., 323 F.Supp. 865 (S.D.Tex.1969), affirmed, 440 F.2d 1163 (5th Cir. 1971). Furthermore, where the immediacy of the occurrence and the absence of other evidence renders too speculative a finding that the decedent consciously suffered pain, an award for pain and suffering is improper. In re Dearborn Marine Service, Inc., 499 F.2d 263 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 886 (1975).
In the instant case a bystander heard a scream emanating from inside the car which was being carried on the front of the Defendant's truck after impact as it was pushed passed him. It was impossible to recognize the voice or to attribute it to a particular occupant of the vehicle. While such evidence certainly supports conscious suffering, it introduces such speculation that, in the Court's opinion, there is insufficient evidence to support Plaintiffs' claim of damages for conscious pain, suffering and mental anguish of the deceased. Evidence of the force of the impact is such that it is more likely than not that the deceased experienced immediate or nearly immediate loss of consciousness. Therefore, Plaintiffs' claim for damages for the conscious pain, suffering and mental anguish of the deceased is denied.
Since Rebecca Stanford, Connie Crook and Holly Crook were killed in the accident, no medical expenses were incurred.
Funeral expenses, which were not controverted, equaled $2,490.00 for the burial of Connie and Holly Crook and $2,468.00 for the burial of Rebecca Stanford.
In determining the loss of future earnings, several factors can be considered, including the decedents' future plans, work-life expectancy, annual earnings before death, health, diligence, aptitudes, work habits in general, and the prospects for advancement. See In re Sincere Navigation Corp., 329 F.Supp. 652 (E.D.La. 1971), affirmed in part, vacated in part on other grounds, 529 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1976). Though the earning capacity of the decedent is not the sole basis for damages in a wrongful death action, an estimate of the decedent's future earnings based on the decedent's past earnings is a primary element of such an award. Dover Corp. v. Perez, 587 S.W.2d 761 (Tex.Civ.App. — Corpus Christi 1979, writ ref. n. r. e.); Simpson v. United States, supra.
According to estimates presented by the Plaintiffs' economist, decedent Connie Crook would have earned an amount equal to $11,011.00 during the period from the date of death to the date of trial and an amount equal to $243,657.00 subsequent to the date of trial. Such estimates further reveal that decedent Rebecca Stanford would have earned an amount equal to $11,796.00 during the period from the date of death to the date of trial and an amount equal to $274,485.00 subsequent to the date of trial.
The term "pecuniary benefits" is quite broad and it encompasses many elements. In measuring the amount of damages for loss of pecuniary benefits, the courts consider not only loss of financial benefits, but also loss of elements that can be valued in money, including the reasonable pecuniary value of counsel, protection, advice, services, care and attention. Camco Inc. v. Evans, 377 S.W.2d 703, 708 (Tex.Civ. App. — San Antonio 1963, writ ref. n. r. e.); Rideaux v. Lykes Bros. S. S. Co., 285 F.Supp. 153 (S.D.Tex.1968).
In addition to compensation for the loss of the decedent spouse's counsel and guidance, the surviving spouse is entitled to the value of the decedent spouse's services in the home. Simpson v. United States, supra. Estimates presented by the Plaintiffs'...
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