Stanford v. Northmont City Schs.
| Decision Date | 08 February 2023 |
| Docket Number | 3:19-cv-399 |
| Parties | SHARON STANFORD, et al., Plaintiffs, v. NORTHMONT CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
SHARON STANFORD, et al., Plaintiffs,
v.
NORTHMONT CITY SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Defendants.
No. 3:19-cv-399
United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Western Division, Dayton
February 8, 2023
ORDER: (1) GRANTING DEFENDANTS' MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT (Doc. No. 99) ON ALL FEDERAL CLAIMS; (2) DISMISSING WITHOUT PREJUDICE PLAINTIFFS' REMAINING STATE LAW CLAIM FOR LACK OF SUPPLEMENTAL JURISDICTION; AND (3) TERMINATING THIS CASE ON THE DOCKET
Hon. Michael J. Newman, United States District Judge.
This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 civil rights case concerns two local high school students suspended for ten days (but not expelled) by Northmont High School for violating the school's marijuana policy.[1]The two high school students-both of whom are African American, minors, and referred to here by their initials, J.S. and J.E.-claim, inter alia, that they were unconstitutionally searched in violation of the Fourth Amendment and on account of their race, and wrongly suspended. J.S., J.E., and their parents-also named as Plaintiffs in this lawsuit-name as Defendants the Northmont City School District (“School District”), and Northmont High School's Assistant Principal James Chad Kaltenbach (“Kaltenbach”). Now before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment. Doc. No. 99. Plaintiffs, through counsel, responded in opposition. Doc. No. 102. Defendants replied, Doc. No. 103, and this matter is ripe for review. For the reasons that follow, the Court, having carefully reviewed the undisputed facts of this matter, finds in favor of
Defendants on the federal claims pled here, and dismisses without prejudice the sole remaining state law claim.
I.
A. Undisputed Facts
1. J.S.'s Suspension
The School District, in its student handbook for Northmont High School, forbids students from “com[ing] to school . . . with the smell of . . . marijuana on his/her breath/person.” Doc. No. 99-1 at PageID 2519. The punishment for violating this provision is a ten-day suspension.[2] Id.
J.S. was in ninth grade at Northmont High School on February 19, 2019. Doc. No. 61 at PageID 1473. That day, he missed the bus and rode to school in a car with friends, all Northmont High School students. Id. Once J.S. arrived at Northmont High School, Kaltenbach received a report from a secretary that he and his friends smelled like marijuana. Doc. No. 91 at PageID 2089; Doc. No. 99-2 at PageID 2522.
Kaltenbach-right after a second teacher told him that J.S. smelled like marijuana-went to J.S.'s classroom and called him into his office. Doc. No. 61 at PageID 1475; Doc. No. 91 at PagelD 2089-90; Doc. No. 98 at PagelD 2244. In his office, Kaltenbach explained to J.S. the allegations and then told him to empty his backpack and pockets. Doc. No. 91 at PageID 2091. Kaltenbach testified at his deposition that he “clearly” smelled marijuana on J.S. before he began the search. Id. He sniffed J.S.'s left hand and found that it smelled like marijuana; he further called a school resource officer into the office to sniff J.S.'s hand. Doc. No. 61 at PageID 1476, 1477; Doc. No. 89 at PageID 2041; Doc. No. 98 at PageID 2226. That officer agreed. Doc. No.
98 at PageID 2226.
Kaltenbach next asked J.S. to explain why he smelled like marijuana. Id. at PageID 2225. J.S. refused to speak with him. Id. Kaltenbach then called J.S.'s father, explained the situation, and had J.S. wait in his office until J.S.'s father arrived. Id.; Doc. No. 61 at PageID 1477; Doc. No. 99-1 at PageID 2518, 2521.
Once J.S.'s father arrived, Kaltenbach informed J.S. that he was suspended for ten days for violating Northmont High School's marijuana policy. Doc. No. 98 at PageID 2226; Doc. No. 991 at PageID 2518, 2521. J.S.'s suspension paperwork, as Kaltenbach explained to him, listed his right to appeal the suspension to the School District's Board of Education. Doc. No. 98 at PageID 2226; Doc. No. 99-1 at PageID 2521.
2. J.E.'s Suspension
J.E. was in tenth grade at Northmont High School on January 22, 2020. Doc. No. 85 at PageID 1871.[3]That day, Assistant Principal Teresa Dillon (“Dillon”) received a call from two teachers who, after receiving comments from other students, told her that J.E. smelled like marijuana. Doc. No. 85 at PagelD 1873-74; Doc. No. 90 at PagelD 2060; Doc. No. 98 at PagelD 2265. She called him to her office. Doc. No. 90 at PageID 2060. Once J.E. arrived at Dillon's office, she determined he smelled like marijuana. Id.; Doc. No. 98 at PageID 2265-66.
She began to search J.E.'s belongings-asking him to empty his backpack and pockets; lift up his pant legs; and take his shoes and socks off. Doc. No. 90 at PageID 2060. Like Kaltenbach, Dillon called over a school resource officer-along with Eric Hughes, a school administrator- who corroborated the smell. Id. Dillon called Kaltenbach to her office and he, too, noted that J.E.
smelled like marijuana. Id. at PageID 2069; Doc. No. 98 at PageID 2268. Kaltenbach also noted that J.E. was glassy-eyed. Doc. No. 90 at PageID 2069; Doc. No. 98 at PageID 2268. J.E. protested that he only smelled like marijuana because his stepfather smoked and alleged that his hand lotion was the source of the odor. Doc. No. 85 at PageID 1874. However, everyone in the office confirmed that J.E. smelled like marijuana, and Dillon would later testify that the “slight” smell of lotion did not overcome the marijuana smell nor his “glassy eye[d]” appearance. Doc. No. 90 at PageID 2060.
Dillon gave J.E. a ten-day suspension notice. Id. at PagelD 2060-61. She offered J.E. a chance to explain his “side of the story.” Doc. No. 98 at PageID 2263. Then, she called J.E.'s mother, and, after she arrived, explained to her the suspension and how J.E. could make up any missed assignments. Doc. No. 90 at PageID 2061.[4]
B. Procedural History
J.S. and J.E. appealed their suspensions in formal hearings, represented by counsel, to the Board of Education. See id. at PageID 2223, 2259. Both lost their appeals, so they appealed those decisions to the Montgomery County, Ohio Common Pleas Court. See Doc. Nos. 99-2, 99-3. The state trial court found that neither suspension violated the two students' constitutional rights, but found the cases moot. See Doc. No. 99-2 at PageID 2529-32; Doc. No. 99-3 at PageID 2541-42. When J.S. appealed (but J.E. did not), the Second District Court of Appeals affirmed on mootness alone. See Stanford v. Northmont City Schs., No. 28884, 2021 WL 1054123, at *4 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2021).
J.S. and his parents filed suit here on December 23, 2019. Doc. No. 1. They added J.E.
and his mother as plaintiffs in their second amended complaint, filed on November 25, 2020. See Doc. No. 23. Their second amended complaint alleged state law claims against the City of Clayton, Ohio, but this Court recently dismissed those claims with prejudice. Doc. Nos. 23, 83. Now pending are Plaintiffs' remaining claims against Kaltenbach and the School District: (1) a § 1983 claim alleging the School District deprived J.S. and J.E. of their federal right to education through searching and suspending them; (2) Fourth Amendment claims, under the federal and Ohio constitutions, challenging the searches of J.S. and J.E.; (3) Due Process Clause claims challenging how J.S. and J.E. were suspended; (4) Title VI claims alleging racial discrimination in suspending J.S. and J.E. in comparison to white students-claims which rely on statistics, several incidents outside of the suspensions, and two potential comparators; (5) Equal Protection Clause claims, relying on the same allegations of race discrimination as the Title VI claims; and (6) a state law negligent supervision claim against the School District for mishandling its supervision of Kaltenbach in a manner that caused J.S. and J.E. harm. Doc. No. 23 at PagelD 617-30.
II.
“Summary judgment is only appropriate ‘if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.'” Keweenaw Bay Indian Cmty. v. Rising, 477 F.3d 881, 886 (6th Cir. 2007) (quoting Bennett v. City of Eastpointe, 410 F.3d 810, 817 (6th Cir. 2005)). Once “a motion for summary judgment is properly made and supported, an opposing party[.]” Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d 551, 558 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e)). Instead, the party opposing summary judgment has a shifting burden and “must-by affidavits or as otherwise provided in [Fed. R. Civ. P. 56]-set out specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial.” Id. The Court does not have to “search the entire record to establish that it is bereft of a genuine issue of material fact.”
Guarino v. Brookfield Twp. Trs., 980 F.2d 399, 404 (6th Cir. 1992) (citations omitted).
42 U.S.C. § 1983 allows citizens to sue for constitutional violations. See Wurzelbacher v. Jones-Kelley, 675 F.3d 580, 583 (6th Cir. 2012). To state a § 1983 claim, a plaintiff must: (1) allege the violation of a constitutional or federal right; and (2) show that the alleged deprivation was committed by a person acting under color of state law. West v. Atkins, 487 U.S. 42, 48 (1988).
“[Q]ualified immunity protects government officials ‘from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known.'” Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 231 (2009) (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982)). It shields “all but the plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, --- U.S. ---, 138 S.Ct. 577, 589 (2018). To defeat qualified immunity, a plaintiff must show “(1) that the official violated a statutory or constitutional right, and (2) that the right was ‘clearly established' at the time of the...
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